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Abstract
Rapid development of distributed computer systems in recent years has dramatically
increased the importance of cryptography. One of the main goals of cryptography is to
provide authenticity of the information. This thesis presents new results on unconditionally secure authentication systems.
T w o classes of enemy strategies are considered and new combinatorial bounds on
the enemy's probability of success are found. Necessary and sufficient conditions on the
incidence matrix of authentication codes with r-fold security are derived and used to
characterise these codes in terms of well-known combinatorial structures. A new concept of 'near-perfect protection' is introduced. It is shown that providing near-perfect
protection is a necessary condition for authentication codes that satisfy the best known
information-theoretic bounds with equality.
A classification of attacks depending on the goal of the attack and the information
available to the enemy is proposed. T w o new types of attacks, plaintext and chosencontent attacks, are investigated. Perfect and near-perfect protection for each type of
attack is defined and information-theoretic bounds on the probability of the enemy's
success are proved. Constructions of authentication codes that are resistant against these
attacks are proposed.
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Preface
Cryptology has been known for thousands of years. The word cryptography stems
from two Greek words meaning "hidden" and "word", and describes the entire area of
secret communication. Development of telecommunication and massive use of computer
networks with new services, such as electronic funds transfer and electronic mail, has
dramatically increased the potential areas of cryptographic applications. Cryptology can
be divided into cryptography and cryptanalysis.

The cryptographer tries to ensure the

secrecy and/or authenticity of messages. The cryptanalyst works in the opposite direction:
he/she tries to break the cipher and to obtain the message. The original message is called
the plaintext message or simply the plaintext. W e will also use the word message source,
or simply source, to refer to the plaintext. To hide the content of the message from the
enemy the sender encodes the plaintext. The encoded plaintext is called the ciphertext
message, or simply the ciphertext, or, very often, the cryptogram. To encode the plaintext
the sender uses a secret key which he/she chooses from a set of possible keys. He/she
delivers the secret key to a receiver (which could be a person, computer, etc.) using some
secure and reliable method, such as a courier or a secure communication channel.
The universal assumption in cryptography,firstgiven by A. Kerckhoff, is that the
security of the cipher must rely entirely on the secrecy of the key. This implies that the
entire mechanism of encipherment, except the value of the secret key, is known to the
enemy.
As mentioned above the goal of cryptography is to provide secrecy and authenticity.

But only recently it was realized that secrecy and authenticity are independent attributes
of a cryptographic system. There exists cryptographic systems that provide perfect secrecy
but do not provide authenticity and systems that provide perfect authenticity but do not
provide secrecy. This thesis is devoted to the theory of authentication systems and is
divided into four chapters.
Thefirstchapter gives the basic introduction to the theory of secrecy systems and
contains a survey of the most relevant results from the theory of authentication systems.
In the second chapter we consider two basic attacks on authentication systems, i.e,
impersonation attack and substitution attack. W e consider different types of enemy's
strategy in impersonation and substitution attack, define optimal authentication codes
and classify them according to the number of encoding rules.
The third chapter is devoted to the spoofing of order r attack. W e show the deep
connection between authentication codes with the best performance and combinatorial
structures, introduce the new concept of near-perfect protection, and define and study,

v

perfect authenticity which is a notion similar to perfect secrecy.
In the fourth chapter we classify enemy's attacks depending on the information available to the enemy and the goal of the attack. W e consider different types of attack and
obtain combinatorial and information-theoretic bounds on the probability of the enemy's
success. W e use some known combinatorial constructions to design the authentication
codes which are resistant against new types of enemy's action.
At the end of each chapter we include a concluding section which gives a brief description of the main results.
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Chapter 1
Theoretical background
1.1 Secrecy systems
The mathematical foundation of secrecy systems was established by Shannon [44] who
used the model of a secrecy system shown in afigure(1.1).
H e considered two different notions of security for cryptosystems. First he considered
unconditional security in which the enemy has unlimited time and computational power
available for the analysis of the intercepted cryptogram. Next he considered practical
security in which the cryptanalyst has limited time and computational power. W e will
concentrate on unconditional secrecy in this section.
Conventional secrecy systems are single-key or private key cryptosystems. The sender
forms the cryptogram m as a function of the message s and secret key e.
m = fe(s), (1-1)

where fe is a member of a parameterized set of functions and the particular function
determined by the value of the secret key e. W e assume that by knowing m and e we
can uniquely determine s (as the decoder can produce the original plaintext knowing only
m and e). Shannon considers a ciphertext only attack which means that the enemy has
access only to one cryptogram. The cryptanalyst observes the cryptogram m and tries
to form his estimate s' of the plaintext s and/or his estimate e' of the secret key e. Let
S and M

denote the set of messages and cryptograms respectively. A system is said to

provide perfect secrecy if plaintext s and cryptogram m are statistically independent. So
for any s £ S and any cryptogram m £

M,

P(s\m) = P(s). (1.2)

The fundamental quantity of Shannon's information theory is entropy (or "uncertainty
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Figure 1.1: Shannon's model of a general Secrecy System
of a random variable S denoted by H(S) and defined as
H(S) = -j:P(s)\og(P(s)), (1.3)
ses
where the sum is over all possible values 5 of the random variable S. Using entropy the
definition of perfect secrecy can be formulated as
H(S\M) = H(S), (1.4)
since the equality holds if and only if S and M are independent variables. Equation
can be equivalently represented as H(M\E,S)

= 0 and/or H(S\M,E)

= 0. Shannon [45]

proved the fundamental bound for prefect secrecy,
H(E) > H(S), (1.5)

which means that the uncertainty of the secret key must be at least equal to the unc
tainty of the plaintext [25, p.537]. Assume our key consists of LE symbols from a g-ary
alphabet A and communicants' use the uniform probability distribution for choosing a
key. Then H(E) = \og(qLjs) = LE • log q. If a plaintext is a string of Ls symbols from the
alphabet A and symbols are chosen independently with uniform probability distribution
then we have H(S) = log(qLs) = Ls • logq and using (1.5) we have
LE > Ls. (1-6)

That is, to provide perfect secrecy the key should be at least as long as the plaint
Shannon gives a simple example of the system that provides perfect secrecy and achieves
bound (1.6) with equality. This system is called the one-time pad. Suppose that we choose
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our key as a string with symbols from alphabet A completely at random. Moreover let
L>E = Ls = LM

= L, where LE,LS,LM

are number of symbols in the key, plaintext

and cryptogram respectively. Then we can enumerate the symbols from the alphabet A
by the integers 0 to q — 1 and define the encoding function as m,- = e,- + s,-, where '+'
denotes addition modulo q and m;, e; and $» are the numbers which correspond to the
i-th symbol of the cryptogram string, key string and plaintext string respectively. For
every possible choice of strings s and m there exists a unique vector e that maps s to
m and so P(m\s) = q~L, independent of the distribution of S. Thus statistical variables
S and M

are independent and hence the system provides perfect secrecy. According to

(1.5) and (1.6) for a fixed length of plaintext, the one time pad uses the least possible
amount of secret key. But the fact that the one-time pad requires one random key symbol
for each plaintext symbol makes it impractical in most applications. O n the other hand a
one-time pad system is used for encrypting messages on a hot line between Moscow and
Washington because it guarantees perfect secrecy. The work of Shannon is extended by a
number of authors [24, 25, 60] by introducing the concept of r-fold secrecy and considering
different types of attacks.
Based on the information available to the enemy cryptanalyst we can define different
types of the attacks [25]:

1. The enemy has access only to ciphertext; the attack is called ciphertext only att

2. The enemy has access to a pair of plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext; the
attack is called known-plaintext attack.
3. The enemy can submit plaintext and receive the corresponding ciphertext for the
actual secret key used by the communicants (sender and receiver); the attack is
called chosen-plaintext attack.
4. The enemy can submit ciphertext and receive the plaintext which corresponds to
the decrypted ciphertext using the secret key. This type of attack is called chosenciphertext attack.

Shannon's concept of perfect secrecy is based on the assumption that the enemy crypt
analyst is limited to the ciphertext only attack and the only cryptogram that the enemy
knows is the single cryptogram that he is trying to break. Stinson extended this work
to the case of order r ciphertext attack [60]. Suppose the enemy knows that the communicants are using the same key to send r messages. The system achieves perfect r-fold
secrecy if the opponent is unable to determine any information about the r source states
from the r observed cryptograms. Let S' C S be the set of r' < r source states that was
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sent by the sender and let M' denote the corresponding set of r' cryptograms which were
observed by the enemy.

Definition 1.1.1 ([60]) A cryptosystem achieves perfect r-fold secrecy if for every
r, and for every corresponding sets of S' and M'
P(S'\M') = P(S') (1.7)
Massey [24, p.6] defined known-plaintext attack of order r as follows: "We shall say
that the enemy can make a known-plaintext attack of order r in the case that he/she knows
r valid and distinct plaintext-cryptogram pairs for the key e in effect for the cryptogram
m that he wishes to decipher".

Definition 1.1.2 ([24]) A cryptosystem provides perfect secrecy against known-plaint

attack of order r if it provides perfect secrecy against order r — 1 attack and the ene
can do no better than to randomly guess the plaintext s, without further consideration
cryptogram m

that he/she wishes to decipher, when he/she is told that m is not one of

the r known cryptograms.
Examples of systems that provide perfect r-fold secrecy are given in [24, 60].

1.2 Authentication systems

In this section we examine theory of authentication from the first theoretical resul
Simmons to the most recent ones. In late 1970's it was understood that authentication
is independent of secrecy; that is, if a cryptographic system provides secrecy it does
not necessarily provides authentication. The theory of authentication was developed by
Simmons [46, 47, 48] and is in many aspects similar to Shannon's theory of secrecy. In
an authentication system the enemy cryptanalyst has more freedom than in Shannon's
model. Figure (1.2) shows Simmon's model of authentication system.
The sender sends a message s through the public channel. To protect the message from
the enemy he encodes the message using a secret key. The encoded message, that is the
cryptogram m , goes through the channel. The enemy who controls the channel can see the
cryptogram and can modify it. The secret key is shared between the communicants using
a secure channel or some other secure and reliable method, and the receiver uses it to
decode the cryptogram. The difference between a secrecy system and an authentication
system is that in the latter the enemy cryptanalyst may tamper with the cryptogram
which is sent over the channel. Simmons assumed that the secret key is used only once to
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Figure 1.2: S i m m o n s ' model of a general Authentication System
form an authentic cryptogram. But even in this case he indicated three types of attack
[46, 47]:
1. T h e e n e m y initiates communication by sending his/her fraudulent cryptogram m'.
This type of attack is called impersonation. A n impersonation attack is successful
if the fraudulent cryptogram is accepted by the receiver as a valid cryptogram. T h e
probability P0 of successful impersonation is the measure of the enemy's success.
Po is defined as the enemy's probability of success when he/she employs the best
impersonation strategy.
2. T h e e n e m y cryptanalyst intercepts a cryptogram m and replaces it with a cryptogram m' ^ m. This type of attack is called substitution. T h e enemy's success is
measured by the probability that the message m ' is accepted as genuine. Probability
Pi of successful substitution is defined as the enemy's probability of success when
he/she employs the best substitution strategy.
3. T h e e n e m y is able to choose impersonation or substitution attack with s o m e probability. Probability of deception P^ is then defined as the probability of the enemy's
success for the best deception strategy.
In authentication systems each key specifies a mapping from the set of source states
to the set of cryptograms. T o describe the mathematical model of authentication w e
introduce the following notation and definitions.
Definition 1.2.1 An authentication code (A-code) is a collection £, \£\ = E, of mappings
called encoding rules (or keys), from a set S, \S\ = k of source states (messages) into the
set M,

\M\ = M

> k of cryptograms (or codewords).

W e assume that each cryptogram is the image of at least one source state under at least
one encoding rule. It is clear that each encoding rule e £ £ m a p s the set of source states

5

<S to some subset M(e)

C M,

where M(e) contains all cryptograms that are authentic

under the key e, and |A-f(e)| = M(e). Similarly we define the set of keys £(m) C £ that
are incident with the cryptogram m £ M, and assume |£(m)| = E(m).

In general we

denote the cardinality of a set A" by A" unless otherwise specified, the exception is the
cardinality of the set S of the source states which we denote by k. A n encoding rule
can m a p one source state to a number of cryptograms. In this case we have an A-code
with splitting. If each encoding rule e is a one-to-one mapping of the set S into the set
M(e) then w e have an A-system without splitting. Unless stated otherwise we consider
A-codes without splitting. To provide protection, an authentication system should have
more cryptograms than source states, that is M

> k. Otherwise if M

= k, then each

cryptogram can be decrypted to a source state under any encoding rule therefore any
cryptogram becomes meaningful. A n (M, k, E) A-code is an authentication code with M
cryptograms, k source states and E encoding rules. The main performance measure of an
authentication system is the probability of the enemy's success.
Definition 1.2.2 An A-code is an A-code without secrecy, or a Cartesian A-code, if
a cryptogram uniquely determines the same source state for any key. So if the enemy
observes a cryptogram m he/she knows the corresponding source state.
An authentication system consists of an A-code and a source with a given probability
distribution. Thefirstgeneral bound on the performance of authentication systems was
obtained by Gilbert, M a c Williams and Sloane in [16]: " W e consider a new kind of coding
problem, which has applications in a variety of situations. A message s is to be encoded
using a key e to form an encrypted message m = F(s,e), which is then supplied to a
user G. G knows e and so can calculate s. It is desired to choose F(.,.), so as to protect
G against B, who knows 5 and m but not e and wants to substitute a false message m'
for m." In [16] the authors only considered substitution attacks for Cartesian A-codes,
and also assumed that the statistics of the source are uniform. They proved that the
probability of the enemy's success under the above conditions is lower bounded:
P1 > £~1/2. (1.8)

They also proposed A-codes based on finite geometries that achieve the bound in (1.8)
with equality. Fak [15] extended these results and introduced the concept of spoofing of
order r. She assumed the communicants used the same key to encode r different source
states and obtained the following bound which generalises the result of Gilbert et al [16],
Pi>E-1/{i+1\ 0<i<r. (1.9)
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Simmons generalised previous results and proposed a mathematical model of authentication. Following Simmons [46, 47] we consider a game-theory model for authentication
systems.

1.2.1 Game theory model of authentication
Definition 1.2.3 The incidence matrix A = [aem] of an A-code is a zero-one matrix
of size E x M, whose rows are labeled by encoding rules and columns are labeled by
cryptograms, and in which aem = 1, l<e<E,l<m<

M, if m £ M(e)

and zero

otherwise.

We note that each row in an incidence matrix A contains exactly k ones and M — k zero
Definition 1.2.4 The encoding array B = [6es] of an A-code is an E x k array, whose

rows are labeled by encoding rules, columns are labeled by the source states and entries
row e and column s is a cryptogram m, which is the image of the source state s under key
e, bes = e(s) = m.

Our definition of encoding array is similar to Stinson's definition of encoding matr
definition of encoding matrix corresponds to the definition of the incidence matrix in
Stinson's work.
Definition 1.2.5 The encoding matrix D of an A-code is a matrix of size E x M, whose
rows are indexed by encoding rules, columns are indexed by cryptograms and entries in
row e and column m £ M(e)

is a source state s £ S with e(s) = m and zero otherwise.

The communicants' strategy is a probability distribution on the set of keys and is
E
given by a probability vector -K = (%i, ...,irE), ^2^j = 1, where TCJ is the probability that
the communicants use encoding rule ej £ £.

Game theory model for impersonation attack
The enemy's strategy for impersonation attack can be defined by a probability vector
q = (<?I,...,<7M), X I 9m = 1, where qm is the probability that the enemy chooses the
cryptogram m as the fraudulent message to be introduced into the channel. W e may
think of the authentication system as a zero-sum game between the enemy and the communicants. This means that whatever one participant gains in the game the other one
loses. In this game a pure strategy of the communicants is the choice of a particular
secret key and a pure strategy of the enemy is the choice of the particular fraudulent
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cryptogram. W h e n these choices are made the enemy and the communicants have probabilities of either zero or one to succeed. The probability vectors -K and q determine the
mixed communicants' and the enemy's strategy respectively. It is clear that in this case
the incident matrix A of the A-code is the game matrix, where each element aem corresponds to the probability of the enemy's success when the communicants choose encoding
rule e and the enemy selects cryptogram m .
If the communicants use a strategy TT and the enemy uses his/her best strategy then the
value of the game and the probability of the enemy's success is equal to
PQ = max m (X^-=i 'irjajm)- So the best strategy of the communicants can be obtained
as the solution to the minimax problem PQ* = min7r(maxTO(52^=1 Tjajm)). Strategy ir* of
the communicants guarantees that using any strategy the enemy's probability of success
is at most PQ*. T h e best strategy of the enemy can be obtained by solving the corresponding maximin problem PQ* — max(min( ^
9

J

qmajm))- W e also note that if the enemy

mEM

uses strategy q and the communicants use a strategy % then,
M

E

»'=i i=i

The fundamental theorem of zero-sum games ensures that there exists a communicants'
strategy,

7r*, and a corresponding

strategy

of the enemy,

q*, such

that

P** — P^* = p0 = p^ K . The value of the game in this case is equal to the probability
of the enemy's success in the impersonation game. To obtain the best communicants'
strategy one must solve a minimax problem which can be transformed to an equivalent
linear programming (LP) problem:
min(z),
E
^7Tj<2jm < 2, 1 < m <
i=i
E

M

52*3 = i»
3=1

Xj > 0, 1 < j < E.
This is equivalent to the following linear programming problem.
max(XX-) (1.11)
E

£>-ajm<l, l < m < M
3=1
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where TT'- = — .
.

z

To obtain the best strategy of the enemy the maximin problem can be transformed to
the following L P problem:
min( J2 C)> (1-12)
M

£9m*im>l,

l<j<E

J=l

It is obvious that the LP problem given in (1.12) is dual to the LP problem given in (1.11
and so the solution is the same. Hence w e can say that there exists the best strategies
q* and IT* for the enemy and communicants respectively such that P0 = PQ

T

. If the

communicants use strategy x then the probability of the enemy's success when he/she
introduces a cryptogram m into the channel is equal to,
E

payoff(m) = 52TJai™>

C1-13)

3=1

Using expression (1.10) and (1.13) w e have
Po = P^

= E

?; payoff(m),

(1.14)

where PQ * is the value of the game and hence using expression (1.14) we have
Po

=

max(payoff(m)).

(1-15)

A-codes that provide the best possible protection (the codes that guarantee the minim u m probability of the enemy's success) are defined by J. Massey and G. Simmons.
Definition 1.2.6 ([24]) Are A-code provides perfect protection against impersonation attack if and only if the value of the impersonation game does not depend on the enemy's
strategy and the enemy can do no better than randomly choosing the fraudulent cryptogram.
The necessary and sufficient condition for an A-code that provides perfect protection
for impersonation follows from (1.15).
Proposition 1.2.7 ([46, 47]) Are A-code provides perfect protection for impersonation
if and only if there exists a communicant's strategy (optimum strategy) for which,
E

payoff (m) = 52 *jaim = k/M.
3= 1

In this case

P„ = A
9

(1.16,

E
52 7C3a3m = k hence we have the following proposition.
Note that ^
mEM j=l
Proposition 1.2.8 ([47, 24]) Are A-code provides perfect protection for impersonation
if and only if P0 =

k/M.

Game theory model for substitution attack
In a substitution attack the enemy intercepts a cryptogram m and constructs a fraudulent
cryptogram rn' which he/she hopes to be accepted by the receiver. A source state 5 is
uniquely determined by the pair (e;,m), where encoding rule a maps the source state s
to the cryptogram m . Let Ps(s) = Ps(ei,m) be the probability of the source state s and
let payofF(m,m/) be the probability of the enemy's success when he/she intercepts the
cryptogram m and replaces it with the cryptogram m'. Then we have

payoff(m,m') =

P(m

valid \m received ),

EJLi Kjajmajm>Ps(ej, ro)

P(m)

(1.17)

E
where P(m) — E 'KjajmPs(£j, m) is the probability that the cryptogram m is sent through
the channel.
W e note that E

P(m) = 1- If we enumerate all the cryptograms from 1 to M,

an enemy's pure strategy can be represented by a vector zl =
m{ £ M

(m2l, ...,m; M ), where

and m,- ^ rrij. This compact representation means that when the enemy sees

a cryptogram mj in the channel he/she substitutes it with the cryptogram m^
The total number of different pure strategies is (M - 1)M.

^ mj.

Hence the mixed strat-

egy of the enemy in substitution attack can be determined by the probability vector
q = (qi, ...,<?(M-I)W)- If trie enemy uses a strategy q then the probability of success can
be determined by the following expression,
(M-1) M

i?= 52 *pqi*%
i=l

where Pq(zl) is the probability of the enemy's success when he/she is using a strategy z%
and is equal to,
M
P\z{) = 52P(mt)

• payoff^, m n ) .

t=i
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So if the enemy uses a strategy q and the communicants use a strategy IT then P^ is
equal to,
(M-1)M

M

E
p

r

=

52

5252<b7r3a3rntajmHPs(ej,mt),

i=l

«=1 j=l

{M-l)M

E

(1.18)

M
7r

52

52^ 352a3mtajmitPs(ej,rnt).

t=l

j=l

(1.19)

t=l

It is clear now that the elements of the game matrix G, with size E x (M — 1)M, are
M

gji = 52a3mta3mitPs(ej,mt).

The best strategies q, TT and the value of the game, that is

<=i

the probability of success in substitution attack, can be calculated as a solution to the
maximin and minimax problems,
{M-\)M E

Pi — maxmin(
"

Y2

3

QiQji) = m i n m a x ( E ^iQji)-,
^

-*

z=l

• -i

3-1

or the corresponding linear programming problems. Suppose that q and IT are the best
strategies of the enemy and the communicants respectively, then

M E (M-1)M

P\-Pr

52 (Ha3mtajmHPs(ej,mt),

= 5252*3
<=1 j=l

M

=

t'=l

(M-l)M

E
7r a

5252 3 3mtPs(eJ,mt)

E

t=l j = l

4=1

9iaimit-

But for a fixed t and j, ajmi takes only M — 1 possible different values,

(ajmi, • • • ,ajmt-iiajmt+ii''' iajmM), which correspond to all possible substitutions
for mi. Summing all q^s which correspond to the same element ajmit we calculate the

probability that the message mt is substituted by message mt-t. This probability is de
by qtitE M

Pi = Pi* = 525252

qtitnjajmtajmitPs(ej,mt).

(1.20)

j=i i=i itfr

The last equality shows that the enemy's strategy can be represented by M probability
vectors with M — 1 coordinates or by an M x M matrix Q = [qmm>], where qmmt is the
probability of substituting cryptogram m with the cryptogram m', where qmm = 0, and
]T qmm, = 1. Therefore assuming that q and x are the best strategies of the enemy and
the communicants respectively we have
Pi = 52 52P(m) E 9mm> • Payoff(m,m'). (1.21)
j=l mEM

m.'£M\m

11

Moreover knowing the best communicants' strategy and calculating payoff (m,m') for all
pairs, (ro,m'), we can find the value of the substitution game as,
E
Pi =52

52 P(»™) m a x payoff (m,ro').

(1.22)

j=l mEM

Perfect protection
Simmons and Massey defined A-codes which provides perfect protection against substitution attack.

Definition 1.2.9 ([25]) An A-code provides perfect protection for substitution attac
the value of the substitution game does not depend on the enemy's strategy and the enemy
can do no better than randomly choosing a fraudulent cryptogram from the remaining
M — 1 cryptograms.

From (1.21) it is clear that if the A-code provides perfect protection then the enemy
can do no better than choosing randomly a cryptogram ro' to substitute for the observed
cryptogram ro. The necessary and sufficient condition for an A-code to provide perfect
protection against substitution attack is given in [47, 24, 62]. Using game theory model
we can define A-codes that provide perfect protection against substitution.

Proposition 1.2.10 An A-code provides perfect protection against substitution attack
and only if there exists a communicants' strategy such that for any pair m , m' £ M, m' ^
m, payoff (ro,ro')= const. In this case Pi = payoff (m,ro').
If we sum payoff (ro,ro') for all m' ^ ro then,
Y^ payoff(m,m') = (k - 1),

which means that for any m £ M, there exists m' £ M,m' =f ro, such that
payoff(ro, m') > (k - 1)/(M - 1). (1.23)

k—1
If payoff (m,ro') = const for all pairs (ro,ro') then payoff(ro,ro') =

_

= Pi. Con-

versely if there exists at least one pair (m,m') with payoff(ro,ro') > (k - 1)1 (M - 1),
then using (1.22) and (1.23) we have Pi > (k - 1)/(M - 1).

Proposition 1.2.11 ([24, 58]) An A-code provides perfect protection for substitution
attack if and only if,

* = th-

(L24)
12

Combined game
In general the enemy m a y be able to choose between the impersonation game and the
substitution game. The game matrix Z — [AG] will be a combination of the game matrices A for impersonation and G for substitution, where the ith row of Z is obtained by
concatenating the ith row of G to the ith row of A. It is clear that the best communicants'
strategies for impersonation, substitution and combined game can be different. This implies Pdx > max(Po,Pi). The communicants' strategy is an ^-dimensional probability
vector 7r and the enemy's strategy is a probability vector with M + (M — 1)M
nents. ThefirstM

components correspond to the M

compo-

columns of the game matrix of

impersonation and the last (M — 1)M components correspond to the columns of the game
matrix of substitution. Therefore we can say that the enemy plays impersonation game
(M-l)M

M

with the probability q° = ^

qi and substitution game with the probability q1 =

*'=1

52

&•

i=l

Proposition 1.2.12 If the best communicants' strategies for impersonation game and
substitution game are the same, then
Pdl =max(P0,Pi). (1-25)
Proof: The communicants' best strategy can be found as a solution to the minimax
problem:
E

m i n m a x 52*3zj^

(1.26)

3=1

where Z{j are the elements of the game matrix Z. But if the probability vector it is a
solution for the two submatrices A and G of the matrix Z, that is for i, 1 < i < M
M + \ <i <M

and

+ (M - 1)M, then it will provide a solution for (1.26), and

E

P0

=

min m a x Y^7i\-z?';,

(1-27)

3=1

E

Pi

=

min

max

5^njZji>

(1.28)

* (M+i)<i<(M-i)M fr{
Suppose that q is the enemy's best strategy for the combined game. Then
E M+(M-1)M

P^ = 52

52

j=l

i=l
M

M+(M-l)M

M

*3<nzi3 = 5252*3vzi3 + 52
j i-l

= "o * 5252*3—zi3 + ai x 5 2
j t=l

<
13

j
M+(M-l)M

9

Q

°

j

a0Po+«iA <max(P0,Pi),

52
i=M+l

52

*i<nzn>

(l-29)

i=M+l
q.

*3-^~zi^

(L3°)

Gl

(1.31)

M+{M-l)M

M

where 52 ^^

=

1 an(^

i=l

52

ai

^ = •'••

i=M+l

O n the other hand if the enemy plays pure impersonation game or pure substitution
game (depending on the relation between Po and Pi) he/she can always achieve bound
(1.25). Hence Pdx = max(Po, Pi) and the enemy's best strategy is either an impersonation
strategy or a substitution one.
•
Extending Kerckhoff's principle to authentication we assume that the enemy cryptanalyst knows matrices A, G, C, Z and the communicants' strategy n. Then from the
above it follows that P ^ = max(P 0 , Pi) and the most appropriate expressions to calculate
P 0 and Pi are (1.15) and (1.22) respectively.
Next w e consider Cartesian A-codes and review combinatorial bounds for this class of
A-codes.
Combinatorial bounds for Cartesian A-codes
In a Cartesian A-code, or an A-code without secrecy, a cryptogram uniquely determines
a source state. Hence we can partition the set of cryptograms M

into k subsets M(s),

s £ S, where subset M(s) contains cryptograms that correspond to the sources state s.
Let P 0 = k/M then |-M(s)| = M(s) = M/k for every s £ S. In such codes, without
loss of generality, we can define a set of C authenticators \C\ = £ = M/k and a mapping
0: M

—> C and assume that every cryptogram consists of a source state with a concate-

nated authenticator, i.e. a source state s is mapped to (s,e(s)) [62].
Definition 1.2.13 The authentication array of an A-code without secrecy is a matrix of
size E x k, whose rows are labeled by the encoding rules and columns are labeled by the
source states and the entry in row e and column s is equal to the authenticator e(s).
The main combinatorial bound for the Cartesian A-code under substitution attack
was obtained by Stinson [60].
Theorem 1.2.14 ([60], Theorem 5.1) In a Cartesian A-code P0 > k/M. Moreover if
P0 = k/M = l/£ then Pi > k/M = 1/t.
Spoofing of order r
Massey [24] and Stinson [60] extended the original model of Simmons and generalised
enemy's attack to spoofing of order r. " W e shall say that the enemy cryptanalyst makes
a spoofing attack of order r in the case where he knows r distinct valid cryptograms for
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the key e for which he seeks to form a fraudulent cryptogram. The enemy succeeds when
ro' is a valid cryptogram for this key and is not one of the r already known cryptograms"
[24]. W e denote by Pr the probability of the enemy's success for spoofing of order r. Let
mT = (m\,rrir2,...mT) be the sequence of cryptograms which the enemy observes in the
channel and let payoff (ro',ror) be the probability that ro' is accepted ifro7"is observed.
W e use £(mT) C £, |£(m r )| = E(mr), to denote the set of keys that are incident with all
cryptograms m\ £ mr.
Theorem 1.2.15 ([24, 60]) In an (M,k,E) A-code,

and equality holds if and only if for any sequence mr and any ro' £ M\mr,
payoff (ror,ro') = const — — .
r

v

'

M-r

Following Massey [24] we give the following definition

Definition 1.2.16 Are A-code is r-fold secure against spoofing if it provides perfec
tection against spoofing attack of all orders i, 0 < i < r, and therefore,

for 0 < i < r.
The corresponding general combinatorial bound for Cartesian A-codes is proved in

[60]
Theorem 1.2.17 ([60], Theorem 5.1) In a Cartesian A-code P0 > k/M. Moreover if
P0 = k/M = l/£ then P{ > k/M = l/£, for any i > 0.

Therefore extending definition 1.2.16 to A-codes without secrecy (Cartesian A-codes)
we say that a Cartesian A-code is r-fold secure against spoofing if Pi - k/M for 0 < i < r.
W e call A-codes that are r-fold secure against spoofing r-fold secure A-codes.

1.2.2 Information-theoretic bounds
For an arbitrary A-code the lower bounds of (1.16), (1.24) and (1.32) might not be achievable. Applying information theory to authentication systems one determine how efficiently
the redundancy introduced during encoding process is used. Simmons and Brickell [46, 8],
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Stinson [58], Pei [30] and Rosenbaum [35] obtained lower bounds on the probability of
the enemy's success using information-theoretic approach.
The first information-theoretic bound for impersonation is due to Simmons [46]. W e
use E and M

for the entropy function to denote random variables ranging over £ and

M

respectively.
Theorem 1.2.18 ([46]) For an (M,k,E) A-code
P0 > 2~{H[E)-H^M\

(1.34)

and equality holds if and only if,
1. The A-code provides perfect protection for impersonation.
2. For a cryptogram m, P(ro|e) is constant for all e such that e £ £(m).
Theorem 1.2.18 implies that if an A-code achieves bound (1.34) it also achieves the
bound of (1.16). Simmons' bound for impersonation was tightened in [18]. Let inf(X)
denotes the infimum of the set X.
Theorem 1.2.19 ([18]) For an (M,k,E) A-code
pQ > 2-'V(tf(£)-tf(£|M))

(1.35)

where infimum is taken over all source statistics that do not change the set of pair
for which P(ro, e) =4 0.
Sgarro [43] introduced a more abstract notion than A-codes which he called a fraud
scheme. H e showed that the information-theoretic bounds on impersonation and substitution can be derived as special cases of a more general bound for fraud schemes.
Pei [30] and Rosenbaum [35] proved a general bound for A-codes with splitting when
spoofing attack of order r is considered. The bound reduces to Simmons' bound for r = 0.
The same bound was proved for A-codes without secrecy by Walker [71].
Let P(mr) be the probability that the sequence rnr occurs in the channel and Mr

be

the set of all possible sequences of r distinct cryptograms.
Theorem 1.2.20 ([35])
pr > 2-{H(E\M^)-H{E\M^))^

(1.36)

and equality holds if and only if for all mr £ MT with P(mr) > 0 and all m' £ M, such
that E(m',mr)
16

> 0, the following conditions are satisfied:

1. payoff(ror,ro')

that ro' is

accepted if mr

was

observed

satisfies,

Pr = payoff (ror,ro').

2. Conditional probability P(m'\e,mT) that ro' is the next message sent by the

mitter, given that e is the encoding rule and the sequence mr is observed, is
for all e £ £(m',mT).

Here £(m',mT) is the subset of encoding rules that are incident with the seque
and the cryptogramro'and |£(ro',mr)| = E(m',mT). In fact £(m',mr) = £(mr)C\£(m').
The following two lemmas which were proved in [35] show the relation between A-codes
that are r-fold secure against spoofing and A-codes that satisfy bound (1.36) with equality
for all orders i, 0 < i < r.
Lemma 1.2.21 ([35]) Let an A-code be r-fold secure against spoofing, then it
bound (1.36), for all i, 0 < i < r, if and only if for all orders i the conditional
P(ml\e) is constant for all ml £ Mx and e £ £(ml).
Lemma 1.2.22 ([35]) Let an A-code satisfy bound (1.36) for all orders i, 0 <

Then the A-code is r-fold secure against spoofing if and only if for all orders i,
we have E(ml) > 0 for all ml £ M%.
Next we consider the probability of deception, P<iT, for spoofing of order r.
following result is given in [35] and independently in [40]. For Cartesian A-codes a similar
result was proved by Fak [15].
Theorem 1.2.23 ([40]) For any A-code
Pdr > 2~^\ (1.37)
and equality holds if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. P0 = ... = PT = k/M.
2. The encoding rules are equally probable; hence H(E) = logE.
3. The A-code satisfies bound (1.36), for all i, 0 < i < r.
4. H(E\Mr+l) = 0.
r+l — i

5. For any 0 < i < r and any mi £ M% such that E(mi+1) > 0, E(mi+1) =

6. E= -——.
kr+1
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1.2.3

A-codes that are r-fold secure against spoofing and combinatorial designs

Thefirsttreatment of authentication systems, by Gilbert, M a c Williams and Sloane [16],
showed that unconditionally secure authentication codes are closely related to combinatorial structures. W h e n we construct A-codes, our goal is to obtain an A-code with the
best protection and the least possible number of encoding rules. It turns out that r-fold
secure A-codes with the minimum number of encoding rules correspond to well-known
combinatorial designs [62]. In this section we briefly review important results proved
in this area [57, 60, 62, 32]. W e consider general A-codes (A-codes with secrecy) and
A-codes without secrecy (Cartesian A-codes) separately as they correspond to different
combinatorial structures.

General authentication codes.
W e give the definitions of combinatorial structures that are relevant to A-codes.
Definition 1.2.24 ([14]) A balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) with parameters
(v, b, r, k, A) is a pair (X, A) that satisfies the following properties:
1. X is a set of v elements (called points).
2. A. is a family of b subsets of X, each with cardinality k (called blocks).
3. Every point occurs in exactly r blocks.
If.. Every pair of distinct points occurs in exactly A blocks.
It is generally required that k < v. BIBDs have the following two properties:
vr — bk,
A(u-l)

=

r(k-l).

So only three out offiveparameters are independent. W e will use parameters (v, k, A) to
specify a B I B D . W e note two important classes of BIBDs. A n (n2 + n + 1, n + 1,1)-BIBD
is called a projective plane of order n. A n (n2, n, 1)-BIBD is called an affine plane of order
n. It is well-known [14] that an affine plane of order n exists if and only if projective
plane of order n exists. Projective plane of order n exists if n is a prime power.
A t-(v, k, A) design is a generalisation of BIBD.

Definition 1.2.25 ([14]) A t-(v,k,\) design is a pair (X,A) that satisfies the followin
properties:
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1. X is a set of v elements (called points).
2. A is a family of subsets of X, each of cardinality k (called blocks).
3. Every t-subset of distinct points occurs in exactly A blocks.

Comparing the above definitions we observe that a (v, k, A)-BIBD is equivalent to a 2(v, k, A) design.
Suppose w e fix the parameters M

and k in an (M, k, E) A-code and try to find the

A-code which provides the best possible protection with the minimum number of encoding
rules. De-Soete [57] used BIBDs to construct A-codes with these properties. Stinson [62]
gave characterisation of 1-fold secure A-codes that have minimum number of encoding
rules.
Theorem 1.2.26 ([62], Theorem 4.1) Suppose we have an (M,k,E) A-code with P0 =
k/M

and Px = (k- 1)/(M - 1). Then E > E0 = (M2 - M)/(k2 - k) and equality occurs

if and only if the encoding array of the A-code corresponds to that of a (M,k,l)-BIBD,
and both the source states and encoding rules are equiprobable.

An A-code that provides perfect secrecy together with perfect protection against impe
sonation and substitution and has minimum number of encoding rules require an additional condition (M — 1) = 0 mod(k2 — k) to be satisfied [62].
The other bound on the number of encoding rules is very similar to the Fisher's
inequality for the 2-designs.
T h e o r e m 1.2.27 ([32], T h e o r e m s 2.1,3.1) For any (M,k,E) A-code which is 1-fold

secure against spoofing we have E > M. Moreover if equality occurs then encoding rules
are equiprobable and cryptograms occurs with the same probability in the channel.
A-codes that are 1-fold secure against spoofing and have E = M can be certainly constructed from symmetric (v, k, A)-BIBD's (v = 6). In this case the source states are
equiprobable. But in [32] the authors presented a remarkable construction, based on
group divisible designs, of 1-fold secure A-codes that have non-uniform source distribution. Specifically the source states have two distinct probabilities.
Theorem 1.2.28 ([32], Theorem 4.2) For any prime power q = 3 or q > 5 there exists
a 1-fold secure ( M , k, E) A-code with k = 2q - 1, M - E = q2 - 1 in which there are two
distinct source state probabilities.
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Example 1.2.29 ([32], Example 2.1) Consider (8,5,8) A-code, with the source probability distribution Ps(si) = Ps(s2) = 2/7, Ps(s3) = Ps(s4) = Ps(s5) = 1/7 whose
encoding matrix is given below.

This A-code is 1-fold secure against spoofi

P0 = k/M and Px = (k - 1)/(M - 1).

E/M

m0

mi

m2

ro3

m4

ro5

ro6

ro7

eQ

Sl

0

53

54

52

55

0

ei

0
0

5l

0

53

54

52

55

0
0

0

5l

0

53

54

52

55

Sl

0

53

54

52

5l

0

53

54

5l

0

53

0

5l

0

0

0

5l

e2
e3
e4

55

0

32

55

0
0

e5

54

52

55

0
0

e6

53

S4

52

55

0
0

er

0

53

54

52

55

To construct the A-codes that are r-fold secure against spoofing we can use
(r + l)-designs.

Theorem 1.2.30 ([64], Theorem 3.8) Suppose an A-code is r-fold secure against
ing then
M(M-l)...(M-r)

~

k(k-l)...(k-r)

and equality occurs if the encoding array is an (r + l)-(M, k, 1) design. Conversely

exists an (r -f 1)-(M, k, 1) design, then there exists an r-fold secure (M,k,E) A
both source states and encoding rules are equiprobable.
We note that in contrast with Theorem 1.2.26 the "if and only if" condition
proved.
Combinatorial structures can be used to construct r-fold secure A-codes with perfect secrecy [60]. To construct such A-codes we need to use perpendicular arrays and
authentication perpendicular arrays.

Definition 1.2.31 A perpendicular array PA\(t,k,v) is an array A with element

a set M, \M\ = v. The array consists of k columns, and each rows consist of k d

elements, such that, if we run t fingers down any t columns, we find every unorde
t-subset of M

exactly A times.

PA's can be used to construct A-codes with perfect £-fold secrecy.
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T h e o r e m 1.2.32 ([60], T h e o r e m 2.3) If there exists a PAx(t,k,M),
then there is an A-code with k source states, M

where k > 2t-l,

cryptograms and A(^) encoding rules,

that achieves perfect t-fold secrecy.

If we wish to provide protection against spoofing and secrecy we should employ authen
tication perpendicular arrays.

Definition 1.2.33 Are PA\(t, k, M) A is said to be an authentication PA (and is denote

by APA\(t, k, M) ) if the following property holds: for any t' < t — 1, and for any t' + 1

distinct symbols X{, 1 < i < t' + 1, we have that among all the rows of A that contain all

the symbols X{, 1 < i < t' -f 1, the t' symbols X{, 1 < i < t', occur in all possible subs
t' columns equally often.
The following result was proved by Stinson and Terlinck in Theorem 2.4 of [63].
Theorem 1.2.34 If there exists an APA\(t,k,M), then there is an A-code that achieves
perfect t-fold secrecy and is (t — l)-fold secure against spoofing with M

cryptograms

A(^) encoding rules. The code is optimal if and only if A = 1.

The theory of authentication perpendicular arrays is further developed in [4, 5], whe
is shown that A P A s are special cases of more general structures.

Cartesian A-codes
The best Cartesian A-codes correspond to orthogonal arrays.

Definition 1.2.35 Are orthogonal array OA\(t,n, k) is a Xkl xn array of k symbols, suc

that in any t possible columns of that array every one of the possible k% ordered t-tuple
of symbols occurs in exactly A rows.
The following theorem is proved in [62].
Theorem 1.2.36 Suppose we have a Cartesian A-code in which P0 = Pi = k/M = l/£.

Then E > k(£ — 1) + 1 and equality holds if and only if the encoding array of the A-code
is an orthogonal array OA\(2,£,k), where A = (k(£ - 1) + l)/£2 and the encoding rules
are used with equal probability.
This theorem can be generalised to spoofing of order r [64]. In this case we need to
have an OA\(r,£, k). The bound on the number of encoding rules is in fact the bound
on the size of orthogonal arrays, that is, E > t. As we mentioned above the best
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information-theoretic bound on the probability of deception for A-codes is bound (1.36)
obtained in [30, 35]. It is shown [30, 71] that A-codes constructed from OA\(r, £, jfc)'s
satisfy this bound with equality.
There are other constructions for A-codes that provide relatively "good" protection.
Most of these constructions are based onfinitegeometries, well-known combinatorial
structures and classical linear groups [1, 2, 72, 20, 7].
In [19, 3, 29] it is shown that error-correcting codes can be used to construct Cartesian
A-codes. It is also demonstrated [3] that error-correcting codes can be used to design the
universal? (U2) and almost universal (AU2) classes of hash functions. O n the other
hand, strong universal and almost strong universal classes of hash functions are known to
be closely related to A-codes [61, 3].

1.2.4 Error-correcting codes, authentication codes and universal classes of hash functions.
Error-correcting codes are codes that provide protection against random channel errors
[28]. The Hamming

distance between two q-a,ry vectors x and y is the number of coordi-

nates in which vector x differs from vector y. Error correction, and/or detection capability
of an error-correcting code is determined by its minimum H a m m i n g distance.
Definition 1.2.37 A q-ary (n,M,d) error-correcting code (E-code) C is a set of M
vectors of length n over a Galoisfieldwith q elements, GF(q), such that Hamming distance
between any two vectors is at least d.

Johansson et al [19] proved that A-codes without secrecy that provide perfect protection for impersonation and have Pi < e can be obtained from error-correcting codes and
vice versa.
Theorem 1.2.38 ([19], Section 2) If there exists a Cartesian (kq,k,E) A-code with
uniform source, PQ = k/M, Pi = e and best communicants' strategy is uniform then there
exist a corresponding (n, M,d) E-code, where n = E, M

= q(q—l)k-\-q and d = E(l — e).

Theorem 1.2.39 ([19], Theorem 3) Consider a q-ary error-correcting code C with parameters (n,M,d) such that if c £ C then we have c + Al £ C for all A £ GF(q).

Then

there exists a corresponding (M, k, E) A-code without secrecy with the following parame
ters k = M/q, E = q2, P0 = k/M = 1/q and Pi =

l-d/n.

For example, Reed-Solomon codes of length q can be used to construct a (qt+l,q\q2)
A-code without secrecy with perfect protection against impersonation, (i.e. PQ = 1/q —
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k/M, and Px = t/q = tP0). Applying the Plotkin bound to a </-ary £-code constructed
from an A-code, using Theorem 1.2.38, Johansson et al [19] also showed that in an A-code
the number of source states grows linearly with the number of encoding rules.
Theorem 1.2.40 ([19], Theorem 1) // a Cartesian(M,k,E) A-code provides perfect
protection for impersonation and substitution, (i.e. PQ = Px = 1/q), then the number of
source states in this codes is upper bounded by:

(q-l)k<(E-l),
where q is a number of tags.
Generalizing the above result the authors also showed that if Px > 1/q then the number
of source states grows exponentially with the number of keys.
In [29] the authors defined a Cartesian A-code to be A-perfect if
Po + P i + P 2 + --- + P;v

n _M*l

N +l
They proved that every A-perfect (M, k, E)

A-code is equivalent to the

MDS

(k,qN+1,d) E-code over GF(q), where q is the number of tags and E — qN+1. A n
MDS

(n,qN,d) E-code over GF(q) is equivalent to the orthogonal arrays OAi(N,n,q)

and its distance distribution is known [28, p.320], [17]. W e note that from Theorem 1.2.23
it follows that any Cartesian (M, k, E) A-code that satisfies bound (1.37) with equality is
A-perfect, and therefore the existence of such codes is equivalent to the existence of the
corresponding MDS

(k,E,q) ^-codes.

Universal hash functions and their relation to A-codes wasfirstinvestigated by Wegm a n and Carter [9, 73]. Let H be a set of functions from a set A to a set B, with \A\ = A
and |^| = B and assume A > B. Let h £ H and x,y £ A; then we denote by 8h(x,y) the
function whose value is equal to one if and only if the hashed values of x and y are equal,
that is they collide, and equal zero otherwise:

,

{

v f i, if

x

± y

and

Kx) = %)

n wl

Oh(x,y) = <
,
(1-38)
1 0, otherwise.
W e denote by 8u(x, y) the number of hash functions in H under which x and y collide.

Then

Sn(x,y) = 52 6h(x,y).
hen
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Definition 1.2.41 Let H, \H\ — H, be a set of hash functions from a set A, \A\ = A,
to a set B, \B\ = B. We say that Ti is a universal2(U2) set of hash functions if for all
x,yeA,

Sn(x,y)

<H/B.

Stinson [61] defined e-AU2 class of hash functions in a similar way by requiring
^n(x,y) < tH. This means that (1/B)-AU2 class is a U2 class of hash functions. H e
also proved lower bounds on the number of hash functions in a e-AU2 class of hash function.
Theorem 1.2.42 ([61], Theorem 4.1) If there exists an e-AU2 class 7i of hash functions, with |7Y| = H, from A to B, then,

A(eP-l) + P2(l-e)'
It was shown in [3] that an t-AU2 class 7i of hash functions from A to B is equivalent to
a q-a,vy (n, M, d) error-correcting code with q = B, n = H, d > n(l — e).
Proposition 1.2.43 ([3], Lemma 1) Let e > 0, q = \B\ — B and n = \7i\ = H then
the followings are equivalent:
(i) H. is an t-AU2 class of hash functions from A to B.

(ii) The codewords c = (hx(a),- • • ,hn(a)),a £ A, form a q-ary (n,M,d) E-code, where
1-d/n

< e.

Stinson ([61], Theorem 5.5) showed that two t-AU2 classes of hash functions can be
combined to form a new e-AU2. Using the language of error-correcting codes, Johansson
et al [3] showed, that this construction is just a concatenation of i?-codes.
Strong universal classes of hash functions, denoted by SU2, and almost strong universal
classes of hash functions denoted by ASU2, are closely related to A-codes.
Definition 1.2.44 Let H be a set of hash functions from a set A to a set B. We say
that 7i is strong universal^, (SU2) if it satisfies the following two conditions:
1. For every xi £ A and for every yi £ B we have
\{h£H:h(xi) = yi}\ = H/B.

2. For every xx,x2 £ A, xx ^ x2 and for every yi,y2 £ B,
\{h £ H : h(xi) = yuh(x2) = y2}\ < H/B2.
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The definition of e-ASU2 class is similar but the second condition is replaced by:
\{h £ H : h(xi) — yi,h(x2) = y2}\ < eH/B. The following theorem provides a lower
bound on the number of hash functions in an e-ASU2 class of hash functions.
Theorem 1.2.45 ([61], Theorem 4.3) If there exists an e-ASU2 class ri of hash functions from A to B, then
H>^4.
MB-I)2
H
^ 1 + Be(A-l) + B-A-

,. ...
(L39)

The next theorem shows the immediate connection between A-codes and e-ASU2
classes of hash functions and so emphasizes the importance of bound (1.39) in relation to
the A-codes.
Theorem 1.2.46 ([61], Theorem 3.2) If there exist an e-ASU2 class 7i of hash functions from A to B, then there exists an authentication code without secrecy for A source
states, having B authenticators and H encoding rules, such that PQ = 1/B and Pi ~ e.
Carter and Wegman proposed algorithms for construction of universal and strongly
universal classes of hash functions [9, 73]. Later Stinson [61] proved that orthogonal arrays
with certain parameters can be used to construct the SU2 class of hash functions. H e also
proposed a new construction of e-ASU2 hash functions using the composition of €i-AU2
and e2-ASU2 classes of hash functions.
Theorem 1.2.47 ([61]) Suppose Tii is an ei-AU2 class of hash functions from Ai to
B\, with \7ii\ = Hi, and suppose 7i2 is an e2-ASU2 class of hash functions from Bi to
B2, with ]K2| = #2- Then there exists an e-ASU2 class of hash functions from Ai to B2,
where e = ei + e2 and H = Hi x H2.

Johansson et al [3] noted that the above construction consists of two ingredients: the
AU2 class of hash functions (or according to Proposition 1.2.43, error-correcting codes)
and the ASU2 class of hash functions. Using Reed-Solomon and geometric codes for the
first ingredient they proposed a new infinite constructions for ASU2 classes and proved
a number of upper bounds on the minimum number of hash functions (or number of
encoding rules in an A-code) in a ASU2 class of hash functions.

1.2.5 New trends in authentication theory
In this subsection we briefly introduce authentication with arbitration and multiple authentication. In both cases the model of authentication is different from the original Simmons'
model.
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Authentication with Arbitration
The purpose of conventional A-codes is to protect the transmitter and the receiver from
the deception by an enemy. The traditional model of authentication is restricted in that
the communicants are using the same secret key and therefore they should trust each other.
For this reason Simmons [51, 52] also proposed an extended model of authentication with
arbitration which includes a fourth participant called an arbiter. The arbiter has access
to all key information and by definition does not cheat. The arbiter is a supervisory
authority whose task is to resolve the disputes between the transmitter and the receiver.
This model is further studied in [13].
Johansson [21] and Kurosawa [22] have proved information-theoretic and combinatorial
bounds on the probability of deception and provided examples of A-codes which provide
"good" protection in this authentication scenario.

Multiple Authentication
In a spoofing attack of order r we explicitly require freshness of the source states, i.e.
Se £ {Si, • • •, SV_i}, otherwise the enemy can always succeed by simply sending a cryptogram that he/she has already intercepted. The only way to avoid the freshness constraint is to change the encoding rule used in the encoding process. This is called multiple
authentication. The main difference between multiple authentication and a spoofing attack of order r is the introduction of the encoding rule (update) strategy. In this model the
key is used to specify a sequence of encoding rules. This model is studied in [53, 55, 56]. In
[55] the authors proposed a construction which can be used for multiple authentication. In
[56] B. Smeets proved a lower bound on the probability of deception for multiple authentication systems and showed that the information-theoretic bound for spoofing of order
r, given by expression (1.36), is a special case of the bound for multiple authentication
systems.
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Chapter 2
Impersonation and substitution
attacks
2.1 Introduction

In this chapter we consider (M, k, E) A-codes under impersonation and substitution a
tacks. W e study two possible classes of enemy's actions for each type of attack, derive a
number of new bounds on the probability of deception in impersonation and substitution
attack and characterise A-codes that achieve the bounds with equality. W e analyse the
A-codes that provide perfect protection for both types of attack, define optimal authentication codes and classify them according to the number of encoding rules. Most of these
results are published in [36, 66, 37].

2.2 Preliminaries

We consider an authentication scenario with three participants: a transmitter and re
(communicants) w h o want to communicate over a publicly exposed channel and an enemy
who tries to deceive the receiver in accepting a fraudulent message as genuine. W e only
consider A-codes without splitting where a unique source state s(ei,m) is determined by
a pair of encoding rule ei £ £ and a cryptogram m £ M(e{). Hamming

distance between

two binary vectors ei,e2, denoted by d(ex,e2), is equal to wt(e\ + e2) where addition
is bitwise and over GF(2).

The distance between two encoding rules is the H a m m i n g

distance between the corresponding rows of the incidence matrix A of the A-code.
The communicants use a probability distribution x = (TTI ,..., %E) on the key space
as their strategy and choose an encoding rule e using this strategy. W e note that in
calculating the entropy of E and M we use E and M as random variables that take their
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values from the sets £ and M

2.3

respectively.

Impersonation

We consider two types of possible actions for the enemy in an impersonation attack and
in each case calculate his/her probability of success.

2.3.1 Class /C0
In class /Co the e n e m y chooses a probability distribution vector p = (pi,...,PE), Ylf=i Pi =
1, on £ and selects an encoding rule e,- with probability p;. Next the enemy randomly
chooses an element of m

£ M(e{) and inserts it into the channel. W e denote by P0K

the probability of the enemy's success w h e n he/she uses his/her best strategy from class
K,Q. T h e probability of success with the given strategies re and p is PQ*

(superscript K

denotes class /Co strategy). Let XT denote transpose of the matrix X.
Theorem 2.3.1 Let A, p and T be defined as above and PQ denote the best probability of
success in impersonation among

all enemy's strategies. Then

Po > ^-. (2.1)
k
This can also be written as
P

o > -r52Piirj(ei-ej)i (2-2)
K

i,3

M

P0

>

l-(l/2k)J2tBt,
e=o

(2.3)

where ej • ek denotes the inner product of the vectors C{ and ey,
Be = 52,Pi*j,
i,3

where the sum is taken sum over i,j that satisfy the following conditions:
ei + ej = t
wt(t) = £.
Equality in (2.1)-(2.3) is obtained if and only if one of the best enemy's impersonation
strategy belongs to class /Co.
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Proof: Let the communicants use e^ and let the enemy choose ej (using his/her strategy)
and pK(i,j) denote his/her probability of success in this case (superscript shows class
/Co is used). T h e n pK(i,j) is the probability that m £ M(ej)f) M(ei), i.e., the message
chosen by the enemy using the encoding rule ej is in M(ei). If dij denotes the H a m m i n g
distance between the vectors e; and ej, then

and we have
P?K

= 52P3*iPK{hJ)-

(2-4)

It can be verified that
e,-.ej — [AA J,j — k

dij/Z,

and hence
pAAT7TT

1P*K

(2.5)

or,
Pg*K =

(l/*)EPW*r

(2-6)

*,j

To prove bound (2.3) we note that (2.4) can be written as
pP*K
r

o

_ y^
—

(2fc-^)
7r

2-^P3 *

^k

'

h3

M

= l-awx;^,

(2-?)

;=o
where (2.7) is obtained by grouping all the encoding rules that have the same inner product
(same H a m m i n g
distance).
In all cases the bound follows because
Po > P0K > PrK•

Equality in (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) is obtained if and only if the best

impersonation strategy of the A-code belongs to the class /C0. Corollary 2.3.7 shows that
if P 0 = k/M then P0K = k/M.
•
Bound (2.2) states that the probability of deception is lower bounded by the weighted
average inner product of the encoding rules which is written in terms of the weighted
M
average distance between the encoding rules in (2.3). T h e expression 52^Bi c a n b e
regarded as a generalised average distance when compared with error correcting codes.
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Simmons [48] pointed out an interesting duality between design criteria of error correcting codes and A-codes: the objective of an A-code is to spread evenly the acceptable
substitutes of a codeword and in an error correcting code the aim is to cluster the most
likely substitutes. Bound (2.3) suggests another duality between these codes, that is, good
A-codes should have high average distance, while good error correcting codes have high
minimum distance.
Generalised average distance depends on the strategies of the communicants and the
enemy. For a given communicants' strategy, the enemy's objective is to choose a strategy that minimizes this average distance and so the communicants' best strategy is obtained by finding the distribution x that maximizes this minimum. W h e n the enemy
and communicants use uniform strategies, the average distance coincides with the one for
error-correcting codes [28].
W e use expression (2.1) to find the best strategy of class /Co for the communicants
and/or the enemy. Let b = (bi,..., bs) = AA T 7r T .

Proposition 2.3.2 The best class /Co strategy of the communicants (or the enemy) for a
given A-code can be obtained by solving the following linear programming problem (LP).
minimize x (2-8)
subject to bi <

x,

1 < i < E:

(2-9)

52*i = 1, *i>0,l<i<E.

(2.10)

i

Proof: W e have
PVK = TPAATTCT.

k
If the enemy knows x, then his/her best strategy is to calculate b =

AATTCT,

find j

corresponding to the m a x i m u m component of 6 and choose p with Pj = 1 and zero elsewhere. Assuming the enemy uses his/her best strategy, the communicants best strategy
is tofinda distribution % for which the m a x i m u m element of AA T 7r T is minimum. So the
communicants' best strategy can be found by solving the following minimax problem:
min max bj, 1 < j < E,
*

3

5>i = l, itj>0,l<j<E.
i

This is equivalent to the L P (2.9)-(2.10).
W e note that, for a given code, if the enemy only knows the fact that the communicants
will use their best strategy, without actually knowing what the strategy is, then he/she
can solve the same linear programming problem to find the communicants' strategy and
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then calculate his/her best strategy.
D
Let

%,m) = 5iIi^L?

(2J1)

and 60 = mint)m 6(e,-, m). We note that 60 > 1 and equality implies existence of a codeword
that is incident with only one encoding rule. Theorem 2.3.3 gives a bound on PQK.
Theorem 2.3.3
P0A'><$o-2-"(£>, (2.12)
and equality holds if and only if the columns of the incidence matrix have the same number
of ones and the communicants
this case PQ

=

use their best strategy which is shown to be uniform. In

k/M.

Proof: See Appendix 2.8.1
Corollary 2.3.4

Po>60-2-HW. ,.
Proof: Since P0 > P0K the corollary follows from Theorem 2.3.3.
D

2.3.2 Class MQ
The second type of action that we consider is when the enemy uses a probability distribution on the set of possible cryptograms and chooses the fraudulent message to impersonate
the transmitter according to this distribution. This corresponds to the enemy's action
in Simmons' model of impersonation. The enemy's strategy is determined by the probability vector q = ({qi, •.. , 9 M } ) on the set M

of cryptograms. In this case the enemy's

best chance of success is denoted by P0M. It follows from (1.10) that the probability of
deception for class Mo, if the enemy and the communicants are using strategies q and -K
respectively, is given by
P?M

= q(rrA)T.

The two types of enemy's actions are related as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 2.3.5 For every strategy p ofJCo, there exists a corresponding strategy q of
MQ

with the same probability of success. Hence P0M > P0K'.
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Proof: Let p be an enemy's strategy from class /C0. Then q = pA/k is a strategy of class
Mo with probability of deception given by

1

jg7rM
M
p?
= q(*Af = -^A(*A) T = P 0 P ^

(2.13)

D
Therefore P 0 = P 0

2.3.3

M

X

> P0 .

Perfect protection for classes /Co and Mo

Strategies of class /Co correspond to a game whose payoff matrix is

AAT

W e say an
k
A-code provides perfect protection for class /Co if enemy's best strategy in this class is

uniform distribution on the keys. W e note that if enemy's best strategy from class Mo
is random selection from the cryptogram space, then his/her best strategy from class /Co
is random selection from the key space. This is true because if there exists a TT for which
7rA is a vector of equal components then 7rAA T has equal components as well. However
the inverse, in general, is not true as the following example shows.
Example 2.3.6 Let

1 1 0 1"
1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 _
Then
3 2 2
A-AT =

2 3 2
2 2 3

and 7r = [1/3,1/3,1/3] gives a vector AAT7C with equal components but TA

does not have

this property.

D

Corollary 2.3.7 In an A-code that provides perfect protection against impersonation, the

enemy's probability of success will remain the same if he/she uses a random strategy of
class /Co.
Proposition 2.3.8 An A-code provides perfect protection for class /Co if and only if
7rAAT is a vector of equal components.
Proof: Follows from expression (2.5).

•
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A n A-code is called distance invariant if its incidence matrix has the following property:
the number of encoding rules that are at distance i, 0 < i < 2k, from a given encoding
rule e is independent of e.
Proposition 2.3.9 A distance invariant A-code provides perfect protection for class
Proof: Let B = AAT and Bij = ei • ej. Then in a distance invariant A-code
52 KjBij = const. Hence from (2.6) it follows that if the communicants' strategy is unii
form then PQ J does not depend on the enemy's strategy and is equal to PQK.
U
Example 2.3.10 The following code is distance invariant with two possible distances
between the encoding rules:

1 1 1 1 1 1 0
A =

0 0 0

0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0

0

1 1 1 1 0

0 0 0

0

1 1 1 1
11

and
6 4 2 4
AAT =

4 6 4 2
2 4 6 4
4 2 4 6

The A-code provides perfect protection for class /Co when the communicants use a uniform strategy. It cannot provide perfect protection for class Mo

as two cryptograms are

authentic under all keys.
D

2.4

Substitution attack

In this section we consider substitution attacks. We allow the enemy to choose his/h
fraudulent cryptogram m' by one of the following ways:
• Use a probability distribution qm on the set M\{m}

(denoted by M\m)

and choose

m' according to this distribution.
• Use a probability distribution pm on the set £(m) of keys that are incident with m
to select a key e and then randomly select m' £ M(e).
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The enemy's strategy in the first case is completely determined by the probability distributions qm,\/m £ M, and in the second case by the distributions p m , V m £ M. W e call
these strategies class M i (for message) and class /Ci (for key) respectively.
A substitution strategy in Simmons' model of authentication corresponds to class
Mi

strategies. W e will show that for every strategy of class /Ci w e can construct a

corresponding strategy of class M\\ however, independent investigation of class JCi is
instrumental in proving new results about A-codes.

2.4.1 Class Mi
Let P$*

denote the probability of an enemy's success in a substitution attack when the

communicants' strategy is x and the enemy's strategy in class Mi

is given by {qm : m £

M}, where qm is defined as above. The following expression for P^M immediately follows
from (1.20).
Proposition 2.4.1
PTM = 52 52 52*3^majmlPs(e3,m)qZ, (2.14)
m£M

m'£M\mj=l

The next two bounds are the main combinatorial and information-theoretic bounds for
class Mi.
Theorem 2.4.2 ([62], Theorem 2.4)
Pi = PXM > (* - 1)/(M - 1) (2.15)
(k - 1)
and equality holds if and only if payoff (m, rn) = - — — — for allm,m' £ M, and m' ^ m.
Theorem 2.4.3 ([35], Theorem 2)
Px= PM > 2-(tf(£W-tf(£|M2)) (2.16)
and equality holds if and only if:
• payoff(m,m') = const for all m,m' £ M, m ^ m','for which E(m,m') > 0.
• P(m'|e,ra) = P(m'\m) for all e £ £(m',m).
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2.4.2

Strategies of class /Ci

In this class of strategies, the enemy chooses a probability distribution pm on the set
£(m) of keys that are incident with the intercepted cryptogram m and chooses a key
e,- £ £(m) according to this distribution. Next the enemy uniformly selects a cryptogram
m' £ M(ei). This is equivalent to randomly choosing a source state andfindingits corresponding cryptogram using the key e». Let Pf*K denote the probability of the enemy's
success in substitution attack, when the communicants' strategy is -K and the enemy's
strategy, in class /Ci, is given by {pm : m £

M}.

Proposition 2.4.4
Pi"

E
E
1
= £ — j ^ 52 5252*3P?ajrnPs(ej,m)

m£M

^2

i=l .7=1

aim>ajm>.

m'€M\m

Proof: P[*'" is calculated by averaging the probability of success when communicants
and the enemy use a pure strategy. A pure strategy of the communicants is choosing a key
ej and an enemy's pure strategy is choosing a key e,- followed by selecting a cryptogram
m' £ M(ei). Payoff of the game, that is, the probability of success for the enemy when a
cryptogram rn is received and the enemy selects the key e^, is equal to,
payoff(m,e,) =

y~]P(communicants select ej, enemy selects rn' £

M(ei)f]M(ej)\m),

j

which, because of the independence of events, reduces to,

52 *>m>ajm,
payoff(m,e,-) = V]P(communicants select e,|m) x
^J

,
k— 1

3

where

^2

a

im'ajm' is

the

number

of

all

rn!

£

M(ei)f]M(ej)

and

m' £M\m

m € \m

tm jm .g ^

e

prokab}jjty 0 f choosing m' £ (M(ei) f) M(ej))\m. But

k—1
.
,
i \ *jPs(m,ej)
P( communicants select e, m ) =
—.—r
,

P(m)
and we have

PVK = 52 52 P(m)prpayofT(m,ei),
i=l m£M
1

. , Efjzzl XjPTa3rnPs(ej, m) Zm'€M\m aim'ajm'

^

" F=T tl, {m)
E

1

=

-r—r
fc

P(m)

52

V-

52 VjP?ajmPs(ej,m)

*• m£Mi,j=l

52

a

im>ajm>.

(2.17)

m'eM\m

D
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Proposition 2.4.5 For every strategy {pm : m £ M} of class /Ci there is a corresponding strategy {qm : m £ M} of class Mi which gives the same probability of success.
Proof: For a strategy of class /Ci, defined by {pm, m £ M},we construct a strategy of
class Mi given by,
1 E
q
™' = 1—i52pTaim', m' £ M\m.
fc

~

L

t =i

Substituting q%, in Proposition 2.4.1 results in (2.17) and Pf*M = P^K.
•
Corollary 2.4.6 is a direct result of Proposition 2.4.5.
Corollary 2.4.6 Px = PXM > PXK.
In [58] Stinson derived a bound on Pi and gave necessary conditions for equality of the
bound. W e will prove a similar bound for strategies of class /Ci and give necessary and
sufficient conditions for equality of the bound. W e note that a similar argument can be
used to show sufficiency of conditions in Stinson's derivation.
Let
E

52 Xjajmajm>Ps(ej, m)
8i(ei,m,m') = tl
^iO,imaimiPs(ei,m)
and Sx = min Si(ei, m,rn). W e note that

(2.18)

i,m,Tn'

payoff(m, et) = — -^——r 52 o~i(m,m',ei)Ps(m,ei)Triaimaim>
^iPs(ei,rn)aim y-^ , . ,oin<,
=
f ( m ) ( t - l ) g *•("»• m '")T h e o r e m 2.4.7
Px > 8x-2-H{E\M) (2.20)
and equality holds if and only if
1. E(m) = kE/M, VmeM.
2. If E(m,m') > 0 then E(m,m') = const = A = 8X.
3. /KiPs(ei,m) is independent of i.
Proof: See Appendix 2.8.2.
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(2-19>

Corollary 2.4.8 Let the encoding matrix of an A-code satisfy the following conditions:

1. E(m) = kE/M, Vm€M.
2. If E(m,m') > 0 then E(m,m') = const = \ = 8X.
3. Ps(ei,m) = Ps(m) is independent ofi.

Then the best strategy of the communicants for both classes of the enemy's strategy i
uniform and we have P 0 = k/M = 80 • 2~HW

and Px = 8X • 2~H(E\MK

Proof: From condition (1) we have P0 = k/M which combined with condition (3) to give
P 0 = 2~(^(£)-ff(£lM)) = 8o2~Hi<E\ Moreover, the uniform strategy of the communicants
when combined with conditions (1) to (3) of the theorem ensures that the conditions of
2~H^M\

Theorem (2.4.7) are satisfied and Px = 8X •

n
A-codes that satisfy the conditions of Corollary 2.4.8 and have E > M2/k2

achieve

Pdj = k/M, where P ^ denotes the probability of deception in the combined game of
impersonation and substitution.

2.5 Perfect protection

As noted earlier, the classes /Co and )CX can be considered as subclasses of Mo and Mx
respectively. In this section we study the best game theoretic performance of an Acode when the enemy can choose between impersonation and substitution, and derive
necessary and sufficient conditions for A-codes that provide perfect protection for both
types of attack. In [59] Stinson derived necessary and sufficient conditions for A-codes
that provide perfect protection for class Mo

and Mi

and have the minimum number of

encoding rules. W e show that perfect protection for class Mi
perfect protection for Mo

in general does not imply

and proceed to give a set of necessary and sufficient condition

for an A-code to provide perfect protection for both classes.
Let n denote a n M x M matrix such that,

r E
/ j 'KjQ'jmQ'im1,m

l*-mm' — AA
m'm

^ m'

i=i

m = m'

> o,

Definition 2.5.1 A source is called uniform if the probability distribution on the sour
states is uniform, that is, Ps(s) — Ps(ei,m) = 1/k.
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If the source is uniform, perfect protection for substitution can be stated as a condition
on the matrix n.
Proposition 2.5.2 For a uniform source PXM = (k - 1)/(M - 1) if and only if Iimm> =
k(k - 1)/(M(M

- 1)), for all m,m' £ M, m ^ m'. In this case we have P(m) - 1/M.

Proof: Let Hmmi be defined as
E

A

n

k(k-l)

i-i-mm' — 2^njajmajmi — ^,^

_ .y

Then from (2.14),
pqirM ._ I

v

Hk

1)

V">

V^

nm -

^~l

- PM - P

p

' -k*M(M-i)xL.Mm^J"-wri-p>

-*•

Conversely, let P™ = (k — 1)/(M — 1). From the uniform source assumption and
it follows that
limmi = kP(m) payoff (m,m'),
which by Theorem 2.4.2 gives
k(k — 1)
nmm' = ——
— x P(m), Vra,m' £ M, rn 7^ m.
Since nmm/ is a symmetric function of m and m' we have,

P(m) = P(m'), Vm,m' £ M, m' ^ m.
That is P(m) = 1/M, and thus
TT - *(*-1)

L

mm

M(M-l)'
D

Proposition 2.5.2 is used to prove Theorem 2.5.3 which is an extension of Massey's
result ([24], Proposition 2). Proposition 2 in [24] is proved under the assumption of
uniform key distribution which is not required in Theorem 2.5.3.
Theorem 2.5.3 For a uniform source if Px = (k - 1)/(M - 1) then P0 = k/M.
Proof: Let Px = (k - 1)/(M - 1). From Proposition 2.5.2 we have
Emm, = k(k - 1)/M(M - 1), and
^

TT

/,,

N
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Hk-1)

k(k-l)

Also,
E

52

n

™™'

=

m'£M\m

E
a

52 *3 3m(ljm' = {k~l)52 *3aJm-

52

m'£M\mj=l

j=l

Hence,
E

k
a

52*3 3m = T7, V m G M.
M

3=1

That is, P 0 =

k/M.
D

W e show in Example 2.5.5 below that the uniform source is a necessary condition in this
theorem, and if the source is not uniform Px = (k — 1)/(M — 1) does not necessarily imply
P 0 = k/M.

However, before giving this example we need to prove Theorem 2.5.4 which

gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for an A-code to provide perfect protection
for impersonation and substitution.

Theorem 2.5.4 An A-code provides perfect protection for impersonation and substitutio
if and only if
E

k-1

52*3a3majm'Ps(ej,m) =

M,M_ly

for allm,m' £ M,m ^ m'. This implies that cryptograms occur with the same probability
in the channel.
Proof: See Appendix 2.8.3.
W e use Theorem 2.5.4 to construct the following example in which Px = (k— 1)/(M —
1), and Po = k/M

requires the uniform distribution on the source. W e will show that

for a non-uniform source there exists a communicants' strategy that results in Pi =
(k — 1)/(M — 1) (without P 0 = k/M) showing that if the source is not uniform Pi =
(k — 1)/(M — 1) does not always results in Po = k/M.
Example 2.5.5 Let A be an A-code whose encoding matrix D and its corresponding
incidence matrix A respectively, are,
52

0

s2 0

5l

0

5l

52

52

5l

0

51

0

52

Sl

39

' 11
1 0
A= 0 1
1 1

0 "
1
1
0

_ 10 1 _

The rows of D and A are indexed by keys ei, 1 < i < 5, and columns by cryptograms
mj, 1 < j < 3.
If P0 = k/M and Px = (k - 1)/(M - 1) then by Theorem 2.5.4 we have
E

52^jajmajm>Ps(ej,m) = (k - 1)/(M(M - 1)) = 1/6, \/m,m' ^ m.

Let m3 be intercepted and replaced by m2. Then (2.5) reduces to 7r3Ps(e3,m3) = 1
Similarly if m2 is intercepted and replaced by m 3 then 7r3Ps(e3,m2) = 1/6 and hence
Ps(e3,m2) = Ps(sx) = Ps(e3,m3) = Ps(s2). But Ps(sx) + Ps(s2) = 1. Hence Ps(sx) =
Ps(s2) = 1/2 and the code provides perfect protection for impersonation and substitution
simultaneously only if the source is uniform. The communicants' strategy, given by,
TTX = 7T2 = 7T4 = 7T5 = 1/6, 7T3 = 1/3,

is a strategy that ensures perfect protection for impersonation and substituti
Let the source be non-uniform and Ps(5i) = 1/3, Ps(s2) = 2/3. Then the probability
distribution,
TTI =

1/28,

TT2

= 4/28,

TT3

= 9/28, TT4 =

TT5

= 7/28,

gives Px = (k - 1)/(M - 1) but P 0 ^ k/M. This is because we have, P(mi) = 30/84,
P(m2) = 18/84, P(m3) = 36/84 and it is easy to verify that
k—l
52*3 3Tnajm>Ps(ej,m) = M_1P(m)i
E

a

V™,™' ^ m.

i=i

However in this case the A-code does not provide perfect protection for impersonation
because,
E

52 *3a3t =
k

19/28,

for £ = 1,

17/28,

for £ = 2,

20/28,

for £ = 3.

D
Using Theorem 2.5.4 and Proposition 2.5.6 allows us to give an alternative proof of
Stinson's Theorem 4.1 in [62].
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Proposition 2.5.6 // an A-code provides perfect protection against substitution attac
and P(m) > 0, V m £ M, then E > M(M - l)/(k(k - 1)) and equality is obtained if the
incidence matrix of the code is that of a BIBD.
Proof: Because of perfect protection P(m' valid \m) > 0, Vm' £ M\m, every pair of
cryptograms should occur together at least once. So E x k(k - 1) > M(M - 1) and the
result follows.
•
Corollary 2.5.7 ([62], Theorem 4.1) Let P0 = k/M and Px = (k-l)/(M-l). Then
E > (M2 — M)/(k2 — k) = EQ and equality holds if and only if rows of the encoding matrix
form a (M,k,l)-BIBD, and both the source state and encoding rules are equiprobable.

Proof: The incidence matrix of an A-code that satisfies both Theorem 2.5.4 and Prop
E

sition 2.5.6 is that of a BIBD and so 52a3™a3™'

=

1- This gives

3=1

tPs{e

*

m)

''

k(k-l)
= MM=T)=W

1

,
<2-21)

But for a given £, we have 52 Ps(et, m)aem = 1 and hence,
m

*t = 52*^Ps(ee,m)a£m = l/(kE)52a£m = 1/E.
m

m

From (2.21) it follows that Ps(e,m) = 1/k which completes the proof.
U
As noted in Proposition 2.5.6, Pi = ~——rr implies
E >
(M-l) r
• ~ k(k-l) '
M(M - 1) ,
•,
r
. P
, . .
Tr _
It E <
—— the system cannot provide perfect protection for substitution.
k(k — 1)
Theorem 2.5.8 gives a tight lower bound on Px when Po = k/M. A-codes that satisfy
this bound with equality are those for which enemy's best strategy can be given by the
uniform strategy of class fCx.

Theorem 2.5.8 Let P0 = k/M. Then Px > Pf > 8xM/(kE) and equality holds if and
only if the A-code satisfies the following conditions ( which are the same as in Coroll
2.4.8)
1. E(m) = kE/M for any m £ M.
2. If E(m,m') > 0 then E(m,m') = const = Si,
3. Ps(ei,m) = Ps(m) and is independent of ei.
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Proof: See Appendix 2.8.4.
Combining Theorem 2.5.8 and Theorem 2.4.2 we can give an interesting classification
of the best protection offered by an A-code with respect to the number of encoding rules
it has.
Corollary 2.5.9 In an A-code if P0 = k/M we have

(k-1

8XM\

Corollary 2.5.10 In an A-code with P0 = k/M we have
1. Pi > 8xM/(kE) ifE< 8XE0 = frggy).
2. Px>(k- 1)/(M - 1) ifE > 8XE0.
3. Px>(k- 1)/(M -1) = 8xM/(kE) ifE = 8XE0.

2.6 Optimal authentication codes
Giving a definition of optimality for an A-codes is non-trivial. It is important to note
that minimizing the value of the games does not ensure efficient use of the redundancy
added during the encoding process. W e consider optimality of an (M, k, E) A-code in
relation to its performance in the combined game. From Proposition 1.25 it follows that
the probability of deception in the combined game is lower bounded, P&x > P 0 >

k/M.

A n A-code uses the added redundancy in the most efficient way if it satisfies informationtheoretic bounds for impersonation and substitution (when the communicants are using
their best strategy for combined game). For the two classes of enemy's strategies we have
two different types of information-theoretic bounds for impersonation (1.34), (2.12) and
substitution (2.16), (2.20).
Definition 2.6.1 An (M,k,E) A-code is optimal if P^ = k/M, and it satisfies bound
(1.34) for P0 and (2.16) for Px or it satisfies bounds (2.12) and (2.20) for P 0 and Px
respectively.
We consider A-codes that satisfy each pair of bounds separately. Firstly we consider
A-codes that satisfy bounds (1.34) and (2.16). Assume that E(m,m')

> A > 0 for all

pairs (m,m') £ M, m ^ m'.
Theorem 2.6.2 If an (M,k,E) A-code satisfies bounds (1.34)

an

d (2-16) with equality

and E(m,m') > A > 0 for all m,m' £ M, m ^ m', then it has the following properties:
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1. The A-code provides perfect protection for impersonation and substitution and achieve
bounds (1.16) and (1.24) w^h

equality. The best enemy's strategy in the combined

game is his/her impersonation strategy.
E

2. 52*3a3™ajm> =

M

k(k — 1)
( M _ -g = 1/^0 •

3. Probability of a cryptogram m occurring in the channel is independent of m,
P(m) = 1/M.
4. Probability distribution of the source is uniform.
5. P(m'\e,m) = P(m'|m), for all e £ £(m,m').

6. E> E0.
7. A-code is optimal.
Proof: Property 1 follows from Lemma 1.2.22. Then using property 1, and Theorems
2.5.4 and 1.2.18 we have
E

E
a

fc
a

P(m) = 1/M = 52*3 3mPs(ej,m) = Ps(ej,m)52*3 3m
j=i

= Ps(m) — .

j=i

Therefore Ps(ej,m) = 1/k and the probability distribution of source is uniform, which
proves condition 4. Property 2 is the result of Theorem 2.5.4 applied to an A-code
with uniform source. Properties 5 and 6 are the direct results of the Theorem 2.4.3 and
Proposition 2.5.6. Property 7 follows from Definition 2.6.1.
•
A n optimal (M,k,E)

A-code that satisfies (1.34) and (2.16) with equality and has

E(m,m') > A > 0 exists if and only if E > \E0.
Next we consider A-codes that satisfy bounds (2.12, 2.20) with equality.

Definition 2.6.3 An (M,k,E) A-code is called 8x-perfect if it satisfies bounds (2.12,
with equality.

We note that conditions of the Corollary 2.4.8 are sufficient for the A-code to be ^Theorem 2.6.4 8x-perfect A-codes are optimal if 81—7-77—T\~ = ^I-^O > E > 8xM2/k2,
where E(m,rn') = 8X or 0.
Proof: If an A-code is optimal then P0 = k/M > 8xM/(kE) and hence E > 8xM2/k2.
Also if E(m,m') = 8X or 0, then from simple counting it follows that E < 8XE0.
•
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Corollary 2.6.5 If 8XE0 > E > 8xM2/k2, a 8x-perfect A-code achieves the minimum
possible value for Px and satisfies the following conditions
1. Pdi =P0 = k/M.
2. Px = ——.
x

kE

Moreover an enemy's and communicants' best strategies are as follows,

• The enemy's best combined and impersonation strategy is random selection from
set M

of all cryptograms.

• The enemy's best substitution strategy is random selection of a key e from th

of all keys £ and then randomly selecting a cryptogram from the set M(e) of cr
tograms that are authentic under the chosen key e.
• The communicants' best strategy is random selection from the set of keys £.

2.6.1 Doubly perfect A-codes

Definition 2.6.6 An optimal A-code which satisfies bounds (2.12) and (2.20) with mi
imum number of encoding rules is called 8i-doubly perfect A-code.

A doubly perfect A-code, as defined by Brickell [8], is a perfect A-code that s
Pd =2~H(EW).

Doubly perfect A-codes are a special case of <$i-doubly perfect A-codes when 8X
is true because for perfect A-codes Pdl = Po and hence we have Po = Pi = P^. Doubly
perfect A-codes have all properties mentioned in Corollary 2.6.5. W e summarize these
results in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.6.7 For a given E, M, k we have
1. IfE< M2/k2 then Pdl > k/M.
2. If E = M2/k2 then doubly perfect A-codes are optimal and have Pdl = Px = Po =
k/M =

M/(kE).

3. If M2/k2 < E < E0 then 8x-perfect A-codes with 8X = 1 are optimal and have
Pdi =P0 = k/M >PX = M/(kE).
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4. If E > EQ then A-codes that satisfy bounds (1.34) a^d (2.16) with equality an

E(m,m') > 0 for all pairs (m,m') are optimal and have the following parameter
Pdl=Po>Pi

=

(k-l)/(M-l).

If for all m,m' £ M,m

^ m' E(m,m') > 8i > 0 or E(m,m') = 0 then the last

corollary can be restated in the following way.
Corollary 2.6.8 For a given E, M, k, we have
1. IfE<

6xM2/k2, then Pdl > k/M.

2. If E = 8xM2/k2, then 8X doubly perfect A-codes are optimal and have Pdl = Px =
P0 = k/M =

M/(kE).

3. If 8xM2/k2 < E < 8XE0, then Si-perfect A-codes are optimal. We have Pdl = P
k/M>
4- If E >

Px=8iM/(kE).
8IEQ,

then A-codes that satisfy bounds (1.34)

an

d (2.16) with equalit

have E(m,m') > 0 for all pairs (m,m') are optimal and have the following param
eters Pdl = P 0 = k/M > Px = (k- 1)/(M - 1).
Examples of optimal A-codes will be considered in the next chapter.

2.7 Conclusion

We have considered two types of enemy actions (key strategies and message stra
in Simmons' model of authentication. Although key strategies is a subclass of message
strategies, its independent investigation allowed us to derive new bounds on the probability of deception for impersonation and substitution and point out the importance of
the average distance of the incidence matrix of an A-code in providing protection for
impersonation. W e proved that A-codes with perfect protection for impersonation limit
probability of success of the enemy in substitution to one of the two distinct values depending on the number of encoding rules. If this number is higher than a threshold EQ
the code may provide perfect protection for substitution but for less encoding rules the
best protection offered by the code is M/(kE).
W e derived a necessary and sufficient condition on the incidence matrix of an A-code
that provides perfect protection for impersonation and substitution. This can be used
to give a simple proof for Stinson's theorem [62, Theorem 4.1]. W e showed that perfect
protection for substitution results in perfect protection for impersonation only if the source
is uniform. This extends Massey's result [24] in this case which holds with the assumption
of uniform strategy for the communicants.
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2.8

Appendix

2.8.1
Proof of Theorem 2.3.3
Using (2.1) w e observe that for class /C0 payoff matrix of the authentication g a m e is given
by (l/k)AAT. For a communicants' strategy x we have
P0K

>

payoff (ei) = (l/k)527Tj52a,sais,
3

1

a

7r

a

^ ( /*)X] «**0 «' »'»

= S

(2.22)

s

(2-23)

°*ii

s
K

and so P0 /80 > x,-, Vz. But

H(E) = -52*3^g^ > -5>>g(x0 = -iog(^),
j

j

80

80

and hence,
8o2~HW.

P0K >

Equality in the above bound holds if and only if we have equality in (2.22) and (2.23),
that is,
PQK

=

80 =

payoff(e,-) Vi,

(2.24)

8(ei,m), Vi,m.

(2.25)

From (2.25) w e have 7T; = 1/E and hence the incidence matrix of the A-code has columns
of constant weight (80 = kE/M).

Moreover using (2.22) we get

payoff(e,) = (1/kE) 5252a3^a^ = < V # = k/M,
s

3

and therefore P0K = payoff(e;), Ve. Conversely if the incidence matrix of the A-code has
the same number of ones in a column, then the uniform strategy of the communicants
results in (2.25) and (2.24) to hold and the A-code will achieve the bound with equality.
•

2.8.2
Proof of Theorem 2.4.7
The proof is similar to Stinson's proof [58]. However in this case
E

1
payoff(m,e;) =
^

— — • 52 ^jPs(ej,m)aiml 52 a3ma3m'
r\m){K - i) {j=1
m,^m
,.
fl"»-a»ma»m'Ps(e,-,m)

P(m)
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m na\

where the last expression is derived by using (2.19).
Let vf(m) = maxt(payoff(e;,m)) then P* = £m P(m)v?(m). We have
H(E\M) = J] P(e,-,m) log -J— (2.27)
t,m
.r^e|mj
e
En/ M P( i)Ps(ei,m)
p
(<>i,™)^g
p, Y
t',m
-* lmJ

%

(2.28)

> £p(e,,m)log^M (2.29)

> _iogi!= = -lo«T- (2-30)
t>l

Oi

and so PXK > 8X2-H^M).

Equality holds if and only if 8x(ei,m,m') = 8X is constant and Pf = vK(m), Vm. I
8x(m,m',ei) = 8i then
<u x TiPs(ei,m) = 8i(ei,m,m') x 7rt-.Ps(e.-,m),
E
a

a

= 52*3 3rn jm'Ps(ej,m), (2.31)
J=l

and because (2.31) only depends on m we have 7T;Ps(e;,m) is independent of i.

case <$i x TTiPs(ei,m) = 7T,Ps(et-,m)]C? o-jm^jm1 and 8X = 52jajmajm>. Moreover
P\ = vi (m)

we nave

r>K
Kt \
i
at
w
KiPs(ei,m)aim y-^
P1 = Vl (m) = max(payoff(e;, m)) =
p(m\(k-l) ^ ^ m '

m

,
'e ^

TCiPs{ei,m)aitm
~ Pjm) 6l>
and since P(m) = T,i7riPs(ei,m)aijm = -KiPs(ei,m)Y,i0.im we have
pK _ Sl

and hence £),• ajm = r is a constant.
E

To prove the converse we note that if WiPs(ei,m) and 52a3ma3m'
.7=1

from (2.18) we have 8x(m,m',ei) independent of m,m',i. Moreover
Kt \ t at w ^iPs(ej,m)8x 8X
vx (m) = max(payoft(m,e;)J = max(
*

*

—.—r
i \TTl j

and P* = 52 P(m)v?(m) = 8x/r. We note that r = kE/M.
D
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J = —,
V

are

constants then

2.8.3
Proof of Theorem 2.5.4
Necessity: Let
fc52*3 3majm'Ps(ej,m) =

1

E

a

M

_

.

(2.32)

Then,
PTM = 52

52 52*3a3™<ijm>Ps(ej,m)q™l = — — M

mEM m'^m j=l

= Pl5

l

and the code provides perfect protection for substitution. Hence from Theorem 2.4.2 we
have
,, Hj=iXjajmajm,Ps(ej,m)
k-1
al
M-V
payoff (m,m ) = — — P(m)
which by using (2.32) gives P(m) = 1/M and the probability distribution on the cryptogram space is uniform. W e note that,
52 ajmPs(ej,m) = 1,
and so we can write,
•Kj = 52 KjajmPs(ej,m)-

(2.33)

Since for all m £ M,
E

E
a

52*3 jm

=

j=l

52 52*3a3m'CljmPs(ej,m'),
m'£M j=l

E

=

52

E

52 ^jajmajm'Ps(ej^m') + 52 *3a)mPs(e-j, m),

m'eM\mj=l

i=l

m'

and we have

P-

*

P

° ~ M'

Sufficiency: Let Px = (k - 1)/(M - 1) and P 0 = k/M. Using Theorem 2.4.2, for all
m,m' £ M, m ^ rn!,
E

k-1
52*3a3^3m'Ps(ej,m) =
3=1

Since P 0 = k/M, using (2.33) results in,
48

M

_lP(m).

E
Po = P 0

E
a

=

52 *3a3m'0'jmPs(ej,ml),

52*3 3m = 52

j=l m'£M

j=l

E

E
a

52 *3 3majm>PS(ej, m') + 52 Xja2jmPs(ej,m),

52

Tn'SA/l\m j=l

j=l

m'E.M\m

=

k/M.

That is P(m) = 1/M. But Px = (k - 1)/(M - 1) implies payoff(m,m') = JT~T,
which by using (1.17) gives
E

k-1
52*3a3ma3rn>Ps(ej,m) =

^ _

.

D
2.8.4
Proof of Theorem 2.5.8
From Proposition 2.4.4
^ E E
Pi

=

T—r 52 5252*3PTaJmPs(ej,m)
52 a™>a,jm<
fc
* meM i=l j=l
m'£M\m
EE
E
1 _

TTTT S

m£M m'£M\m

^

X)Pra«-m'£Tjaimajm'P5(ej,m).

(2.34)

(2.35)

Using (2.19) we have

E
52*3a3Tnajm'Ps(ej,m) >

8XTriaimaim>Ps(ei,m).

3=1

Hence,
a

E

1

px > 8X-r^— 52 52 52pT im'^iaimaim'Ps(ei,m).
k ~ 1 m£M
mGM m'GM
m'£Mmm i=l
A possible enemy's strategy is,

PT =

E""""

, e> € E(m).
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(2.36)

This is a valid strategy because, p™ > 0, e,- £ E(m), and

52 pT = 52pTaim = i.
e;€£(m)

t'=l

Using this strategy in (2.36) and noting that, P 0 = k/M implies J2j *jajm = k/M, m £
M, we have
E
1
k_l

P? > ^T

M
-

52

m£M m'£Mm »'=1
E

Sl

u(u_-\\52
K K

\

52P?aim'XiaimaimiPs(ei,m),

52

52

52

*laimaim'Ps(ei,m),

l

) i=lmeMm'£M\m

where we have used P * > pf. This means,

1 = 1

E

The second inequality is obtained because 52 *\1S a concave function and its minimum is
i=l

obtained for 7r,- = 1/E, i = 1,2, • • •, E. Equality in (2.37) implies that the communicants'
best strategy is uniform and, 8x(ei, m, m') = 8X implying that the product of two unequal
columns in the incidence matrix A is equal to 0 or 6X. It is easy to see that the uniform
strategy for communicants with Po = k/M implies that the columns of the incidence
matrix A have an equal H a m m i n g weight of kE/M.
•
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Chapter 3
Spoofing attack of order r
3.1 Introduction

In this chapter we study A-codes under spoofing attack of order r. We consider the cl
(M,k,E) A-codes and assume that the enemy sees r, r > 0, cryptograms encoded under
the same key. W e use game-theoretic and information-theoretic models to derive bounds
on the probability of deception and characterise A-codes with the best performance. This
includes characterisation of r-fold perfect codes, r-optimal codes and r-fold secure codes.
W e prove necessary and sufficient conditions on the incidence matrix of r-fold secure Acodes. W e also introduce the concept of near-perfect protection which is a useful extension
of perfect protection. W e show that near-perfect protection is a necessary condition for
A-codes that satisfy the information-theoretic bounds with equality. Another interesting
result of this chapter is a definition of perfect authenticity, which is similar to perfect
secrecy, and proving that A-code that provides perfect authenticity requires at least r + 1
bits of key for one bit of protection. Most of these results are published in [38, 67, 68, 40,
41].

3.2 Preliminaries
We consider the same model as described in chapter 2 but extend possible attacks to
spoofing of order r. That is we assume that the enemy may impersonate the transmitter
by introducing a codeword m' into the channel or use a spoofing attack of order r in
which he/she uses the knowledge of the sequence, mr, of r codewords, sent over the
channel, to construct a fraudulent codeword m' £ M\mr.
successful if m' £ M(e).

In either case the enemy is

Impersonation is spoofing of order zero and spoofing of order

one is usually referred to as substitution attack. In this chapter we only consider A-codes
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without splitting although some of the results can be generalised to codes with splitting.
The structure of the chapter is as follows:

1. In section 3.3 we consider two classes of enemy strategies.

2. In section 3.4 we consider A-codes that are r-fold secure against spoofing and pro
necessary and sufficient conditions on the incidence matrix. W e give two characterisation theorems and show the equivalence of such codes with the (r + l)-designs
and orthogonal arrays of strength (r + 1). W e use Delsarte's approach [11] to find
a new bound on the size of the orthogonal arrays (OA) of strength 2 and 3 and
respectively on a number of encoding rules for Cartesian A-codes with 1-fold and
2-folds security. W e also characterise the codes that achieve the bound with equality and show that the bound is achieved by A-codes obtained from the dual of two
well-studied error correcting codes: an M D S code and the extended H a m m i n g code.

3. Section 3.5 is devoted to near-perfect protection which is a generalisation of per
protection. W e show that the codes which have the best information-theoretic
performance should provide near-perfect protection.
4. Finally we consider the combined game for spoofing of order r and define r-fold
perfect codes and r-optimal codes. W e introduce the concept of perfect authenticity
and show that an A-code that provides perfect authenticity of order r requires at
least r + 1 bits of key for 1 bit of protection.

3.3 Two classes of enemy's strategies
Suppose an enemy has intercepted a sequence of r cryptograms. We consider extensions
classes /Co and Mo

discussed in section 2.3 when spoofing attack of order r is considered.

• The enemy tries to guess the correct key; he/she chooses a key e £ £(mT), using
a probability distribution pmr on the set £(mT), and then randomly selects a cryptogram m' £ M(e)\mr.

The enemy's strategy is the collection {pmT,mr

£ Mr}

of

probability distributions pmT. This is called a key strategy and is referred to as class
Kr of enemy's strategies.
• The enemy tries to guess a valid cryptogram; he/she selects a fraudulent cryptogram
m' £ M\mr

using a probability distribution q™r over M\mr.

The enemy's action in

this case is similar to Simmons' model of attack [46] and is given by {qmT,mT
This is called a message strategy and is referred to as class Mr

52

£

Mr).

of enemy's strategies.

W e use P r A and PrM to denote the best probability of success for spoofing attack of
order r in the above cases, respectively.

3.3.1 Probability of deception
Class Mr
Let the communicants use a strategy 7r and the enemy's strategy be the message strategy
given by {qm ,mr £ MT}. The probability of success with a cryptogram m', when mr is
intercepted, is payoff(mr,m'),
E

52*3a3mi---a3mra3m'Ps(e3imr)
payoff (m\m')

=

^

— —
P(mr)

,

(3.1)

E
mT

= 52*3a3™T1--M3™rrPs(e3imr)-

P{ )

(3-2)

3=1

Then p*f, probability of the enemy's success for the given communicants' strategy TT and
enemy's strategy qm , can be calculated as follows:
E
P™ =

52

52*3a3mriajmr...ajmrajmlPs(ej,mr)q'^.

52

mT£MT

(3.3)

Tn'£M\mr j=l

The probability of the enemy's success, PrM, is obtained by averaging max payoff (mr ,rn)
m'
T

over all m

£ M,

Pr = V P(m ) max payoff (mr ,m),
M

T

mT£MT
E

m X

= 52 ^ (y^*3a3^---a3^a3^'Ps{e3^mT))mT

(3-4)

j=l

Class /Cr
Let the enemy's strategy be given by {pmT,mr £ MT) where pmT is a probability distri-

bution on the set £(mT). The payoff of the game, that is, the probability of the enemy's
success when he/she has intercepted a sequence mr of cryptograms and chooses e; is,
al T

,

E

TTjttjmr ... ajmrPS(m/iej) m>£M\mr . .
PayofF(m,eO

-

£

j ^

^

,

(3-5)

Then pK, the probability of the enemy's success for the given strategies IT and pmT, is,
Pr = 52P(rnr)pfp*yoft(mr,ei),
mT ,i
1

=

E

T
K

52
i

r

m £M

r

E

5252*3PTTa3m[---ajmrPs(ej,mr)

a

3m'airn<-

52
r

i=l j=l

m'£M\m
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(3.6)

The probability of deception in the class KT is given by the following expression:
PrK = 52 P(mr) max payoff (mr,e2).
mr

We

note that for any communicants' strategy w and any enemy's key strategy

{pmT,mr

£ Mr),

and probability of deception equal to pf, one can obtain a corre-

sponding enemy's message strategy {qmT,mT

£ MT)

withp^ = pK . This can be verified

by substituting,
E
1
q™, = -^—l52pfaim>,

rri e

M\mT

x=l

in expression (3.3) which results in (3.6) and p™ = pK.

Hence we have the following

corollary.
Corollary 3.3.1 Pr = PrM > PrK.

Therefore the best enemy strategy can be always represented as a strategy of class Mr.

3.4 A-codes that are r-fold secure against spoofing
3.4.1 General A-codes
Spoofing attacks of order r have been studied by a number of authors [25, 71, 60, 35].
According to the definition 1.2.16, a general A-code is r-fold secure against spoofing if and
(k — i)
only if Pi = — —
—, for 0 < i < r. The probability of the enemy's success, P r = P r M ,
can be obtained using expression (3.4).
It is important to note that for a spoofing attack of order r, order r statistics of the
source must be considered. W e require the following definitions.
Definition 3.4.1 A source is said to be key independent of order r with respect to an
A-code if Ps(ei,mr) depends only on mr and not on ei.
Letsr = {sr,...,sr}.
Definition 3.4.2 A source is r-fold uniform if,

P(0 = ( *(*-l)...(*-r+l)' 5<^'1^'^r
I 0,

otherwise.

W e note that an r-fold uniform source is also t-fold uniform, t <r, but an (r — l)-fold
uniform source is not in general r-fold uniform.
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In Theorem 1.2.15 we gave necessary and sufficient conditions for A-codes that provide
perfect protection for spoofing attack of order r. Perfect protection against spoofing
attack of order r does not imply perfect protection against spoofing attack of order r - 1.
Theorem 2.5.4 established necessary and sufficient conditions for A-codes that are 1-fold
secure against spoofing. Theorem 3.4.3 generalises this result for spoofing attack of order
r.
T h e o r e m 3.4.3 An A-code is r-fold secure against spoofing if and only if
T(mT,m') = 52*3a3mi-ajmrajmlPs(eJ,mr) =

M

_ iM_ry (3-7)

for all m' £ M\mr and mr £ MT. In this case P(mr)

M(M

-1)...(M

-r)

Proof: See Appendix 3.10.1.
•
N o w we consider A-codes that are r-fold secure against spoofing (r-fold secure A-codes)
under 2 different assumptions. Firstly we characterise these A-codes assuming that they
have a m i n i m u m number of encoding and the source is arbitrary. Secondly we characterise
these A-codes assuming that the source is uniform and the code has an arbitrary number
of encoding rules. In both cases the existence of such A-codes is equivalent to the existence
of (r + 1)-(M, k, A) designs.
r-fold secure A-codes with minimum number of encoding rules
A-codes that are r-fold secure against spoofing require a large number of encoding rules.
Theorem 3.4.4 extends Stinson's Theorem 3.8 [64] and Theorem 6.2 in [60], De Soete's
Theorem 7.2 in [57] and Massey's Proposition 2 in [24].
Theorem 3.4.4 Let Pt = (k - r)/(M - r) for 0 <t<r. Then
M(M-l)...(M-r)
k(k-l)...(k-r)
-

_

and equality holds if and only if the incidence matrix of the A-code is the incidence matrix
of a (r + l)-(M,k,l) design. This implies that the encoding rules are equiprobable and the
source is uniform of order r.
Proof: Let an A-code provide perfect protection against spoofing attacks of order r.
Then E(mr,m')

> 1, for all mr £ Mr and m' £ M\mr.

E-k(k-l)...(k-r)> M(M - 1)... (M - r),
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This gives,

E

and for A-codes with E = Er we have 52 a . K • • • aimrajm, = 1. Then from Theorem 3.4.3
3= 1

there exists a unique £ for which,
*tPs{e!'mr)=M(M-kl)~r.(M-r) =

1
k{k-l).. (k-r +

l)E/

(3 8)

-

But for a given £, w e have
52Ps{et,mr)aimr...aimr = 1,
and hence using (3.8),
*( = 52*zPs{eiimr)atm'1---aimT = l/jE?r,
which shows that the communicants' strategy is uniform. From (3.8) it follows that
1
.
' '
Ps(ee,mr) = •—
———
which completes the proof. The converse has been
k(k — l)...(k — r -f 1)
proven by Schobi [42], where he proved that the existence of a (r + l)-(M,k, 1) design
implies existence of an (M, k,Er) A-code that is r-fold secure against spoofing.
•
Theorem 3.4.4 removes the unnecessary condition of Theorem 3.8 in [64] and gives an "if
and only if" condition when the number of encoding rules is minimum.
Hence w e have the following conclusion which generalises Stinson's result [60] by removing the uniformity requirement on the source.
Corollary 3.4.5 The existence of an A-code with a minimum
E

=

number of encoding rules

ET that is r-fold secure against spoofing is equivalent to the existence of a

(r + 1)-(M, k, 1) design.
W e note that for A-codes which provide perfect protection of order r, every sequence
of r -\- 1 cryptograms is incident with at least one encoding rule. Let Ar = minm>- E(mr),
V m r £ Mr.

Then the existence of an A-code that is r-fold secure against spoofing and

has E = XrEr encoding rules, is equivalent to the existence of an (r + 1)-(M, k, A r ) design.
The existence of such designs has been studied by a number of authors [14], however a
general construction for r > 5 is not known.
r-fold secure A-codes with r-fold uniform source
A n A-code that provides perfect protection against spoofing of order r does not necessarily provide perfect protection against spoofing of lower orders. Massey [24] showed that
perfect protection is provided when the source has uniform distribution and the c o m m u nicants' strategy is uniform. Theorem 3.4.6 removes the requirement on the strategy of
the communicants.
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T h e o r e m 3.4.6 // an A-code provides perfect protection against spoofing attack of order
r, and the source is r-fold uniform, then the A-code is r-fold secure against spoofing.
Proof: Let n(r) = [nmr(jn/(r)] , mr £ Mr,m' £ M, be a matrix whose rows are labeled
by mT £ Mr

and columns by m ' £ M, and its elements are

E
nmrim/(r) = 52*3a3mr1---ajmrajm).

(3.9)

3=1

Using (3.1), (3.2) and the uniform distribution of the source we have
E

payoff (mr,m')

=

52*3a3mri--M3mrTa3m'PS(e3imr)
J
^—^
,
52^jajmi-ajmrPs(ej,mr)
3= 1

nur-iimr(r-l) M-r
where ur~l = (m^m^,..., mrr). From (3.10) we conclude that nmr)m/(r) is independent of
m' and depends only on (m\,..., mrT). However using (3.9) we can conclude that nmr(7n/(r)
only depends on {m\,..., mTr} and not on any particular order of these cryptograms. That
is, nur-i)mr(r - 1) = IIwr-iimr(r - l), where vT~l = (rn\,... ^m^m^

... mrr).

To prove that nVftn/(r) = llvrim„(r) for all ur,vT £ MT', and m',m" £ M,

we note

that nur>m/(r) = n u r m »(r) and so we have to show that nur)m/(r) = n„rim/(r). This is
trivially true if ur and vr differ in only one cryptogram. In other cases a set of at most r
sequences (ur(l),... ,ur(r)) can be constructed such that ur(l) = uT and ur(r) = vr and

"r(i) = K ( i - 1 ) , • • • ,«i-i(i - i),^.«5+i(i -1).• • ->KU -1)) and
nur>m,(r) = nltr(i),mi(r) = nur(2),m'(r) = • • • = nur(r),m/(r) = n^ im( (r).
Hence nmrm/ = consi and is independent of mr and m. Then using the property of the
source and (3.9), (3.7)

we have that T(mr,m') = const for all mr, m' which according to

Theorem 3.4.3 completes the proof.
•
Definition 3.4.7 The support of a q-ary vector x of length n, denoted by supp(x), is a
binary vector such that supp(x){ = 1 if xt- ^ 0 and supp(x){ = 0 otherwise.

For r-fold uniform source (3.7) becomes independent of the source probabilities and w
can characterise the combinatorial structure of the code.
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T h e o r e m 3.4.8 Let the source be r-fold uniform. Then an A-code is r-fold secure against

spoofing if and only if the incidence matrix of the code is the incidence matrix of a (r+1)
(M,k,X) design (with possibly repeated blocks).
Proof: See Appendix 3.10.2
•
Both Theorems, 3.4.4 and 3.4.8, require the incidence matrix of the A-code to be the
incidence matrix of a (r + 1)-(M, k, A) design. However Theorem 3.4.8 does not require the
number of encoding rules to be minimum and hence the incidence matrix of the A-code
may have repeated rows.
W e note that according to Theorem 3.4.6 perfect protection for spoofing of order r
implies r-fold security against spoofing for r-fold uniform source and hence we have the
following corollary.

Corollary 3.4.9 Let the source be r-fold uniform. Then an A-code provides perfect pro

tection against spoofing attack of order r if and only if the incidence matrix of the cod
the incidence matrix of a (r -\- 1)-(M, k, A) design (with possibly repeated blocks).
We give an example of the incidence matrix of an A-code that is 1-fold secure for a
1-fold uniform source and the communicants' strategy is not uniform. It implies that the
incidence matrix of the A-code is a matrix of a 2-(M, k, A) with multiplicities.
Example 3.4.10 Consider the following (M = 6, k — 3, E = 14) A-code. It has P0 =
k/M and Pi = (k — l)/(M — l). The following incidence matrix of the code is the incidence
matrix of a 2-(M, k, A) design with multiplicities.
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E/M

mi

m2

m3

m4

m5

m6

ei

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

1
1

0.100

e2

0
0

e3

0
1
1
1
1
0

1

1
0
1
0
1
1

e9

i

1
1
1
0
0
0
1

eio

1
1
1
1
1

0
0

0
0
1
1
0
1

0
1
0
1
0
1

0.090

e8

0
0
0
0
0
2

0
0
1
0
0

0.090

e4
e5
e6
e?

en
ei2
ei3
e14

0
1
1
1

0
0
1
0
0
1

1
1
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
1
0

•K

0.010

0.090
0.010
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100

0.010
0.100
0.010
0.090

In this design blocks labelled by ex,e%,ei,e%,eo),eX2 have multiplicity 10, block lab
by e^, t\, eXo, eX\ have multiplicity 9, and all other blocks have multiplicity 1.

3.4.2 Cartesian A-codes
In the study of Cartesian A-codes we do not require any assumptions on the distribution
of the source. W e note that a Cartesian A-code is r-fold secure against spoofing if and
only if P 0 = Pi = P 2 • • • = Pr — k/M.

In Theorem 3.4.11 we prove a generalisation of

Theorem 2.3 [62], very much in the spirit of the earlier Theorem 3.4.8.
Theorem 3.4.11 The authentication array of an r-fold secure Cartesian (M,k,E) Acode is an OAA(r + 1, k,£), where £ = M/k

is the number of tags and E — Xlr.

Proof: (sketch) We generalise Theorem 2.2 in [62] and obtain

e££(mrm')

Using an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4.8 we can prove that the authentication array of the A-code is an OAA(r + l,k, M).
W e note that for r = 1 and minimum number of encoding rules the above theorem
reduces to the Theorem 2.3 in [62].
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•

3.4.3

Linear programming bound for Cartesian A-codes

In this section w e will use an elegant approach due to Delsarte [11] to find a lower bound on
the number of encoding rules E for r-fold secure Cartesian A-codes. In the study of errorcorrecting codes this approach has been considered by a number of authors [28, 27, 23]. In
the context of cryptography the same problem was considered by Bierbrauer et al in [6].
W e use the result of Theorem 3.4.11 to formulate a linear programming problem where the
solution is a lower bound on the number of encoding rules for an r-fold secure Cartesian
A-codes. W e transform the original linear programming problem to an equivalent one
using the ideas proposed in [34, 10] and prove a new bound on the size of OA\(t,n,q).

Error-correcting codes, orthogonal arrays and distance distribution.
Let C be g-ary (n,M,d) error-correcting code (.E-code) and d(u,v),u,v £ C denote the
Hamming distance between vectors u,v. From the definition 1.2.37 we have d(u,v) > d.
Definition 3.4.12 The distance distribution of a q-ary (n,M,d) error-correcting code C
is a sequence (Bo, Bx,..., Bn) where
B{ = T7|{(w,v) :u,v £ C,d(u,v) - i}\, 0 < i < n.
We note that B0 = 1, B0 + Bx + ... + Bn = M, Bt = 0 for 1 < i < d - 1, and Bt > 0 for
d < i < n.
Definition 3.4.13 ([28], chapter 5) For a natural n Krawtchouk polynomial, Pk(x), is
defined as follows,

where
x(x-i)...(x-j+i)
(j) =

1,
0,

y •fena+urai number

if J = 0

(3-12)

otherwise.

The few first Krawtchouk polynomials, are,
Po(x) =

1,

(3-13)

Pi Or) =

(q-l)n-qx,

(3-14)

((q-l)n-qx)2-(q-2)((q-l)n-qx)-(q-l)n.

(3.15)

2P2(x)

=

We note that
ft(o) = (2) (?-!)*• (3-16)
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Definition 3.4.14 The dual distance distribution of a q-ary (n,M,d) E-code C is a
sequence (B1,..., B'n), where
B

'k = T7l>^(0- (3-17)
iV1

i=0

W e note here that using (3.13) we have B'0 = 1. For more detailed information about
dual distance distribution and proof of the fact that B'k > 0,0 < k < n we refer to [28,
chapter 5}.

Definition 3.4.15 The dual distance d' of a q-ary (n,M,d) error correcting code C is a
number d! such that B'k = 0,1 < k < d' — 1 and B'd, > 0
The following theorem establishes the relationship between error-correcting codes and
orthogonal arrays.
Theorem 3.4.16 ([28], Chapter 5) A q-ary (n,M,d) error correcting code C with dual
distance r + 1 is an orthogonal array OA\(r,n,q), where A = M/qr.
O n one hand Theorem 3.4.11 showed that r-fold secure Cartesian A-codes are equivalent to orthogonal arrays of strength r + 1 and number of encoding rules in the Cartesian
A-code is equal to the number of rows in the OA. O n the other hand, an OA\(r, n,g)'s
are equivalent to (n,M,d) error correcting codes with dual distance r + 1. W e use the
equivalence between A-codes and (9A's to obtain a tight lower bound on the number of
encoding rules for r-fold secure Cartesian A-codes and construct A-codes with the minimum number of encoding rules from P-codes. W e note that the equivalence between
orthogonal arrays and .Encodes implies that any (n, M, d) E-code with dual distance r + 1
is a r-fold secure Cartesian A-code.
W e can only prove bounds for 1 and 2-fold secure Cartesian A-codes (0A\(2,n,q),
0A\(3,n,q)), and with some limitations, for 3-fold secure A-codes. W e believe however
that this approach can be extended to r-fold secure Cartesian A-codes. W e show that the
distance distribution of A-codes that achieve the bounds with equality must be of certain
form. W e describe our approach for 2-fold secure A-codes and note that a similar result
for 1-fold secure A-codes follows directly.

Linear programming problem for OA\(r, n,q)
Consider an OA\(r,n,q), since it is equivalent to a g-ary E-code with dual distance r + 1,
B'k = 0,1 < k < r. W e note that number of rows in OAx(r, n, q) (g-ary (n, M, d) E-code)
is equal to B0 + Pi + B2 + ... + Bn = 1 + Pi + ... + Bn, where B{ is the ith component
of the distance distribution.
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To find a lower bound on the number of rows in OA\(t,n,q), we form the following
linear programming LPO problem:
Minimize (xx + x2 + 1- xn) (3.18)
n

subject to

B[ = ~52xiPx(i) = 0,
i=0
n

B2 = 52xtp2(i) = o,
1=0

(3.19)
B'r =

52xtPr(i)=0,
i=0

Xi > 0, 0 < i < n,
where x,- = P, is the ith component of the distance distribution. W e use x,- to emphasise

that components of the distance distribution are our variables in the above LPO problem
Let L be the minimum of the objective function (3.18). Then L is a lower bound on the
number of rows for OA\(t,n,q).
Linear programming bound for OA\(3,n,q) and OA\(2,n,q)
For OA\(3,n,q) the general LPO problem can be transformed to the following LPl
problem:
n

Minimize

(52Xi)
t=0

subject to B[ = 52 xtPi (i) = 0, (3.20)
i=0

B'2=52xiP2(i) = 0, (3.21)
i=0

^

= ^ ^ P 3 ( i ) = 0,

(3.22)

i=0

Xi > 0, 0 < i < n,
Now using first two conditions (3.20) and (3.21) as an example we show how this LP
can be transformed to the more appropriate form. Using (3.14) and (3.16) we transform
(3.20).
B[ = 52XiPi(i) = 52xtPi(i) + Pi(Q) = 52((q - l)n - qi)xt + (q - l)n = 0.
t=0

i'=l

t'=l

Therefore
52((q - l)n - qi)x% = -(q - l)n. (3.23)
i=l
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Then using (3.15), (3.16) and (3.23) we transform (3.21)
2P2 - E2P2(i)xi = ^2P2(i)xi + 2P2(0) =
i=0
n

=

i=l

£ ( ( ( ? - 1 ) " - <ltf ~{q~

2)((? - l)n - qi) -(q-

l)n)x, + n(n - l)(q - l) 2

»'=i

= E(((? - 1)" ~ <Z*? - (9 ~ l)*)*i ~ (? ~ 2) £((? ~ l)n - <Z>>." ~
«=1

i=l

n( 9 - ! ) ' + „'(,-1)'<
=

£(((<? " 1 ) " ~ ?«? ~ (<Z ~ l)")*i + (q ~ 2)(g - l)n - n(q - l) 2 + n2(q - l) 2 =
i=i

= 52(((q - 1)" - qi? ~(q- l)n)xi -(q- l)n + n2(q - l)2 = 0
«'=i

Using the same technique the third condition (3.22) can be transformed to,
n

6#3 = E(((<? ~ 1)« " 9 0 3 " (q ~ 2)(q - l)n)Xi - (q - 2)(q - l)n + n3(q - l) 3 = 0
t=i

W e note that the above described transformation can be applied to the Krawtchouk
polynomials of arbitrary degree [34].
Therefore the L P 1 problem can be represented as follows

Minimize

52x*

(3.24)

i=l
n

subject to

52RiXi-Di = 0

(3.25)

i=l

52(R2 + Dx)Xi + Dx + D2 = 0

(3.26)

i=l

52(R* + D2)x% + D2 - P 3 = 0,

(3.27)

i=\

Xi > 0, for 0 < i < n,

(3.28)

where Ri = (q — l)n - qi, Dx — —(q - l)n, D2 = —(q - l)n(q - 2) and x; > 0.
W e note that a similar LP problem is considered in [10].
Consider a set of three variables, Xj, xk, xg for the constraints (3.25),(3.26) and (3.27).
The determinant of the coefficient matrix of these variables is
(Ri - Rv)(Re - Rk)(Rk - Rv)(RiRvRk - D^Ri + RV + Rk) + P2),
which, as will be shown in Theorem 3.4.17, for a proper choice of the variables can be
made to have afixedsign. W e use this property tofindan explicit value for the minimum
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of the objective function and hence a lower bound on a number of rows in the orthogonal
array.
For an orthogonal array 0A\(3,n,q), and the corresponding error-correcting code C,
let W(C) be the set of indices {vxv2i...,vs} such that xVi = BVi > 0.
Theorem 3.4.17 1. If n > 2 + 2^-, then the number of rows in an OA\(3,n,q),
and hence the number of encoding rules E in the 2-fold secure Cartesian (M, k, E)
A-code, is lower bounded by

~ —RvRv+iRn + DX(RV + Rv+X 4- Rn) — T)i

<?M^ +i)

f3301

R2V - ZqRv + 2RV + 2q2 - Aq + nq - n + 2'

V

'

where v = [^~1)n~^~2^J . Equality in (3.29) occurs if and only if in the corresponding
error-correcting code C the set of indices W(C) has the following form,
W(C) CWV = {v,v + l,n}.
2. Let C be an OA(3,n,q) with n > 2 + *=£ for which
W(C) CWV = {v,v + l,n}.
Then C has the minimum number of rows (for a fixed n and q) and achieves bound
(3.30) with equality.
Proof: See Appendix 3.10.3
•
If C has only 2 non-zero distances xv, xn then W(C) can always be extended to the set
W „ assuming xv+x = 0. In this case the system of three equations (3.25),(3.26) and (3.27)
is a system with three variables (v,xv,xn). The solution in this case can be represented
by the following expressions:
Rv
v
(3.32)

- q-2,
(q ~ l)n - (g - 2)
=
q
nq(n- l)(q - 1)
n + q—2
3
q n - dnq2 + 3nq - n + Aq2 -5q-q3

(3.31)

+ 2

x. = T 5 • (3-33)
n -f q — I
This gives the lower bound E > nq(q - 1) - q(q - 2) on the number of rows in the
orthogonal array which coincides with the well known Rao bound [31]. W e note that in
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general, (3.30) is tighter than the Rao bound for OA's and is equal to the latter if and
only if v =

. A similar approach can be used for orthogonal arrays of

strength 1 and 2. For OA\(2,n,qYs we have the following results.
q2

Proposition 3.4.18
1. If n > —
— then the number of rows in an OA\(2,n,q)
and number of encoding rules E in the 1-fold secure Cartesian A-code is lower
bounded by,
E>F(v,n,q)

+

l = /°('>

+ 1

) =R,/V{: + '] n. (3-34)
RVRV+X - Dx
RV(RV - q) + (q- l)n

where v = [ J. Equality in (3.34) occurs if and only if
W(C)CWv = {v,v + l}.
q2
2. Let C be an OA(2,n,q) for which W(C) C Wv = {v,v + 1}. If n > T ^ T T y then
C has the minimum number of rows, and achieves (3.34) with equality.
For the orthogonal array of strength 1 optimal arrays have only one non-zero weight n.
In this case v = n,Rv = —n, M = q,xn = q.
W e know that any MDS

(n,qk,d) E-code has at most k non-zero distances and

n > d > n — k + 1 [16]. Hence, MDS

P-codes with k = 3 satisfy the conditions of

Theorem 3.4.17. It is proved in [29] that the so-called A-perfect Cartesian A-codes are
equivalent to MDS

P-codes. W e also know that Cartesian A-codes which satisfy (1.37)

are r-fold secure, A-perfect and have minimum number of encoding rules. Therefore the
characterisation of A'-perfect codes in [29] supports our conjecture that Theorem 3.4.17
could be generalised for orthogonal arrays of an arbitrary strength.
Examples of A-codes from P-codes
As noted earlier a g-ary (n,M,d) E-code with dual distance d' is an OA\(d' - l,n,q).
Therefore we can construct r-fold secure Cartesian A-codes with minimum number of
encoding rules from P-codes.
Proposition 3.4.19 Let C be a q-ary (n,M,d) E-code with dual distance d! — 4 and
W(C) C W „ .

Then this code gives a 2-fold secure A-code with minimum number of

encoding rules E.
If W(C) = {v,n} then a solution to the L P 1 is given by (3.31), (3.32) and (3.33), and
number of encoding rules in the corresponding Cartesian A-code E = ng(g - 1) - q(q - 2).
W e have two examples of P-codes that achieve this bound.
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1. The P-code that is dual to (g + 2, q - 1,4)-MDS code with q = 2m.
gm - 1
2. The P-code that is dual to (——-f l,n - (m + 1),4) extended H a m m i n g code.
In the following we briefly look at these P-codes.
Consider the dual of an (q + 2,q - 1,A)-MDS code. This is an orthogonal array of
strength 3, i.e., an 0Ai(3,g + 2,g) which is an M D S P-code generated by the generator
matrix H2 (page 242 [33])

( 1 ••• 1 1 0 0 \
»i

\*\

••• aq-i 0

1 0

••• a2_x 0 0 1 J

where a,-, Vz, are non-zero elements of GF(q). This is a (g + 2,3,g) code with non-zer
distances {q,n = q + 2} = W465].
gm - 1
— + l,n — (m + 1),4) H a m m i n g code. This
Consider the dual of the extended (
qm — 1
_
qm — 1
m_1
m_1
is a (
— h 1, m -f 1, g
) P-code with two non-zero distances g
and
(-1.
g-1
g-1
qm - 1
h 1, g) with A = g m + 1 /g 3 = g m 2 which
The codewords of this code give an OA\(3,
q-i
has minimum number of rows. W e note that the parameters of these codes satisfy (3.31),
(3.32) and (3.33).

3.5

Perfect and near perfect protection

If the enemy's best strategy for any sequence mr of r intercepted cryptograms is rand
selection from the set of valid cryptograms (or for key strategies, the set of valid keys),
then the value of the game is independent of the enemy's strategy. The size of these sets
in general depends on mr. Suppose that the enemy has intercepted a sequence mT of r
cryptograms. A n A-code provides perfect protection for spoofing attack of order r [24] if
payoff(mr,m') = ^^", Vmr £ Mr,m' £ M\mr.
In this case the A-code needs at least Er encoding rules [60]

M(M-1)...(M -r)
r

~

k(k-l)...(k-r) '

If E < ET, then there exists a cryptogram m ' £ M\mr
is,

there

exists

a

sequence

mT

for

which

the

with payoff (mT,m') = 0; that
set

of

Cmr = (\Jeie£(mr) M(ei))\mr C M, has less than M - r elements.
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valid

cryptograms

Definition 3.5.1 An A-code provides near-perfect protection against spoofing attack of
orderr if for anymr

£ MT, with E(mr) > 0, the enemy's best strategy is random selection

from Cmr, and Cmr = Cr; that is, the number of valid cryptograms depends only on r and
does not depend on the actual sequence of the intercepted cryptograms.
For an A-code with near-perfect protection payoff(mr,m') = (k — r)/Cr and

Pr = PrM=

52

k—r

k— r

\jf

\yr

P(mT)'

Near-perfect protection against spoofing attack of order r ensures that enemy's chance of
success is independent of the sequence mr and his/her best strategy is to randomly select
a cryptogram from Cmr.
Near-perfect protection is an important concept. Proposition 3.6.1 and Theorem 3.6.3
show that near-perfect protection is a necessary condition for an A-code that satisfies the
best known information theoretic bounds (3.38) and (3.44) with equality.
Proposition 3.5.2 The number of encoding rules in an A-code that provides near-perfect
protection against spoofing attack of order r satisfies the following bound,

E > -^—. (3.35)
K
~ PoPxP2 • • • PT-i k-r
'
Equality holds if and only if the A-code satisfies (1.36) for spoofing attacks of all orders

i,0<i<r,

and H(E\Mr+1)

= 0.

Proof: Using Theorem 1.2.20 we have
p. >

2~(H(E\Mi)-H(E\Ml+l)).

Hence,
P -P

>2HiE{Mi+1)~H{ElM,).

P

Using H(E\Mi+1) > 0 and H(E) < log(P) we have
E>

'
PoPx. . . Pr
The result follows from the fact that the A-code provides near-perfect protection against
spoofing attack of order r and so PT = -^L.
•
If the code provides near-perfect protection for spoofing of all orders i, 0 < i < r, then
(3.35) reduces to

!=0

where C0 = M.
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E x a m p l e 3.5.3 Consider the incidence matrix of an A-code with M

= 6, k = 3, E = A

given below. Let r = 1. Then Cmr = 4 and (3.36) is satisfied with equality.

E/M

mi

m2

m3

m4

m5

m6

ei

1

1

0

1

0

e2

0

1

1

e3
e4

0
1

0
0

1

0
1
0

0
1

0

0
1
1

0
1

We note that in this example the A-code provides near-perfect protection for impersonatio
and substitution, and the number of encoding rules is minimum.

Definition 3.5.4 An A-code provides perfect protection for key strategies against spo
attack of order r if for all mr £ Mr, the enemy's best strategy is random selection from
the set E(mr).
In section 3.3 we noted that for any key strategy there exists a message strategy
that results in the same probability of deception. In Proposition 3.5.5 below we show
that if an A-code provides near-perfect protection for message strategies then it provides
perfect protection for key strategies; hence for an A-code with near-perfect protection,
the enemy's chance of success will be the same if he/she tries to guess the correct key or
choose a valid cryptogram.

Proposition 3.5.5 If an A-code provides near-perfect protection against spoofing atta

of order r then it provides perfect protection against spoofing attack of order r for k
strategies and PT = PTM = PrA".
Proof: W e have

52 P(m^k

Pr = PrM=

r)

Ur

mreM'
O n the other hand using (3.5) we obtain
a,

r

>

A

v^

payoff(m,e!) = E

*3aJm][•••aimrTPs(mr,ej)airnl
j m 'a

£

_

3=1 m'eM\mr

v

I

\

J

Because of near-perfect protection we have
ai r A
A 7r i a jm[...a im ra im /P 5 (m r ,e J )
r
l
payoff (m , m ) = £
P(mr)
3=1

This implies that
k — r
payoff (mr,e,) =

Or
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k-r

L/r

(3.37)

Using (3.6) w e have
P
=
P?K =

V P(m
52
P ( rm\-r ) ^ = PrrM

a

mreMr

Corollary 3.5.6 Let Pr — —
strategy.

3.6

D

. Then the enemy's best strategy is the random key

Information-theoretic bounds

The Pei-Rosenbaum [30, 35] bound of (1.36) is the main information-theoretic lower bound
on Pr. For r = 0, this bound reduces to Simmons' bound [46] for impersonation. Proposition 3.6.1 shows that equality in the bound is obtained for A-codes with near-perfect
protection and a matching source. That is, a source whose probability distribution satisfies condition 2 of this proposition. In Theorem 3.6.3 we obtain a second bound on P r A
(and hence P r ) and then give a comparison of the two bounds.
Let Ps(m'\ei, mr) denote the probability of the source state that is mapped to m' when
mr is received and et- is used by the communicants. In the following section P, M and S
are random variables that take the values from the sets 6, M and <5 respectively.
Proposition 3.6.1 For an A-code without splitting,
Pr > 2-(tf(£liW7>tf(£|M'-+1))

(3.38)

and equality in bound (3.38) is obtained if and only if,
1. The code provides near-perfect protection for spoofing attack of order r.
2. Ps(m'\ei,mr) is independent of ei, for all mr £ MT, m' £ M\mT with
E(mr,m')

>0.

Moreover in the case of equality Pr = (k — r)/Cr.
Proof:
Necessity. Using condition 1 of Theorem 1.2.20 and (3.1) we have
52 Pr = CmrPT = 52 payoff (mr, m') = (k-r),
m
'
m' valid
and hence Cmr = Cr = (k — r)/Pr. W e also have
r>/ /i

P(ej,rn',mr)

r\

p(m|e m)

-

=

pfe^)

Ps(ej,mT,m')

=
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. ,.

n

=Ps(m|ej,m)

ftfe^r

'

,

,

(3 39)

-

which completes the proof. Proof of sufficiency can be given in a similar way.
D
W e note that (3.38) can be written in alternative forms which clearly relates Pr to the
redundancy introduced during the encoding process.

Proposition 3.6.2 The bound (3.38) can also be written in the following forms.
PT > 2-((F(5r)-"(Mr))-("(5r+1)-tf(Mr+1))) (3.40)
pr

>

2-(7^;Mr+1)-7(E;Mr))

(3.41)

Proof:
H(E\Mt)-H(E) = H(St)-H(Mt), (3.42)

and (3.40) is obtained by substituting (3.42) in (3.38). The second form is obtained b
using the definition of mutual information,
I(E;Mt) = H(E)-H(E\Mt).
•
A second information-theoretic bound on Pr can be obtained by generalising a bound
originally proved by Brickell-Simmons [8] and later tightened by Stinson [58]. This bound
is the general form of the bound given in Theorem 2.4.7. The proof, which is similar to
Stinson's proof, shows that the lower bound is in fact a lower bound on P r A , and for the
class KT strategies of the enemy. W e also give a characterisation of authentication codes
that satisfy the bound with equality.
Let 8r(ei,mr,m') be

r , r i\ J2f=i^jajm[---ajmrajm>Ps(ej,rnr)
br(ei,m ,m) = - ^
*
—
,
iriaimr...aimraim'^s\ei, m')
and Sr = min,-imrjm/ £r(ef, mr, m').
Theorem 3.6.3
Pr > P? > 6T2-ffWMr). (3.44)
In the case of equality the A-code has the following properties:
(i) E(mr) = const = Xr_x, for all mT £ Mr with E(mr) > 0.
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(3.43)

(ii) E(mT,m')
E(mT,m')

=

const =

6r for all mT

Xr =

£ • MT

and m' £

MT\mT

with

>0.

(iii) •KjPs(ej,mr) is independent of j for all mr £ MT and 1 < j < E.
/• \ nM

r>K

*r

(ivj Pr = PT = -

Ar

=

k — r

= — — — and the A-code provides near-perfect protection.

Moreover thefirstthree conditions are sufficient conditions for an A-code to satisfy (3.44)
with equality.
Proof: See Appendix 3.10.4.
•
It is interesting to compare the bounds of (3.38) and (3.44). Let ar and j3r denote
the value of the right hand sides of these two bounds respectively. If an (M, k, E) A-code
satisfies either P r = ar or P r = /3r then it provides near-perfect protection. Hence for all
mr £ Mr

with E(mr)

> 0 we must have Cmr = Cr, which is a requirement on the inci-

dence matrix of the code. O n the other hand if an A-code provides near-perfect protection
and there exists a source that satisfies condition 2 of Proposition 3.6.1, then the bound of
(3.38) is satisfied with equality and the A-code uses all the redundancy introduced during
the encoding process for providing protection. However Pr = ftT requires the incidence
matrix of the A-code to satisfy a stricter condition. In general, if P r = aT then ar > (3T
and if P r = f3r then /3r > ar.
If the A-code does not provide near-perfect protection neither of the bounds can be
satisfied with equality. Proposition 3.6.4 shows that in some cases (3.38) is a tighter
bound. However such a statement, in general, is not possible.
Proposition 3.6.4 If Ps(m'\ei,mr) is independent of ei then

ar > f3r.
Proof: If P(m'\ei,mr) is independent of et- then

i,mr+1

v

' '

=

52 P(ei,mr+1)log6(et-,m7',ra') > log6 r
t',mr+l

and

2"(H(£|Mr)-/f(£:!Mr+1))

>

6r-2~H(ElMr).

•
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Corollary 3.6.5 // an A-code satisfies the bound of (3.44) with equality for all orders i,

0 < i < r, then it satisfies the bound of (3.38) with equality for all orders i, 0 < i < r —
Proof: Assume that the A-code satisfies (3.44) with equality for all orders i, 0 < i
Then from theorem 3.6.3 it follows that the best communicants strategy is uniform and
therefore Ps(ej,mt) is independent of ej for all m l £ Ml

and for all i, 0 < i < r. Then

Ps(m'\ej,mx) = Ps(ej,mx,m')/Ps(ej,mx) is independent of ej for all 0 < i < (r — 1) and
the proof follows from Proposition 3.6.1.
•

3.7 Combined game

Some of the results given in this section are similar to those reported in [35] but w
obtained independently and published in [38].
In a realistic situation the enemy has access to at most r codewords and the choice
of the order of spoofing is part of his/her strategy. W e may extend Simmons' [46, 48]
definition of a combined game in this case and define Pdr, the best probability of success,
equal to the value of the combined game. The enemy's strategy is completely determined by a collection of strategies for every level t, 0 < t < r, of spoofing: that is,
{{qm%,mt £ Ml},0

< t < r}, where {qm ,mt £ M1}

is a strategy for spoofing of order t.

The communicants' strategy is determined by the vector x = (%x,..., -KE)- In general t
communicants' best strategy in an order t game is different from their best strategy in an
order t' ^ t game. Similarly their best strategy in the combined game may be different
from those of simple games. It is easy to see that the Pdr of a combined game is at least
equal to the probability of success in a simple spoofing game.
Proposition 3.7.1
P<fr>(Po-Pi...Pr)1/(r+1)- (3-45)
Proof:
Pdr > max(P 0 ,...,P r ),
and the result follows.
•
Equations (3.38) and (3.45) can be used to derive a bound on the probability of deception
for the combined game Pdr.
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T h e o r e m 3.7.2
-(H(E)-H(E\Mr+1))

Pdr > 2

'V

",

(3.46)

and equality is obtained if and only if the A-code satisfies (3.38) for all orders t, 0 < t < r,
with equality and PQ = Px = • • • = Pr = k/M.
Proof: Using (3.45) and substituting Pt, 0 < t < r, by the lower bound of (3.38) we have
.1// n\ -(H(E)-H(E\Mr+1))

Pdr > (P 0 • Pi • • • P r ) 1 / ( r + 1 ) > 2

'+1

U

.

The first inequality is satisfied if and only if P 0 = Pi = • • • = P r , while satisfying the
second inequality requires the A-code to satisfy (3.38) for all orders t, 0 < t < r, for the
same communicants' strategy.
•
Definition 3.7.3 An A-code is designed for spoofing attack of order r if H(E\Mr+1) = 0.
Therefore the protection provided by the code is limited to attacks of order at most r and
attacks of higher order have guaranteed success.
Corollary 3.7.4 For an A-code the probability of deception for the combined game of
order at most r is lower bounded by the following expression,
-H(E)

Pdr>2^i.

(3.47)

Equality holds if and only if
L PQ= ••• = Pr = k/M.
2. The code satisfies (3.38) for all orders

t,0<t<r.

3. The code is designed for spoofing attack of order r.
4. Intersection ofanyt + 1, 0 < t < r, columns of incidence matrix of the code is equal
Mr+l-t

t0 X

r = -j^TZT-

Moreover in this case we have
a. The best communicants' strategy is uniform.
b. The code satisfies (3.44) for

al1

orders t, 0 < t < r.

Mr+1
C. E = -r—r.

kr+1
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Proof: Thefirst2 conditions are consequences of Theorem 3.7.2. W e can also conclude
that to achieve equality in (3.47), P ( P | M r + 1 ) must be zero which implies that an A-code
should be designed for spoofing attack of order r. It also implies that the intersection of
any r -f 1 columns is equal to zero or one. From condition 2 we know that the A-code
provides near-perfect protection for all orders 0 < t < r. Then for any mr

£ Mr

we

have Amr(fc — r) = GT • 1, where Xmr is the intersection of r columns of the incidence
matrix of an A-code which corresponds to the cryptograms {mi : m,- e m r } . So we have
Xmr = Ar_i = Crj(k — r) = M/k, where the last equality holds because according to
conditions 1 and 2 of this corollary and Proposition 3.6.1 we have that Pr = (k- r)/Cr =
k/M. Then for any mr~l £ Mr~l we have Xmr-i(k-(r - 1)) = Cr-i • Ar_i, which implies
that Amr-i = A r _ 2 = Ar_i • Cr-X/(k — (r — 1)) = M2/k2.

Continuing this process we can

show that A 0 = Mr /kr. But Ao is the number of ones in a column, which on the other hand,
is known to equal to kE/M.

This implies thatfirstlythe best strategy of communicants

is the uniform strategy and secondly kE/M

= Mr/kr,

hence, P = Afr+1/fcr+1. If an

A-code satisfies conditions 1-4 of this corollary then it satisfies all conditions of Theorem
2.5.9 and satisfies (3.44) for all orders t, 0 < t < r, with equality.
D

Definition 3.7.5 * An A-code is called r-fold perfect if it achieves (3.47) with equa
Definition 3.7.6 An A-code provides perfect authenticity of order r if Pdr = k/M.

Perfect authenticity is a concept similar to perfect secrecy. For A-codes that provid
perfect authenticity, the probability of success in impersonation is at its minimum and
the probability of deception will remain at this minimum level when the enemy intercepts
additional cryptograms. Theorem 3.7.7 gives a lower bound on the number of encoding
rules E for such A-codes. Corollary 3.7.8 gives a bound similar to Massey's result [24] for
perfect secrecy, and shows that r-fold perfect A-codes provide perfect authenticity with a
minimum number of encoding rules.
Theorem 3.7.7 If Pdr = k/M then
E > 2H^Mr+l) • ^-r. (3.48)

Equality holds if the A-code satisfies the Pei-Rosenbaum bound of (3.38), for all orde
t, 0 <t <r, Pt — k/M

and the best communicants' strategy is uniform.

*A similar definition was given in [35].
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Proof: If Pdr = k/M

then Pt < k/M, 0<t<r.

Using (3.45) and (3.46) we have

Pd/+1 > P0Pl...Pr > 2-"(£)+"(ElMr+1),
k
Since, Pdr = —
M

then,
jLr+1
> 2~H(E)+H(E\M

r 1

+)

Mr+1
Hence, we have
E

> 2H(E) > 2^(^|Mr+1) .

MT+1

In order to achieve equality the best strategy of the communicants must be uniform
(H(E) = log P ) , and the A-code must satisfy the bound of (3.38) of all orders t, 0 < t < r
and Pdr = P0 = Px = • • • = Pr =

k/M.

n
Corollary 3.7.8 If Pdr = k/M then
Mr+1

and equality holds if and only if the A-code is an r-fold perfect code.
Proof: From Theorem 3.7.7 it follows that an A-code satisfies (3.49) with equality if and
only if 2"(£lMr+1) = 0, and satisfies (3.38), for all orders t, 0 < t < r, Pt = k/M.

Then

using Theorem 3.7.2 we can also show that an A-code satisfies (3.47) with equality. And
the proof follows from the definition of r-fold perfect A-codes.
•
A n (M, k, E) A-code limits Po to k/M and this requires at least (log M — log k) bits of
key (or P 0 > M/k). Corollary 3.7.8 shows that providing perfect authenticity for higher
level of attacks requires an additional (log M — log k) bits for every extra level of attack
considered. Massey obtained a similar result for perfect secrecy systems [24] and proved
that providing one bit perfect secrecy if the enemy can have access to r cryptograms
requires at least r -f 1 bits of key. W e note that P 0 > k/M

implies that an (M, k, E)

A-code has at most (log M — log k) bits of protection available and A-codes with perfect
authenticity of order r provide this m a x i m u m protection for a combined attack of order
at most r. In this case the code needs more key bits, and in fact, r + 1 bits of key are
required for providing one bit protection.
Definition 3.7.9 An r-optimal A-code is an A-code that provides perfect authenticity of

order r and satisfies the Pei-Rosenbaum bound of (3.38) for order t, or (3-44) for order
t, 0 < t < r, with equality.
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The above definition is an extension of definition 2.6.1 and requires optimal A-codes to
satisfy one group of information-theoretic bounds. W e note that r-optimal A-codes might
not provide perfect protection for all orders of attack.
Using Theorem 3.4.4 and Corollary 3.7.8, we can classify r-optimal A-codes according
to the number of encoding rules and the possibility of providing perfect protection.
Mr+1
T h e o r e m 3.7.10

1. If E <

then there is no r-optimal code.

Mr+1
2. If E =

x

then r-fold perfect codes are the only r-optimal codes.

o uMr+1 P M(M-l)...(M-r) 1
f ir+i < E < — — - — —
—
— then r-optimal A-codes can not provide
perfect protection for all orders t, 0 < t < r.
M(M - l)...(M-r)
4- If E = — —
—
—
— then the only r-optimal codes that provide perfect
k[k — 1)... [k — r)
protection of all orders t, 0 < t < r, are A-codes whose incidence matrix corresponds
to a (M, k, l)-(r + 1) design.

3.8

Constructions

In this section we give examples of r-optimal codes for different values of P. We review some of the constructions proposed by different authors that give optimal A-codes.
Proposition 3.8.1 provides a construction for r-fold perfect A-codes [30, 60]. For Cartesian A-codes this construction is an example of r-optimal codes with m i n i m u m number of
encoding rules. W e note that this construction immediately follows from Theorem 3.4.11.
Proposition 3.8.1 ([30, 60]) If there exists an orthogonal array OAi(r + l,k,l), then
there exists a Cartesian r-fold perfect A-code with k source states, M = kl cryptograms
and Mr+1/kr+1

encoding rules. Conversely if there exists an r-fold perfect Cartesian A-

code with k source states, M = kl cryptograms and Mr+1/kT+1

encoding rules then there

exists an OAi(r -f- l,k,l).

In [16], Gilbert, Mac Williams and Sloane proposed a construction for 1-fold perfect Cartesian A-codes using projective planes. This is an example of 1-optimal codes and can be
briefly described as follows.
Let P G ( 2 , Fq) be a projective plane over thefieldFq of g-elements. Fix a line I in
PG(2, Fq) and a point P on this line. The source states are all the points on t different
from P; the encoding rules are all the points not on 1; and the messages are all the lines
not passing through P. This construction results in a 1-fold perfect (M, k, E) Cartesian
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A-code with a minimum number of encoding rules. For this code M
E = q2 = M2/k2

= q2, k = q,

and Px = P0 = l/q = k/M. The corresponding encoding matrix of the

A-code for q = 2 is as follows:

E/M

m0

mi

m2

mi

e0

so

Sl

0

e\

SQ

0
0

0

Sl

e2

0
0

So

Sl

0

So

0

Sl-

e3

W e refer to the above construction as GMS-construction. Proposition 3.8.1 shows
that GMS-construction is a construction for an orthogonal array 0Ai(2,g,g). This construction can be extended to A-codes with secrecy [55], where the resulting A-code is a
1-fold perfect A-code with perfect secrecy and minimum number of encoding rules. The
encoding matrix for the case q = 2 is as follows:

E/M m0
eo

s0

ei

Sl

e2

0
0

ez

mx

m2

m3

0
0

Sl

0

0

so

Sl

So

0-

so

0

Si.

A more general construction of 1-fold perfect codes that provide perfect secrecy and
has minimum number of encoding rules is proposed by Johansson [20]. His construction
uses linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) and has the following parameters: M
k = qn,E = q2n and E = q2n =

= q2n,

M2/k2.

Another construction of optimal A-codes is due to Pei [30] where the author proposed
a combinatorial construction of 1-optimal A-codes with secrecy.
Definition 3.8.2 ([30]) A (M,k,r,X)-PBIB is a pair (M,S), where M is a set of elements called points, and £ is a family of k-subsets (called blocks) of M

such that eac

point occurs in exactly r blocks and each pair of points occurs in exactly X blocks or do
not occur in any blocks at all.

Theorem 3.8.3 ([30]) Suppose there is a (M, k, r, X)-PBIB. Then there exists an (M, k,
A-code for k equiprobable source states, M
which P0 = k/M

= 2(*<W-"<s>> ; and Pi = ^
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cryptograms and E = rM/k

encoding rules in

= A 2 " < 1 W » = 2-M*M-*W'9>>.

•
A n A-code whose incidence matrix corresponds to a (M, k, kE/M, 1) P B I B with a uniform
source provides an example of a 1-optimal code with
M2
„ M(M-l)
ml.
-p- < E <
_
. This construction is mentioned in [30, 37].
It has been previously shown in [60, 57] that (r + l)-designs can be used to construct
A-codes with minimum probability of deception for all orders t,0 <t <r, and minimum
number of encoding rules. So a (r + l)-(M,k,l) design corresponds to an r-optimal Acode that provides perfect protection for all orders t, 0 < t < r and has the minimum
number of encoding rules.

Proposition 3.8.4 ([60], T h e o r e m 6.2) If there exists an A-code with k source states,
*,
J IP M(M-l)...(M-r)
, ,
M cryptograms and E = — —
-y -p- —'- encoding rules that provides perfect protection of all orders t, 0 < t < r, then, there exists an (r-f 1)-(M, k, 1) design. Convers

if there exists an (r + 1)-(M, k,l) design then there exists an r-optimal A-code with k
M(M - 1) ...(M -r)
v
source states, M cryptograms and E =
-y ~
-^- encoding rules that pro
vides perfect protection for all orders t, 0 < t < r.

3.9

Conclusion

In this chapter we considered A-codes under spoofing attack of order r. We proved
necessary and sufficient conditions on the incidence matrix of the r-fold secure A-codes
and showed that r-fold secure A-codes with secrecy and minimum number of encoding
rules and/or uniform source correspond to ^-designs and r-fold secure Cartesian codes
correspond to OA's.
W e introduced the concept of near-perfect protection which is a useful extension of
perfect protection. W e showed that near-perfect protection is a necessary condition for
A-codes that satisfy one of the information-theoretic bounds with equality. W e considered
two different types of the enemy strategies and showed that near-perfect protection implies
perfect protection for key strategies.
W e defined r-optimal A-codes and noted that an r-optimal A-code does not necessarily
provide perfect protection. W e proposed a classification of r-optimal A-codes depending
on the number of encoding rules and possibility of providing perfect protection. Next we
defined perfect authenticity, which is a concept similar to perfect secrecy, and proved that
for one bit perfect authenticity of order r at least r -f 1 bits of key are needed.
Some open questions are,
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1. Combinatorial characterisation of A-codes (similar to Proposition 3.8.4) that provide
perfect and near-perfect protection with a non uniform source (or with a source that
has two distinct probabilities).

2. Combinatorial construction of r-optimal A-codes with secrecy when r > 1. (sim
to Proposition 3.8.1)

3.10 Appendix
3.10.1
Proof of Theorem 3.4.3:
Sufficiency: Let
E

^

f

T(mr, m) = 52 -Kjajm\-ajmrajm>Ps(ej, mr) = MrM_l\jM_ry

(3'5°)

We use induction on r to prove this theorem. Theorem 2.5.4 gives the proof for r
We prove that if

then PrM = %~T and
M -r
T(mT-\m') = „„„ k~r*1 r-pr, VmM € AT^Vm' £ M\m*-\
v
' ' M ( M - l ) . . . ( M - r + l)
which will complete the induction step. From (3.4) we have
Pr=

r
max(T(m
,m')) =
v v

Y
r

m eM

m

' "

k —r

M —r

r

which implies that the A-code provides perfect protection against spoofing attack of order
r. Using (3.1) we have
T,f=i*3a3m^-ajmrrajm'Ps(ej,mr) _ k-r
payoff(m,m) =
j ^
~ M - r'
al

r

A

1
which by using (3.50) gives P(mr) = M<M_ly^M_r
W e note that for any mr~l £ Mr~1,

52 a^Kl^m'-1)*:!. (3-51)
iT-1

m' fcyvl\m
€A<\J
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+ iy

Multiplying both sides of (3.51) by Xj we have
*3= 52 *ja3mrPs(mrr\ej,mr~1). (3.52)
m^£M\mr-1

Therefore for all m r _ 1 £ Mr~x and m ' £ A ^ \ m r _ 1 we have
E
r 1

r(m - ,m') =

E^ a i^ p 5(m;|e i ,m r - 1 )a jmr i...a jm;;: ia : , m /Ps(e i ,m r - 1 ),

52
r

r 1

m .£M\m - 3=1

E
=

E

52
52*jajmi—ajmrajm>Ps(ej,mT) + 52*3a3mr1---ajmrajmrrPs(ej,mr),
r 1
m^eM\m - m' 3=1
j=l
k r
v~
. p, rN=
+ imj
m^w-m,M(M-l)...(Af-r)

fe-r
+1
M ( M - l ) . . . ( M - r + l)'

where mT~1m' is a sequence of r cryptograms obtained by concatenating m r _ 1 and m'.
This completes thefirstpart of the proof.
Necessity: W e note that for all m' £ M\mT~l, we have P(mr~1m') = P(mT). Let
Pt = (k- t)/(M - t) for all t, 0 < t < r. W e will show that
T

^m'^M(M-lZ(M-ry Vm'eAT,W€Mm'.

Again Theorem 2.5.4 gives the proof for r = 1. W e assume that it is true for t = r — 1
and complete the induction step by proving it is true for t = r. W e can write (3.50) as
ff/

t

A

T(m\m')

payoff(m , m ) =

,

(3.53)

z

P[rn )
which because of perfect protection and the induction assumption gives
f ro

< '>°Af(*-l).V« + l)'°-t-(r-1)-

Moreover from (3.53) we obtain
r(m>')=^PK).' (3.54)
M —r
Using the induction assumption (3.52) and noting that for m'

£

M\mr~1,

P(mT~x,m') = P(mr) we have
r

T(m -\m')

E
= ^/7Cjajmr-1...ajmr-jiajmlPs(ej,mr-1) = M
=

£
XI

S

( M

k _ r _j_ i
_ ^ ^ _r+

1)S

_
^a i m rP s (m;|e i ,m r 1)ajmr-i...aimr-iaim/P5(ei,mr ),

m^.£M\m'—1m' 3=1
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Tnr&•M\m,

1

m'

^(^K"1) - P(mr-\m')) + P(mr-\m').
(3.55)
That is,
P(m

""'»

=

f(mr)

=M(M-l)...(M- r + l)-

^

Using (3.56) and (3.54) we have
T(mr,m') =

M(M

fc — r
- 1)...(M - r)'

which completes the proof.
•

3.10.2
Proof of Theorem 3.4-8:
Necessity: Using Theorem 3.4.3 and uniform source we have, for all mr £ M, m' £

M\mr:
f*« a n Hk-l)...(k-r)
^ TTjajmr... ajmrajm> - M,M_ly_(M_ry

\6-b<)

This is a set of linear equations with a zero-one coefficient matrix and rational num
as the constant values. If this set has a solution for 7Tt's it means that there exists a set
E
of positive rational numbers 7T;, 1 < i < P, with 52** = ^ ^ a t sa^lsfy these equalities.
t=i

That is
TTi = ~,

0<i<E,

Pi
where o;,- and /?,• are positive integers. Multiplying both sides of (3.57) by

£ ^MOJ

} [ /?,- we have

Maim

'' • • "M"'"=£M~-l)'.'%-r) •.. n,f

N o w we can consider ajdli^o.j A ) as the multiplicity of the row ej in the incidence
matrix of the A-code and interpret the left hand side of this equation as counting the
number of rows (with the associated multiplicities) of A that cover supp(mr). Since this
is independent of mr then we have the required result.
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Sufficiency: Let the incidence matrix of the A-code be the incidence matrix of a (r -f 1)(M,k,X) design with multiplicities {ft,...,ft;},£f=i ft = B. That is, there are ft
encoding rules that have the same vector support as the ith block of the design. Then
from the definition of the (r + l)-designs we have
E
/ J Pjajm^ • • • 0'jmT'ajmi —

A

3=1
E

52 *3a3m\ •.. aj raj i
m

m

X
—

,

3=1

where TTJ = 0j/B. Hence

^ 7cjajmr... a3mrajml - M(M _xy,M_ry
Then, according to Theorem 3.4.3, the A-code is r-fold secure against spoofing for a
uniform source.
•
3.10.3
Proof of Theorem 3.4-17: Let xv, xg, Xk be the three basic variables of L P 1 given by
Minimize (52 x< =

E

~

l

J (3-59)
n

subject to

52 P-iXi ~ Pi = 0

(3.60)

i=i

52(R2 + Dx)xi + Dx + D\ = 0

(3.61)

i=l

52(R* + D 2 ) X i + P 2 - P ? = 0,

(3.62)

t=i

x{ > 0, for 0 < % < n,

(3.63)

where R{ = (q - l)n - qi, Dx = -(q - l)n, D2 = ~(q - l)n(q - 2) and xt- > 0.
W e use the following three steps to eliminate these variables from the objective function
(3.59).
Step 1 Let Rv ^ 0, P 2 + Pi ^ 0, R?v + D2 ^ 0.
1. Divide (3.60) by Rv and subtract from the objective function (3.59).
2. Multiply (3.61) by

* and subtract from (3.60).
P„ + Pi
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R2 4- D
3. Multiply (3.62) by »
* and subtract from (3.61), which yields
ii,, + Do
Minimise [ X ) - ^ — ~ X i + B ~ )

(3-64)

subject to fe (*.-m*-*-Dl) \ _ D1(fi„ + 1)(^ + P,) =
V
#2 + Pi
/
# 2 + Pi

( » * . - « . ) f l ; f i ? + M R l + y +nfi- * ~ ^
\
| | ^ ( P ; + Pi) = 0

+ f t )

Rv + P2

Q

*•)+^+*>? /
(3.66)

Step 2 Assuming P^Rk — Dx ^ 0 and
(P2P2fc + DX(R2V + RvRk + R\) - D2(RV + Rk)) ? 0,
we do the following.
1. Multiply (3.65) by
"
-— and subtract from the objective function (3.64).
Rv(KvRk — Dx)
2. Multiply (3.66) by
(R3v + D2)(RvRk-Dx)
(Rl + DX)(R2VR\ + DX(R?V + RvRk + P^) - D2(RV + Pfc))
and subtract it from (3.65).
This results in

MmlmlSe

((? Aft, - Dt *>

+ Dl

(JUfc-A) J '

subject to
/ v (P„ - Rj)(Rk - Rj)(RkRvRj - DX(RV + ifr + ifr) + P 2 ) \
Xi
VY
" R2vR2k + Di(R*v + RvRk + R2k) - D2(RV + Rk)
)
-rF(Rv,Rk,Di,D2) = 0.

+

(3.68)

Step 3
Multiply (3.68) by
P 2 P^ + P t (P 2 + RvRk + iff) - D2(RV + Pfc)
(P„P* - Di)(RkRvRe - DX(RV + Rk + i^) + P 2 ) '
and subtract it from the objective function which gives,

/ _
Minim se T

n

q3(v-i)(k-i)(l-i)
„ !/ - 7 „ £
£r

-rF(Rv,Rk,Rt,Dx,D2).

,
FT^ +
(3.69)
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(3 6?

'

W e note that if the coefficients of x,'s, i ^ v,k,£, are all positive, then the expression
(3.69) becomes minimum if Xi = 0, Vi, i ^ v,k, I.
N o w suppose there exists an O A A ( 3 , n, q) whose distance distribution includes the three
non-zero distances that correspond to the basic variables of L P 1 given by {v, v 4 l,n).
Then the coefficients of x,'s in (3.69) are all positive. This is true, because in this case

Rk = Rv+l = Rv — q, Ri = Rn = —n,
and the denominator of the coefficient of x,- reduces to
n((q - l)n - qv - q)2 - n((q - l)n - qv - q)(q - 2) 4 n(q - l)(n - 2),
which is always positive if n > 2 4

q=

£-. Moreover, the numerator is

q3(v — i)(v + 1 — i)(n — i) which is positive for all z's. Hence F(RVRV+X,Rn,Dx,D2)

=

F(v,n,q) is the minimum of (3.69) and is achieved when x,- = 0,Vi ^ v,v 4 l,n. and
so F(RvRk,Re,Dx,D2)

= F(v,n,q) gives a lower bound on the number of rows in the

0A,\(3,n,g). N o w we use the fact that all variables Xi are greater than or equal to zero.
Using (3.60), (3.61) and (3.62) for the above defined variables x,, we have
RyXv 4 (Rv - g)xu+i - nxn — Dx = 0 (3.70)
(R2V + Dx)xv + {{Rv - qf 4 Dx)xv+X + (n2 4 Dx)xn + Dx + D\ = 0
(Rzv + D2)xv 4 ((Rv - qf 4 D2)xv+X 4 (-n3 4 D2)xn + D

2

(3.71)

- P 3 - 0. (3.72)

Solving this system of linear equations for the variables xv,xv+x,xn and demanding that
all variables be greater than zero, we have the following conditions on Rv

(q-2) + q>Rv>q-2.
Solving this for v we get the following

(q-l)n-(g-2)
q

(g-l)n-(g-2)
~

~

x

<i

W e know that v is an index variable and therefore is an integer hence there is only one
value for v in this range, that is v = \}q~ 'n~

>)\.

N o w suppose the orthogonal array has only three non-zero distances. Then the number of rows of this array achieves this bound and hence is minimum among all arrays
OA(3,n,g) (with fixed n and g).
D
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3.10.4

Proof of Theorem 3.6.3: The proof is similar to Stinson's Lemma 2.7 [58]. W e note that
using (3.5) we have
payoff (mr, et) = 52 f>r(Tnr,m',ei)Ps(mr,ei)TriaimT...aimraim,
\
=

/ m'£M\mr

/ \

7rtPs(e,,mr)atmr...qimr
P(m')(i-r)
y

;
r

(m,m,

e i

<5r7rtPs(ei,mr)
>im<>-^—•

Let f^(m) = max,(payoff(mr,e,)). Then we have Pr*" = EmreMr^(mr)uf(mr)
combining it with the expression,

an(

*

P(P|Mr) > -log^,
which was proved in [58] we obtain the required bound.
Equality holds if and only if 6r(e,-,mr,m') = 8T is constant for all mT £ MT,
m' £ M\mr, ei £ £ and PrA = v^(mr), Vmr. If Sr(mr,m',ei) = 8T, then
E
<^r • 7r,Ps(e,-, m r )

=

J^ 7Tjajmr...ajmrajm/Ps(ej, m r ) , V m r , e,-, m ' £ m r
i=i

which means that 7C'jPs(ej,mr) is independent of j. In this case

0r = / j QjmZ •••Q'.iml.Q'jm' — "r.
3=1

Moreover since P^ = t>A'(m) we have
P* = t,r*(m') = max(payoff(el,m')) = p^k^l) ^^K'm''C°
7rtP5(et-,mr)
"

r

'

P(mr)

'

and since,
E E
P(mr) = 522*iPs(ei,TnT)airnr...aimr = 7riPs(et-,mr)^aimr...aimr,
i=l

t=l

we have
pK

^i

Hence £t-a1-mr...al-mr = Ar_i is a constant and PrA' = Ar/Ar_i. But for any mr € A4r
we have Ar_i • (ifc - r) = Xr • Cmr implying that Cmr = Cr and PrK = (k - r)/Cr. Also
using (3.2) we have
al r

„ *jPs(ej, mr) Ef=i ajm\ • • • ajmrajm> Ar k-r

payoff(m ,m) =
V

=——7

f-—

7rf=iPs(ej,mr)EJajmj...aimr
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= 7
Ar_a

-7; •
Cr

Hence the A-code provides near perfect protection for class Mr and perfect protection
for class K.T. To prove the sufficiency of conditions 1-3 we note that if 7TiPs(ei,mr) and
E

52a3m\ • • • ajmr.o:jm> are constants, then from (3.43) we have that
3=1

8r(mT ,m' ,a) = 8r = Xr
is independent of mr,m',i. Also

and P r K

/
rrt T w
,-KiPs(ei,mT)8r 8r
A'
v? = max(payoff(mr,e!)) = m a x
nt \\
) = -: ,
r
«
*
P(m )
Ar_i
r
T
r
K
= E m P(m )vT (m ) — 8r/XT_x = Xr/Xr-X. To prove condition 3.6.3 we note

that in general P r M > P r A . If the A-code satisfies conditions 1-3 of Theorem 3.6.3 we have
PM

, r ,. -KjPs(ej, mr) EE, = i o.jmr... ajmrajmi
r
( m ' m ) = 7TjPs(ej,m
TTt
~T^E
) Ej ifljmj• • • ajm=r "i
=

r

Xr
>K-1

and so the best strategy of class Mr is uniform strategy. That is, the A-code provides
near-perfect protection and so
pM __ pK

A

K-i
D
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Chapter 4
Plaintext and chosen content
attacks
4.1 Introduction

A basic assumption in authentication and secrecy systems is that the encoding proced
and the probability distributions of the source and the key space are known to the enemy.
As noted in the first chapter, in secrecy systems, the extra information available to the
enemy is used to classify the attacks, so that the ciphertext-only attack is the easiest,
followed by the plaintext and chosen-plaintext attack which are the more stringent ones.
In authentication systems a similar approach can be used. However a second crucial
factor in this classification is the goal of the attack. In Simmons' model of authentication
[46, 48], the enemy's goal is to construct a cryptogram acceptable by the receiver. A more
demanding goal of the attack is to construct a valid cryptogram with a given content.
This type of attacks is called chosen-content attack.

A similar model of attack is also

mentioned in [12] but no analysis of the model is given. A n example of such an attack
is when the value figure of a financial transaction is substituted by a value chosen by
the opponent. W e also note that the information available to the enemy depends on the
possibility of his collusion with the transmitter. W e say that the enemy colludes with
the transmitter if he/she can choose the plaintext and/or the cryptogram sent over the
channel. W e classify attacks on authentication systems using the information available to
the enemy and goal of the attack.
There arefivelevels of information available to the enemy:
• No information.
• An intercepted cryptogram sent over the channel.
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• A cryptogram of his/her choice, sent over the channel.
• A n intercepted cryptogram and its content.
• An intercepted cryptogram whose content is chosen by the enemy.
The goal of the attack m a y be,
• Construction of a valid cryptogram.
• Construction of a valid cryptogram with a certain content.
In Table 4.1, columns correspond to various levels of information available to the
enemy and the rows represent the two possible goals of the attack. The table columns
marked by G denote the game theory model of assessment and those marked by W denote
the worst case analysis of the code. A n element T(i,j) specifies an attack for which the
enemy's available information is given by j and his/her goal is determined by i.

Table 4.T. Types of Attack in A-systems
Information available
Goal of attack
Valid ctext
Chosen-content

No info (G)

Ctext (G)

Chosen ctext (W)

Ptext (G)

Chosen ptext (W)

V
V

V
V

V
V

Impersonation Substitution

V

V

W e note that compared to Simmons' traditional model of authentication, the information available to the enemy may be considerably higher. A n enemy m a y not only intercept
the cryptogram but m a y have also access to its content and even be able to choose the
cryptogram sent over the channel. The last case corresponds to the most powerful enemy
and the worst case analysis of the system by the communicants. The enemy's probability
of success in this case is the m a x i m u m of all payoffs and not the value of the authentication
game.

4.2 Preliminaries

Table 4.1 shows that there are 10 possible types of impersonation and substitution at
Column 1 represents the two types of impersonation attack, distinguishable by the goal of
attack. The remaining 8 elements of the table correspond to various types of substitution
attack.
W e use the following notations to denote probability of deception,
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1. Impersonation:
a. P0: impersonation in Simmons' model of attack;
b.

P^: chosen-content impersonation.

2. Substitution: Px where a and /3 are interpreted as
a. a is the intercepted information,
(i) c : ciphertext only;
(ii) c : chosen ciphertext;
(iii) p : plaintext only;
(iv) p : chosen plaintext;
b. /3 is the goal of attack,
(i) c : constructing a valid ciphertext;
(ii) c : constructing a valid ciphertext with a chosen content.
We note that Pxc = Px denotes the probability of deception in Simmons' model.
In thefirstpart of this chapter we study (among those marked by y/) attacks that
require a game theory model for their analysis. W e prove information-theoretical bounds,
define perfect protection, obtain lower bounds on the number of encoding rules and characterise the A-codes with the best performance. A-codes that have the best performance
with respect to the game theory model of assessment require to have symmetries that
combined with other conditions such as minimum number of encoding rules result in
combinatorial structures. W e describe three transformations on A-codes that make them
resistant against chosen-content ciphertext, plaintext and chosen-content plaintext attacks
respectively.
In the second part we consider attacks that require a worst case analysis and show
the relationship between probabilities of the enemy's success for different types of attack.
Johansson et al [19] established a two-way relationship between a subclass of A-codes
without secrecy (those that provide perfect protection for impersonation with uniform
communicants' strategy) and g-ary P-codes. W e use a similar argument and show a
relationship between minimum distance of P-codes and the probability of deception for
A-codes when an attack (on of the four mentioned in the Table 4.1) that require worst
case analysis is considered.
In Simmons' model of authentication the enemy intercepts a ciphertext and wants
to construct a valid cryptogram. For the attacks that we consider the enemy is either
intercepting the source state along with the cryptogram, or he/she wants to construct a

89

cryptogram which will be decoded to a certain source state. W e note that the incidence
matrix of the A-code, used so far, does not contain information about source and hence
we introduce a refined incidence matrix.
Definition 4.2.1 The refined incidence matrix of an A-code is a binary matrix A =
[o(m»),e] whose rows are labeled by the elements of the set M

x S and whose columns are

labeled by the elements of S and a(ms))C = 1 if e(s) = m and zero otherwise.
The encoding matrix D and encoding array B are the same as in previous chapters.
Let C denote the set of pairs (m,s) with P(m,s) > 0 with C denoting \C\ which is
equal to the number of non-zero (with at least one non-zero element) rows of matrix A.
W e denote by £(rn) the subset of keys that are incident with a cryptogram m,
by S(m, s) the subset of keys that m a p a source state s into the cryptogram m, i.e,
£(m,s) = {ej £ £|a(ms),j = 1}, and by £((m, s), m') the subset of keys that m a p the source
state 5 to the cryptogram m and are incident with the cryptogram m'. The communicants
choose an encoding rule (key) according to the probability vector rr = (irx, ...,7TE)-

4.3 Attacks on A-codes - game theory model

In this section we consider four different types of attack that can be analysed using
game theory model. W e begin from a plaintext attack in which the goal is to construct
a valid ciphertext, and then we consider three chosen-content attacks: chosen-content
impersonation, chosen-content substitution and chosen-content plaintext attack.

4.3.1 Plaintext Attack
Plaintext attack is a substitution attack in which the content of the cryptogram is known
to the enemy. For Cartesian A-codes this is the same as Simmons' model of substitution.
However for A-codes with secrecy, knowledge of the content of the cryptogram is the extra
information available to the enemy and hence:
pvc > pcc =

Pi

(4 !)

Let P(m, s) denote the probability of a source state s being mapped into a cryptogram
E
m. W e have P(m,s) - Ps(s)-52*3a(ms)>3' w n e r e Ps(s) is the source probability distribution. The probability of the enemy's success if he/she intercepts cryptogram m, knows the
corresponding source state s, and introduces a fraudulent message m' into the channel, is
given by payoff ((m,s), m'),
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payoff((m, 5), rri) =

P(m' valid |(m,s) received ),
E
jL/ Z^I *3a{™.s),ja(m's'),j
s'£S\sj=l

=

,

x

(4-2)

E

52 *3a(ms),j
1=1

The enemy's strategy q can be represented by a collection of probability vectors
q = {q(ms\ m £ M, s £ S}, where
g(m.) = (^T)5

. . .

?

^ ), m. ^

m>

1 < < <

M> qirns)

>

Q?

£ g(m.)

= L

i

The game theory model for plaintext attack can be constructed using arguments similar to the ones used for the Simmons' model of impersonation and substitution.
The probability of the enemy's success when the enemy has intercepted a pair (rn, s)
and uses the best strategy is
E

_
p

r

=

52 52
m£M

=

52

52 52*3a(™s),ja(m>s>),jq{™)ps(s)

(4.3)

sSS m'£M\m s'£S\s j=l

^j^(m's)max(payon?((m55)5m/))
m
m,s
'

(4-4)

4.3.2 Perfect and near-perfect protection
An A-code provides perfect protection against plaintext attack if the enemy's best strategy
is uniform, i.e, q^)3' = 1/(M — 1), for every pair (m,s) for which E(m,s) > 0. Note that
we do not require E(m,s) ^ 0 for all pairs (m,s); rather it is required that the strategy
be uniform for all (m,s) with P(m,s) > 0.
Similar to the usual authentication scenario we have:
Proposition 4.3.1 An A-code provides perfect protection against plaintext attack if
only if,
k— 1
payoff ((m, s), m')

M-V
k-1

pc _ P[
for every pair (m,s) with P(m,s) > 0 and every m' ^ m. In this case
M -1

k — 1
k— 1
then from (4.4) it follows that Pxc = —
and
Proof: If payoff((m,s),m') = —
does not depend on the enemy's strategy. O n the other hand we have
52 payoff((m,s),m') = (fc-l)-
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k — 1
k— 1
Therefore max(payoff ((m,s),m')) > - ^ — y and P f > - ^ — only if payoff ((m,s),m') =

and equality holds if and

for all pairs (m,s) with P(m,s) > 0 and all rri ^ m .
D

Proposition 4.3.2 Lei P,pc = - ^ — k
M - 1

Then

2M < C < kM.

Equality in the right hand side holds if P(m, s) > 0 for all m £ M and s £ S. In this
case C =

kM.

Proof: The refined incidence matrix A has kM rows so C < kM. We assume that
E(m) > 0 for all m £ M.

Let C < 2M. Then there exists an ms £ M

to only one source state s. Consider an encoding rule e ^ £(ms).

that corresponds
Then e maps the

source state 5 to a cryptogram m' ^ ms and payoff((m', s),ms) = 0 which contradicts
that A-code provides perfect protection.
D
Using a simple counting argument we prove a lower bound on the number of encoding
rules for an A-code which provides perfect protection against a plaintext attack.
Proposition 4.3.3 If an A-code provides perfect protection against plaintext attack

C(M-l)
E

~

k(k-l)'

(4

" 5)

Proof: From Proposition 4.3.1 we have payoff((m, s), m') > 0. Then from (4.2) we derive
that
E

52 52a(^)ja(m's'),j>i,

(4.6)

s'es\sj=i
for all m £ M,

s £ S, m' £ M\m

such that P(m,s) > 0. Summing both sides of (4.6)

for all m, s, m' w e have

k(k-l)E= 52 E E E E HmS),3Hm>s'),3 > C(M - 1). (4.7)
m£M m'£M\m s£S s'ES\s j=l

Therefore E

> g(f-D.
k(k — 1)

•
Equation (4.5) shows that the minimum number of encoding rules for an A-code that
provides perfect protection for plaintext attack is at least twice the corresponding number
for Simmons' model of attack.
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T h e o r e m 4.3.4 Let Pxpc = (k - 1)/(M - 1), C = kM
equality.

Then P 0 = k/M

and let E satisfy (4.5) with

and the code provides perfect one-fold secrecy.

In this cas

communicants' best strategy is uniform.
Proof: Consider the encoding matrix D with P = M(M - l)/(k - 1) encoding rules.
Consider the column labeled by the cryptogram mt- and permute rows of D such that Uj
rows with D(e, nii) = Sj occur consecutively. Let Dij denote the matrix obtained from D
by considering these tij rows.
A n A-code provides perfect protection against plaintext attack if for every m' £

M\m

there is at least one row e of D^ with P,j(e,m') ^ 0. A row of P,j contains exactly k — 1
different elements hence Uj > (M - l)/(k - 1) and Ej(Uj) = d{ > k(M - l)/(k - 1). But
the total number of non-zero elements in the matrix D is equal to
M

kE = 52di> kM(M - l)/(k - 1),
i=i

and so P > M(M

— l)/(k — 1) where di is the number of non-zero elements in column m;.

Equality holds if and only if Uj = (M - l)/(k - 1) and d{ = k(M - l)/(k - 1) for all i,j.
In this case every column of the encoding matrix contains an equal number of non-zero
entries s,-, 1 < i < k, and for a uniform strategy of communicants we have Po =

k/M,

Pi = Pxpc = (k — 1)/(M — 1) and the code provides perfect one-fold secrecy.
D
Theorem 4.3.4 leads to the construction of A-codes with perfect protection against
plaintext attack. The construction was originally used by Stinson ([60], Theorem 4.2)
to construct codes that provide 1-fold secrecy and are 1-fold secure against spoofing. In
section 4.3.4 we generalise this construction to a transformation on an arbitrary A-code
to make it resistant against plaintext attack.
Let V(m,s) denote (Ue,ef(m,s) Mfa))

C M,

the set of valid cryptograms when the

enemy intercepts a pair (m,s).
A n A-code provides near-perfect protection against a plaintext attack if for any pair
(m,s) with P(m,s) > 0, the enemy's best strategy is random selection from the V(m,s),
and |V(m,s)| = V{m,s) = V; that is, the number of valid cryptograms does not depend
on the actual intercepted pair (m,s). If an A-code provides near-perfect protection then
payoff((m,5),m') = (k - 1)/V =

P?

4.3.3 Information-theoretic bound
The main information-theoretic bound on Pi is due to Pei and Rosenbaum [30, 35]. A
similar result can be proved for Pfc. In the following theorem P, M
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and S are random

variables that take values from the sets £, M

and S respectively.

Theorem 4.3.5
Ppc > 2_(i/(£lM5)-//(£;lM25))

(4.8)

and equality holds if and only if

(i) The A-code provides near-perfect protection against a plaintext attack and there
k —1
ppc _ ^

*_

(ii) The conditional probability P(m'\e, (m,s)) that m' is a cryptogram sent by the t

mitter, given that e is the actual encoding rule and pair (m,s) has already been sen
is constant for all e £ £((m,s),m').
Proof: See Appendix 4.6.1.
•

4.3.4 Construction of yl-codes resistant against plaintext attack
The construction is based on a combinatorial construction known as perpendicular array.
A perpendicular array PA\(t, k,E) is a 6 x k array of elements from a set £, \£\ — E,
such that each row of the array consists of k distinct elements of £ and a set of t columns
contains every i-subset of £, X times.
Theorem 4.3.6 Consider an (M,k,E) A-code with uniform source and Px = t. Then
we can construct an (M, k, kE) A-code, with kE encoding rules, and Pxc = Px — e.
Proof: Consider the encoding matrix D. We substitute a row, labeled by e,- £ £, with
a block of k rows labeled by, (ej,...ef) such that e\(s) £ M(ei).

Moreover for each

h 1 < i < E, the array obtained by restricting k rows, which correspond to the keys
e

j) 1 < j < k, to k columns which correspond to the cryptograms rn, m £ M(ei) is a

PAi(l, A;, k) on the set <S of \S\ = k source states. This results in a new A1-code with kE
encoding rules.

Let the communicants' strategy be defined by -K' = (ir\,..., ir*,..., -KkE) and -K\ — iti/k
Let A and A 1 denote the refined incidence matrices of the original code and the new code
respectively. Then we have:
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k

E

E EZXa(^--''a'

payoff1((m,s),m') =

s'€S\s j=l i=l
fc

(4.9)

g

i=ii=l
A;

£

s'e5\sj=i i=i

A; E
E E ^^(maj.ti

(4.10)

i=l t=l
E
ia

52 52 52* {^),ia(m's,)li
sES s'ES\s i=l

(4.11)

E

E
=

E *ia{ms),i

ses t=i
payoff (m,m').

(4-12)

Hence using the above equality and (4.4) we have

PV(Al) = E E^K5)max(pay°ffl(K*W))
rnE-M s£o

=

E

E P(m55)max(Pay°ff(m5m')) = A (A) = e.

mE-M sES

D
If the enemy knows the content of the cryptogram he/she is in a more powerful position
compared to the Simmons' model of attack. However Theorem 4.3.6 shows that it is always
possible to transform an arbitrary A-code to one with Pf c = Px; that is, one for which
the knowledge of the content of the cryptogram is not useful to the enemy and his/her
chance of success is not affected by this extra knowledge. The transformation substitutes
a row et- of the encoding matrix by k rows, each with k non-zero elements, as discussed
above. Using (4.1) we observe that the code constructed in Theorem 4.3.6 has the lowest
possible Pxc for the given Pi.
Using Theorem 4.3.6 and Theorem 2.3 from [60] we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3.7 If the original code in Theorem 4-3.6 has P 0 = k/M, the resulting Acode has Po = k/M, Px — Px° = e. Further, the resulting A-code also provides perfect
one-fold secrecy.
It is shown [62] that for an A-code with P 0 = k/M
number of encoding rules P is lower bounded by

M(M-l)
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and Pi = ( f c - l ) / ( M - l ) t h e

If an original A-code has P = P 0 , Po = k/M and Px = (k - 1)/(M - 1), then transformation of Theorem 4.3.6 results in a new A-code which has the minimum number of
encoding rules (E satisfies (4.5) with equality) among all A-codes with P 0 = k/M

and

P{c = (k-\)/(M-l).
W e note that for codes with P 0 = k/M the increase in the number of encoding rules,
due to the construction given in Theorem 4.3.6, may either contribute to providing secrecy,
or protection against a plaintext attack, or in general both. W e consider two extreme
cases. If the code originally provides perfect secrecy but does not provide any protection
against a plaintext attack, increasing the number of encoding rules will only increase
protection against a plaintext attack (see Example 4.3.8). O n the other hand, A-codes
without secrecy always provide protection against a plaintext attack. Thus increasing the
number of encoding rules only results in perfect secrecy (see Example 4.3.9).
Example 4.3.8 Consider the following A-code with uniform source. It has Po = k/M,
Pi = (k — 1)/(M — 1) and provides perfect one-fold secrecy, but Px° = 1.

E/M

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

ei

•Sl

0

•52

S3

0

e2

0 s2 •53
0 Sl 0 S2
0 0 Sl 0
0 0 0 Sl
S3
s2 s3 0 0 0
0 s2 S3 0 0

0
0
S3

0
0
0

•52

•S3

e3
e4
e5
e&
e7

0
0
0

Sl

0 s2
0
•Sl
0 Sl

Applying the transformation of Theorem 4-3.6 results in an A-code with the same
values of P0 and Pi, which provides perfect one-fold secrecy and has P[c = Pi.
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E/M

0

1

2

3

e\

Sl

s2

S3

A

s2

s3

Sl

el

S3

0
0
0

Sl

s2

1

0

Sl

4

5

6

0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0

e

el

0 s2 S3
0 s2 0 S3 Sl
0 s3 0 Sl s2
0 0 Sl 0 S2

S3

0
0
0

4

0

0

e33
e4

0
0

0
0

e
e

2

e2
e

2

e\

E/M

0

S3

Sl

0

S3

0

Sl

S2

0

0

Sl

0

S2

S3

1

2

0

0
0
0
0
0

0 s2 0
0 S3 0
0 0 Sl
0 0 s2
0 0 S3
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0

e

4

0

e

5

S3

e2

5l

e

s2

2

0

5

S2

P1
e
6

•S2

•S3

el

•S3

•Sl

e36

Sl

s2

e]

0 s2 S3
0 S3 Sl
0 Sl s2

4
e?

3

0
0
0

4

0
0
0

5

6

S3

Si

Sl s2

0

s2

0

S3

0

si

si

0

s2

0

S3

0

0

si

0

52

0

S3

D
E x a m p l e 4.3.9 Consider the following Cartesian A-code with the uniform source and
P0 = PX = Pfc =

k/M.
E/M

0

1

2

3

ei

Sl

S2

0

e2

Sl

0
0

e3
e4

0 s2
0 s2 0
0 0 s2

Sl
Sl

After the transformation, the A-code will have P 0 = Pi = Px° = k/M
also provides perfect one-fold secrecy.

0

1

e\

Sl

s2

4

s2

Sl

e]

Sl

E/M

e\
e1
e

3

e\
e\
e\

2
0
0

3
0
0
0
0

0 s2
s2 0 Sl
0 s2 0 Sl
0 Sl 0 s2
0 0 s2 Sl
0 0 Sl s2
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and the code

4.3.5

Chosen-content impersonation

In chosen-content attacks the enemy succeeds if he/she constructs a valid cryptogram for
a particular source state. In a chosen-content impersonation attack the enemy sends the
cryptogram m into the channel and expects it to be decoded into the source state s.
The enemy's impersonation strategy is represented by a probability vector
9 — (<Z(misi)5 • • •) 9(mMsk)) w ^ h Mk

coordinates, where q(mis3) 1S the probability of choosing

the pair (mi,Sj).
The probability of the enemy's success when he/she introduces cryptogram m into the
channel and expects it to be valid and be decoded to a source state s is

E
payoff(m,.s) = 52*ia(ms),j-

(4-13)

3=1

The probability of deception in the chosen-content impersonation attack is given by
E
P

°

= r

^f52*3a(ms),jm S

'

(4-14)

j=l

Proposition 4.3.10
Po > P0C > j- •

Proof: Chosen-content impersonation is obviously a more demanding type of attack fro
enemy's perspective, so P 0 > P0C. Using (4.14) we have
E

P0C

= max E

u

m,s *—*
j=l

E

\
a

*j (ms)j > m a x ( 7 E
v

'

m

fc

E *3a(ms),j) = Po/k.

(4.15)

'—• *—*
sES 3=1

0
The A-code provides perfect protection against chosen-content impersonation attack if enemy's best strategy is random selection among all pairs (m,s) £ M

x S and

q(ms) = l/(kM).
Proposition 4.3.11

Po > 1/M,

and equality occurs if and only if the A-code provides perfect protection against ch
content impersonation attack. In this case the code provides perfect one-fold secrecy
E

payoff (m,s) = 52*3a(ma)<i = 1/-^
3=1
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Proof:

Using

(4.13) w e have

EPay°ff(m>5)

E

=

k.

Therefore

mE-M sES

payoff (m, s) > 1/M.

Then from (4.14) it follows that P0C > 1/M, with equality if and

only if payoff (m, s) = 1/M for all pairs (m, s) £ M

p

^ = ^ -

r

x S. Then from the above we have

Eg WM«)
1/M • P5(5)

=V

(416)
„, ,

= f W

(4 i7)

-

That is, interception of a cryptogram does not affect source probability distribution
and the A-code provides perfect secrecy.
•

4.3.6

Chosen-content substitution

In chosen-content substitution attack the enemy has access to a cryptogram m and wan
to construct a valid cryptogram m' with a certain content s'. Let payoff (m, (m', s')) be the
probability of the enemy's success when he/she intercepts a cryptogram m and introduces
a cryptogram m' which he/she expects to be decoded to the source state s'.

payoff (m, (m',s')) =

P((m',s) valid\m received),
E

E E *ia{ms),ia(m>s'),iPs(s)
i=l sES
E

(4.18)

52 52 *3a(ms),jPs(s)
3=1 sES

Probability of deception P{c is

Pf =

52 P{m) m a x payoff(m,(m',5/)),

(4.19)

mEM

E

-

maX

52
5252*ia(ms),ia(m's'),iPs(s).
*-?. s',m'^m r-* ~t
mEM

(4.20)

«=1 sES

We can derive a relationship between Pf and Pi which is similar to the relation der
in Proposition 4.3.10 for chosen-content impersonation.
Proposition 4.3.12

Pi > Pf > x-
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Proof: A chosen-content substitution attack is a more restrictive type of attack than
traditional substitution and so Pi > Pxc. Using (4.20) we have
E

P C

1

=

E

m

, £? 5252*ia(™),ia(m's'),iPs(s),

mEM S 'm *m i=l sES

>

E

E
p
a
5252*i (ms),ia(m's'),iPs(s) = -±.

max(l/fc) E

mEMm *m

K

s'ES t=l sES

D

The code provides perfect protection against chosen-content substitution attack if t
enemy's

best

strategy

(m1, s'), m' £ M\m,

is

random

selection

from

the

set

of

all

pairs

s' £ S. In this case q™,s, = l/(k(M - 1)), for all m' £ M\m,

s' £ S,

where q™isi is the probability of success with (mr, s') when m is intercepted.
Proposition 4.3.13
k-1

pec >
1

-

k(M-iy

with equality if and only if the code provides perfect protection against a chosen-con
substitution attack. In this case
payoff(m,(m',5')) = uM_ly

for all m £ M,m' £ M\m, s' £ S.
Proof: Using (4.18) we have
E J] payoff(m,(m',5')) = fc-l,
s'ES m'^m

and therefore,

k-1
/

/

payoff(m,(m ,5 )) >

uM_1y

Then using (4.19) we can show that

k-1
Px > fc(M-l)'
c

k— 1
and equality holds if and only if payoff (m, (m , s')) = k,M_^
1

f o r a11 t r i

P l e s (m' (m''s'))D

In the following we derive a lower bound on the number of encoding rules for an A-code
that provides perfect protection against chosen-content substitution attack.
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Proposition 4.3.14 //

Pf

k l

' k(M-iy

then
E>Eo=M(M-l)

k — 1
k(M — 1)
Equality holds if and only if E(m) = —
Vm £ M.
k—1
(k — 1)
Proof: Using Proposition 4.3.13 we have payoff(m, (rri, s')) = -~-—— for all m £ M,
k(M — 1)
m' £ M\m, s' £ S. Then using (4.18) we show that
E

E E a(ms),iO-(m's'),i > 1i=l sES

Summing both sides of the last inequality over all m, m' and s' we have
E

52
52 525252a(rns),iH™>s'),i = k(k-l)E>M(M-l)k,
mEM m'EM\m s'ES i=l sES

(4.21)

which proves the lower bound on the number of encoding rules. Next assume that Pxc =
———— and E = —-r———. Then from (4.21) it follows that E 52 a{ms),iO-(m>s'),i = 1
k[M — i)
[K — ij
i=1 se5
for all m £ M, m' £ M\m, s' £ S. Summing the above equality over all m' ^ m and
s' £ S we have
_ E

52

525252"(r^wv),; =

(4.22)

m'EM\m s'ES t'=l s£S
E
a

(M-i)k = 5252a(™*),i 52 E (m's>),i = (4-23)
i=l sES

m'EM\m s'ES

(k ~ 1) E E a(ms),i = {k~ l)E(m). (4.24)
i=l sES

Therefore E(m) = const = (M - l)k/(k - 1) for all m £ M. Conversely if
k —1
Pf =
and E(m) = (M - l)k/(k - 1) for all m £ M then we can show that
1

k(M-l)

E

v

'

v

; /v

'
„

M(M-l)

a

52 E (ms),ia{m's'),i = 1 for all m £ M, m ' £ M\m, s £ S and hence P =
*=1sES

fc

_1

•
„

Using Proposition 4.3.12 we have, if Pf = (k-l)/(k(M-l)) then Px = (k-l)/(M-l).
Protection against a chosen-content substitution attack can be increased by adding mo
encoding rules in a special way. In Theorem 4.3.15 we give a transformation on an

arbitrary A-code that increases its protection against chosen-content attack to the h
possible value.
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T h e o r e m 4.3.15 Consider an (M, k, E) A-code with Px — e and a uniform source. Then
we can construct an (M,k,kE)

A-code with Px = e and Pf = Px/k = t/k. This is the

c

lowest possible value of Pf for the given Px.
Proof: To construct an A-code which is resistant against a chosen-content substitution
attack w e use the same transformation as in Theorem 4.3.6. For the resulting A1-code,
let payoff1 (m,(m', s')) denote enemy's probability of success when he/she intercepts a
cryptogram m and substitutes it with a cryptogram m ' that he/she wants to be decoded
to a source state s', and let payoff (m, (m', s')) denote the same probability for the original
A-code. Also let the communicants' strategy be defined by %' = (ir\,... ,rrx,... ,1?%),
where TTJ =fti/k,and A and A 1 denote the refined incidence matrices of the original code
and the new code respectively. Then using an argument similar to Theorem 4.3.6 w e have
it

E

525252 *ialm,),tia\m>,'),iiPs(s)
payoff1 (m,(m',s')) =

i=1 i=

l **

525252

(4.25)

;

%J a

i (ms),pPs(s)

j=1 i=l sES

Since restricting k rows of the encoding array of the A1-code, that correspond to the
keys e\ 1 < j < k, to k columns, that correspond to cryptograms m £ M(e{), results in
PAi(l, k,k) and using (4.25) w e have
k

E

52 52 52 52 *ialm,),Ua\m'a'),iiPs(s)
payoff1 (m, (m', s')) =

1_ s'ES 3=1 i=l sES

*

525252 *i4m^Psis)
3=1 i=lsES

— • payoff1 (m,m / )

k
E

5252*ia(ms)>ia(m's')>iPs(s}

E
1

s'ES i=l sES

E

~k '

5252*ia{ms),iPs(s)
j=lsES

- • payoff (m,m').
k
Therefore using (4.19) we get

Dc£

v^ Df

v

/payoff(m,m/)^

E

P ( m ) max(payoff (m,m'))

meM

=

£i

0
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W e note that in Example 4.3.8, the original (M,k,E)

A-code has P 0 =

k/M,

Px = Px = (k — 1)/(M - 1) and the resulting code has the same value for P 0 and Px
but according to Proposition 4.3.12 achieves the best protection against a chosen-content
substitution attack for the given value of Px, i.e, P " = Px/k = (k — l)/(k(M — 1)).
Theorem 4.3.16 gives a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an A-code that provides perfect protection against impersonation and chosen-content substitution attacks.
This result is similar to Theorem 2.5.4 in Chapter 2.
T h e o r e m 4.3.16 An A-code provides perfect protection against impersonation and chosencontent substitution attacks if and only if
k_i

E
E E 7r i jP 5(s)a (ms))j a (mV ),j =
3=1 sES

-, Vm £ M, m! £ M\m,

s' £ S.

KM[1V1 - I)

Proof: See Appendix 4.6.2.

a
4.3.7 Chosen-content plaintext
In a chosen-content plaintext attack the enemy intercepts a pair (m, s) and introduces a
cryptogram m' into the channel which he/she wishes to be decoded to the source state s'.
The enemy's probability of success in this case is denoted by payoff((m,s), (m',s')).

payoff((m,s), (m',s')) =

P((m',s') valid)\(m,s) received),
E

52 'Kja{ms),ja{m's'),j
3= 1
E

'

(4.26)

/ J 1T3a{ms),j
3=1

S u m m i n g over all possible ml £ M\m

and s' £ S\s we can show that

payoff ((m, s), (m', s')) > 1/(M - 1).

(4.27)

The enemy's strategy q can be represented as a collection of probability vectors
{q(ms\ m £ M, s £ S], where # ( m s ) is a (k - 1)(M - 1) dimensional vector and q\Z's')
is the probability of choosing (m', s') when (m, s) is received. Probability of the enemy's
success can be calculated by the following expression, where we assume that TT and q are
the best strategies of the communicants and the enemy respectively.
Pf = E E E E 52*3^rns),3^'s')Jpl}Ps(s), (4.28)
mEM sES m'EM\m s'ES\s J'=1
=

EE p ( m ' 5 ), m , a ^(p a y° f f (( m ' s )'( m '' s / )))'
*—' *—'
(m'.sM
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(4-29)

In section 4.3.5 we showed that P 0 > P0C, however, there is no general relation between
Px and Pfc. This can be seen by noting that in Example 4.3.8 we have Px = 1/3, but
if the content of a cryptogram is known, the encoding rule is uniquely determined and
we have Pxpc = 1 > Px, while for Cartesian A-codes a chosen-content plaintext is a more
restricted attack than traditional substitution and Px > Pf.

Proposition 4.3.17 For an A-code with probability of deception in a substitution att
equal to Px we have
ppc

p

Proof: A chosen-content plaintext attack has a more demanding goal than pure plaintext
attack, and hence Pf c > Pf. Using (4.26) and (4.28) we have

( E

\
7r

(k-l)Pf

=

/ , ia(ms),ifl(m'«'),i
i=l

52(k-l)P(m,s)ma.x

E

m,s'

m,s

52 *ia(ms),i
\
/

P

5

E

m

> E E K ) max
J
mEM

i=l

I

E

\
a

E *i {ms),i^{m's'),i

i=l s'ES
E

sES

_

DP
P{

C

/ j ^i^{ms),i

i=l

The last inequality follows from (4.1).

•

Perfect protection against a chosen-content plaintext attack

An A-code provides perfect protection against a chosen-content plaintext attack if fo
any intercepted pair (m,s) the enemy's best strategy is random selection from all pairs
(m',s'),m' ^ m,s' ^ s, i.e., q™fs, =
P(m, s) > 0, and all pairs (m', s') £ M

rk_1\fM_1\

f o r a11

P airs (m's)

€

M

x <5

'

x S, m' ^ m,s' ^ s.

Proposition 4.3.18

P{>

1

(M-l)'

with equality if and only if the code provides perfect protection against a chosen-conte
plaintext attack. In this case
pa,yofi((m,s),(m',s')) =

< M_ ly

for all (m,s) with P(m,s) > 0 and all (m',s'), m' ^m,s' ^ s.
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Proof: T h e proof follows from (4.27) and (4.29).
•
It is interesting to note that for an A-code that provides perfect protection against
chosen-content impersonation and chosen-content plaintext, a substitution attack is always the better game to play. This is true because P,pc =
5

F

1

> P„ =

M-l

°

—

M'

T h e o r e m 4.3.19 An A-code provides perfect protection against a chosen-content impersonation and a chosen-content plaintext attack if and only if
E

1

2^*3a{ms),ja(m's'),j = j^-tj^ _ j\ 5

for all pairs (m,s), (m',s') £ M x S, m' ^ m and s' ^ s. In this case C = kM.
Proof: See Appendix 4.6.3.
•
W e note that if an A-code provides perfect protection against a chosen-content plaintext attack and C = kM, then it provides perfect protection against chosen-content
impersonation attack, following from (4.61) and (4.63). Theorem 4.3.19 shows that the
reverse is also true, i.e., if an A-code provides perfect protection against a chosen-content
impersonation and a chosen-content plaintext attack then C = kM.
Next Theorem 4.3.20 shows that an A-code that provides perfect protection for both
attacks needs a large number of encoding rules. It also gives a characterisation for A-codes
in this case.
W e need the following definitions. A n ordered design OD\(t,k,M)

is a b x k array

of orderedfc-subsetsof a set M, such that every set of t columns contains every ordered
t-subset of M

exactly A times.

Theorem 4.3.20 Let Pf = 1/(M-1) and C = kM. Then E > M(M-l) with equality
if and only if encoding array B of the A-code is an ordered design ODx(2, k, M). In this
case PQ = 1/M and the code provides perfect one-fold secrecy.
Proof: Let Pxp£ = 1/(M - 1), E = M(M - 1) and C = kM (hence P(m,s) > 0
for all (m,s) £ M

(m,s) £ M

x S). Then from Proposition 4.3.18 we conclude that for all pairs

x S and (m',s') £ M

xS,m' / m, s' ^ s, we have

E

52a(ms)'3a(m's'),j > i3=1

Let E(rn,s) = Xms. Then as C = kM, Xms > 0. Summing over all ml £ M\m,
s' £ S\s, we have
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and

E

52
E E a(ms),ja(m's'),j =
m'EM\m s'£S\s 3=1
Ama

>

(k - l)Xms > (k - 1)(M - 1);

(M-l),

V pairs (m,s) £ M

xS

(4.31)
(4.32)

But Em,s Xms = kE and so
min(ATOS) < kE/(kM) = E/M. (4.33)
From (4.32) and (4.33), it follows that E/M > M - 1 and P > M(M - 1), with
E
equality if and only if E a(ms),ja(m's'),j = 1 for all pairs (m,s), (m',s'), meaning that
i=i

there exists a unique encoding rule e such that e(s) = rn and e(s') = ml and hence
the encoding array B of the A-code is an ODi(2,k,M).

Therefore Am,s = E/M

and

payoff((m,s),(m', s')) = TTJ/ E j 7Tja(ms),j = 1/(M — 1), which implies that Tj = 1/E.
Then from the definition of perfect secrecy it follows that A-code provides one-fold secrecy.
Conversely, if there exists an OPi(2, k, M) then using uniform communicants' strategy,
i.e., %j = 1/E, we have P0C = 1/M and Pf = 1/(M - 1).
•
Corollary 4.3.21 characterises the combinatorial structure of A-codes which provide
perfect protection against a chosen-content impersonation and a chosen-content plaintext
attack. W e note that the encoding array of an A-code corresponds to an ordered design
E

0D\(2, k, M) if and only if E

a

(ms),j«(m's'),i — const for all (m, s) £ MxS

and (m1, s') £

3=1

M\m

x S\s. If w e allow repeated rows in the ordered design then the necessary and

sufficient conditions on the incidence matrix can be written as
E

x

52^3Hms),ja(m>s'),3 = MtM_Xy

(4'34)

where xy's are positive rational numbers with J2f=i flj = 1- On the other hand we kno
that (4.34) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the A-code to provide perfect protection against a chosen-content impersonation and a chosen-content plaintext attacks.
Therefore w e have the following corollary.

Corollary 4.3.21 An A-code provides perfect protection against a chosen-content impe

sonation attack and a chosen-content plaintext attack if and only if the encoding array
the A-code corresponds to an ordered design OD\(2,k,M)
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(with possibly repeated rows).

Information-Theoretic b o u n d
Let V(m,a) be the set of valid pairs (m',s') if the enemy intercepts a pair (m,s) and Vtm,a)
denote the cardinality of the set V(miS).
A n A-code provides near-perfect protection against a chosen-content plaintext attack
if for any pair (m, s) with P(m, s) > 0, the enemy's best strategy is random selection from
the set V(m,s), and V(m,s) = V; that is, the number of valid pairs (m',s') does not depend
on the actual intercepted pair (m, s). If an A-code provides near-perfect protection then
payoff((m,5),(m,5')) = (* - 1)/V = Pf.
Theorem 4.3.22 gives the information-theoretic bound on Pxc. In this theorem E, M
and S are random variables that take values from the sets £, M

and S respectively. The

proof is an immediate extension of the proof of Theorem 4.3.5.
Theorem 4.3.22
ppc > 2-(H(E\MS)-H(E\M2S2))^

^ 3 ^

with equality if and only if

(i) The A-code provides near-perfect protection against a chosen-content plaintext a
tack.

(ii) For two arbitrary pairs ((m, s), (m', s')) for which P((m, s), (m1, s')) > 0, co
probability P((m',s')\ei,(m,s) is independent of ei, where ei £ £((m,s),(m',s')).
In the case of equality we have
ppc _ k

1

Proof: See Appendix 4.6.4

Chosen-content plaintext attack of order r
Most of the above results can be easily extended to a chosen-content plaintext attack of
order r, which we state without proof.
In a chosen-content plaintext attack of order r the enemy intercepts a sequence of r
pairs of (cryptogram,plaintext), {(m\,sTx),(mr2,sr2),...,(mT,sr)}, and constructs a fraudulent cryptogram m ' which he/she wants to be decrypted into the plaintext s' using the
knowledge of previously intercepted r pairs. A chosen-content plaintext attack considered above is an attack of order 1. W e denote by Pf° the probability of deception in a

107

chosen-content plaintext attack of order i. For order i attacks, Pf > 1/(M - i). T h e
next theorem gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an A-code to provide perfect
protection for all orders of chosen-content plaintext attack.
T h e o r e m 4.3.23 An A-code has Pf = 1/(M - i), 0 < i < r, if and only if
E

1

E *jajmr1 -.. ajmrajm, =

^, _

, _ .+

Vm r £ MT, m' £ M\mr

The proof of the above theorem is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4.3, uses induction by r and the fact that Theorem 4.3.19 gives the proof for r = 1.
The next theorem gives characterisation of the A-codes which provide perfect protection against a chosen-content plaintext attacks for all orders i, 0 < i < r.
T h e o r e m 4.3.24 An A-code provides perfect protection against chosen-content plaintext
attacks of order i, 0 < i < r, if and only if the encoding array of the A-code corresponds
to an ordered r-design OD\(r,k,M)

(with possibly repeated rows).

T h e o r e m 4.3.25
ppc > 2-(H(E\Mrsn-H(E\Mr+1Sr+1))^

t±Mj

with equality if and only if
(i) An A-code provides near-perfect protection against chosen-content plaintext attacks
of all orders i, 0 < i < r.
(ii) For two arbitrary sequences ((mT,sr),(m',s')) for which P((mr,sr),(m',s')) > 0
conditional probability P((ml, s')\ei, (ml,sT)) is independent of ei, where
ei££((mr,sr),(m',s')).

4.3.8 Construction of A-codes that provide resistance against
a chosen-content plaintext attack
In Proposition 4.3.17 w e noted that

ppc > J\_
k— 1

(4>37)

Theorem 4.3.26 shows that an arbitrary A-code can be transformed into one which has
the same Px, and Pf is at its m i n i m u m and achieves (4.37) with equality.
The transformation substitutes each row e,- of the encoding matrix with k(k -1) rows,
similar to the transformation described in Theorem 4.3.6, but this time restricting these
k(k - 1) rows to co-ordinates from the set M(ei) results in an 0Pi(2, k, k). Such designs
exist when A; is a prime power [14].
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T h e o r e m 4.3.26 Consider an (M,k,E) A-code with Px = e with a uniform source and
let k be a prime power.
Pf

Then there exists an (M,k,k(k — 1)E) A-code with

= Px/(k - 1) = e/(k - 1). IfC

= kM

then the code will have P0C = 1/M and

will provide perfect one-fold secrecy.
Proof. See Appendix 4.6.5.
•
Corollary 4.3.27 In Theorem 4.3.26 ifP0 = k/M then the new code will have P0C = 1/M
and will provide perfect one-fold secrecy.
An example of this construction is given below.
Example 4.3.28 Consider an A-code without secrecy with P0 = Px = Pxpc = k/M.

E/M

0

1

0
1

so

Sl

2

3

4

5

s2 0

0

0
0

0

0 s2 Sl
0 Sl 0 s2 0 so
0 0 s2 0 Sl •s0

so

2
3
The transformed code is

E/M

0

0
1

so

2
3

4
5
6
7

1

2

3

0
Sl s2 so 0
0
S2 so Sl
0
Sl so s2
So s2 Sl 0
S2 Sl so 0
so
s2

8

Sl

9
10

S2
So

Sl

0
0
0
0
0

s2

4 5
0
0
0
0
0
0

0 s2 Sl
0 Sl So
0 so s2
0 so Sl
0 Sl s2

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

E/M

0

1

2

3

11
12
13

Sl

0

s2 so 0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
. 0
0
0

Sl

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

14
15
16
11
18
19
20
21
22
23

s2
So

s2
Sl

so

0
0
0
0
0
0

4

5
so

s2

0
0
0
0
0
0

s2 0

Sl

so

Sl

s0
Sl

s2
so

s2
so
Sl
Sl

so

Sl

s2
so
s2
Sl

0 So s2
0 s2 Sl
0 s2 so
0 so Sl
0 Sl s2

The new code preserves the protection properties of the original code but also provi
perfect secrecy and has the following parameters: P0C = 1/M, Px° = k/((k - 1)M).
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D
A-codes with P0C = 1/M, Pxc = 1/(M — 1) and suitable parameters can be combined.
The result is an A-code with the same values of P0C and Pf c for a larger source and hence
increased efficiency. The composition is based on a method used by Bierbrauer et al
[4] for composition of perpendicular arrays. Proposition 4.3.29 gives the details of this
construction.

Proposition 4.3.29 ([4]) Ifan 0Dx(2,k,M) and an OD^^M-k) exist, where t >
1, then there is an ODxx^x(M-k)(M-k-i)(2,k + £,M).
Hence having an (M,k,Ex) A-code and an (M — k,£,E2) A-code that provide perfect protection against chosen-content impersonation attack and chosen-content plaintext
substitution attacks implies existence of an (M, k + £,E) A-code with PQ = 1/M and
Pxc = 1/(M — 1) and for which S = k +1. W e note that the new code obviously does not
preserve the original values of P 0 and Px.

4.4 Attacks on A-codes - worst case analysis

In this section we consider four attacks whose analysis is equivalent to the worst c
analysis of the system. In these attacks the enemy may choose the cryptogram and/or
the plaintext that he/she intercepts. These types of enemy actions are possible only
when he/she has access to the sending device. First we describe the attacks and derive
expressions for the probability of deception in each case and then show the relationship
between different types of attacks. In [19] Johanson et al showed that it is possible
to construct good P-codes from Cartesian A-codes and used the bounds on P-codes to
derive a bound on the size of the source. W e extend their approach to A-codes with
secrecy when the A-code performance is measured using worst case analysis approach.
W e assume uniform communicants' strategy and uniform source through the rest of this
chapter.

4.4.1 Chosen ciphertext
The enemy can choose the ciphertext sent over the channel and his/her goal is to construct
a valid ciphertext. W e denote the probability of deception by Pxcc
Pf = max (payoff(m,m')) (4.38)
(m,m')
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*ia{ms),ia(m's'),iPs(sy

E

i,s,s'

max

52*ia(ms),iPs(s)

(m,m')

\

4.4.2

(4.39)

t,s

Chosen-ciphertext chosen-content

The information available to the enemy is the same as above but the goal of the attack is
to construct a cryptogram with a given content. T h e probability of deception is denoted

by Pf.
P

iC

=

.m a ;X

(payoff(m,(m',s')))

(4.40)

(m,(m',s'))

52 *ia{ms),ia>{m's'),iPs(s)
i,s

=

max
(m,(m',s'))

4.4.3

52*itt(™s),iPs(s)

(4.41)

Chosen-plaintext

The enemy can choose a ciphertext with a specific content, to be sent over the channel,
and his/her goal is to construct a valid cryptogram. The probability of success is denoted

by if,
PIpc

„m a x A (payoff((m, s), m'))

(4.42)

(\m,s),m')
'52*ia('ms),ia(m's')Ji
i,s'

max

52*ia(^),i

((m,s),m')

4.4.4

(4.43)

Chosen-plaintext chosen-content

The enemy can choose a ciphertext with a specific content, to be sent over the channel,
but the goal of attack is to construct a valid cryptogram with a certain content. In this
case the probability of deception is denoted by Pxc,

Pf

=

max

(payoff((m,s),(m',5')))

(4.44)

((m,s),(m',s'))

( 52

7r a

i (ms),ifl!(m's'),i

i

max
((m,s),(m',s'))
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(4.45)
,

/ j " i^(m»),t

4.4.5

Relationship between different attacks

The following proposition shows the relationship between probability of deception for
different types of attack.
pec

Proposition 4.4.1
.

ppc -v^

• rl

1

• Pf >

k'

ppc

- k-lrl •

Proof: Using (4.39) and (4.41) w e have
E
Pxcc

=

7r a

' H,ifl(mV),i-Ps(s)

t,s

max

52*ia(™)sPs(s)

m,('m',s')

)

i,s

(

>

a

a

52 *i (rns),i (m's'),iPs(sy

1-E

max

E7r'a("is).i-^5(s)

771,771

V

i,s

52 *ia(ms),ia(m's'),iPs(sy
DC(

i,s,s'

=

— * max

r

7ria

E (^).'^ ( )

k m,m'

\

l

>5 5

l,S

I

Using (4.43) and (4.45) w e have

f

52*ia(ms)<ia(m's')^Ps(s^
max
i(i ms i s s
pr = {(m,s),(m',s'))
52*
( )> P ( )
\
i

/

>

max
[m,s),m'

J

a

E *i (ms),iO-(m's'),iPs(s)^

J

- —-52k 1
\ ~

52*ia(ms),iPs(s))

s'?s
i

f

a

52 *i (ms),ia(m's'),iPs(s)
max
k — 1 {m,s),m'
52*ia(ms),iPs(s)
1

PIpc
k-1

\

D

4.4.6

P7-codes from A-codes

Let the source and the communicants' best strategy be uniform, i.e., Ps(s) = 1/k and
VJ = 1/E, l<j<E.
Equations (4.38) to (4.44) reduce to the following:
E(m,ml)

P{c

=

max
*T1 TTJ.'

(4.46)
E(m)
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'

-,
P cc =
1

PP C
P[
ppc
1

=
=

E(m,(m',s')) .
v
max
') ' '',
m,(m's>) E(m)
'
m a v E((Tn,s),m')
max — —
— ,
(m,s),m> E(m,s)
E((m,s),(m',s'))
m a x
(m,S),(mV)
E(m,S)
'

(AA7)
^At>
(4.48
v

;

[

^^

Let P 0 = k/M. Then E(m) = E.>a(m*),; = PPo and from (4.46) and (4.47) above we
have
E(m,m')<EP0Px£c, (4.50)
E(m,(m',s'))<EPoPr.

(4.51)

Similarly if P0C = 1/M. Then E(m,s) = £t-a(m,)fl- = £P0C and from (4.48) and (4.49)
above we have

E((m,s),m') < P P 0 P f / "'

(4.52)

E((m, s), (m1, s')) < E P 0 P f •

(4-53)

In the following we describe a way of obtaining M-ary P-codes from A-codes that
are resistant against a chosen-content chosen-plaintext attack. W e assume that M

has a

structure of a finite field which implies that M is a prime power.
For every source state s we construct an M-ary vector vs of length P such that its jth
component vs- is m = ej(s). This gives us an (P, k, E) E-code. The minimum distance of
the P-code is E because for any two source states s,s' £ S the corresponding codewords
vs and vs cannot have a c o m m o n component as otherwise we have ei(s) = ei(s'), which is
not possible. In the following we show that if Pf c < 1 then more codewords can be added
to the P-code without significantly affecting the minimum distance. Later this code is
used to obtain a bound on the size of the source.
The composition of a vector vs denoted by comp(vs) is a vector of M

components

such that,
comp(vs)j = —\{j : v'j = m}\, m £ M.
We note that for A-codes with P0C = 1/M comp(vs) is a constant vector because
comp(vs)j = i • ^ = 1/M,
and is independent of s. In other words,
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comp(vs) = (PcQ,...,PcQ),

Vs£S,

We have
|{i;«J = my!

= m'}\ = E((m,s),(m's')),

which by using (4.53) gives
d(vs, vs') >E-M- max (E((m, s), (mV))) = E(\ - if). (4.54)
(m,s),(m',s')

But in general m could be represented in the following form Cim' + c2, for arbitrary
cx ^ 0, c2 £ M.

W e assume M

is a finite field. Then from (4.54) it follows that if

Pxc < 1 we can add new codewords to the P-code without affecting the lower bound
on its minimum distance. From each codeword v3 we form new codewords vSn using the
following transformation: vSn = cxvs + c2, where Ci ^ 0, c2 £ M.

If Pxc < 1 no two

codewords from this transformation can be the same and the minimum distance is still
low bounded by (4.54).
There are M(M

— 1) such mappings and hence we have kM(M

— 1) vectors in the

P-code. The second type of vectors that we can add to the code are constant vectors.
These are vectors of length P with equal components m denoted by m l .
The H a m m i n g distance between m l and an arbitrary vSn is equal to
d(ml,vSn) = E(l-l/M),
and is still low bounded by P(l - 1/M) > P(l - Pf) as Pf > 1/(M - 1)
There are M

such vectors and hence we obtain a (E,M(M

- l)k + M , P ( 1 - Pf))

P-code. W e note that the better protection A-code provides against a chosen-content
chosen-plaintext attack the higher is the minimum distance in the corresponding A-code.
W e note that the parameters of the code are very similar to the one obtained in [19].

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we considered new attacks on authentication system and classified the
using the information available to the enemy and the goal of the attack. Attacks in which
the enemy does not collude with the sender can be studied using game theory model. W e
defined perfect and near-perfect protection and proved information-theoretic bounds for
each type of attack. W e showed that A-codes that provide the best protection against the
chosen-content plaintext attack correspond to ordered designs. W e proposed transformations on A-codes that result in new A-codes which are resistant against chosen-content
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impersonation, chosen-content substitution, plaintext and chosen-content plaintext attacks respectively.
Attacks in which the enemy colludes with the sender and therefore can choose the
cryptogram and/or plaintext can be analysed only using worst case analysis of the Acode. W e showed the relation between probability of deception for different attacks. W e
provided an algorithm for constructing error-correcting codes (P-codes) from A-codes and
showed that A-codes with better protection give P-codes with higher minimum distance.
Some open problems for the second group of attacks:
1. Derive bounds on the probability of deception for all four attacks.
2. Constructions of the A-codes that are resistant against chosen-ciphertext, chosencontent chosen ciphertext, chosen-plaintext and chosen-content chosen-plaintext attacks.

4.6 Appendix
4.6.1
Proof of Theorem 4-3.5
W e need the following l e m m a due to Jensen [28].
L e m m a 4.6.1 (Jensen's inequality.) Let w{ £ [0,1], i £ I = {l,...,n}, n is some
integer, with Y2ieiwi = 1- U f

ls a

real function which is convex on the interval [a,b] and

Xi £ [a,b], i £ I, then

f(52wiXi) <52wif(x*)Equality holds if and only if all Xi i £ I, are equal.
To prove the theorem assume P, M
values from the sets £, M

and S denote independent variables which take the

and S respectively. From definition of the conditional mutual

information w e have
I(E; M\(M, S)) = H(E\(M, S)) - H(E\(M2, S)) = H(M\(M, S)) - H(M\E, (M, S)).
Thus it is sufficient to show,

log(PD > H(M\E, (M, S)) - H(M\(M, S)).
Let (m,s) be a pair of cryptogram and source state with P(m,s) > 0, and let m' £
M\m
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be a cryptogram with P(m', (m, s)) > 0. In the first step of the proof we show the

following inequality:
P(m'|(m,5))-log(P(m'|(m,5)))<
E P(e,m'|(m,s)log(payoff((m,5),m')P(m'|(m,5)), (4.55)
e££(m',(m,s))

which is fundamental to the proof of the theorem. We define a probability distribution
on the set of encoding rules £(ml, (m,s)) by
,_ P(e|(m,s))
^'•("••K C J- payoff((m,s),m'Y
Because,
payoff((m,s),m') = E ^(el(™,s)),
e&£((m,s),m')

then,
E payoff ((m, 5), m') = 1.
e££((m,s),m')

Now we can derive an expression for the conditional probability P(m'|(m,s)).

P(m'|(m,5)) = E P(e,m'|(m,5))
e££(m' ,(m,s))

E

P(e|(m,S))P(m'|(m,5))

e€£(m',(m,s))

V,m',(m,s)(e)payoff((m,5),m')P(m/|e,(m,5))

E
e€f(m',(m,s))

Using Jensen's inequality for f(x) = x • log(x) at x = P(m'\(m,s)) = £ee£(m',(m,s)) wexe,
with we = ^m/)(m,5)(e), and xe = v&yofi((m,s),m')P(m'\e,(m,s)) we have

P(m,|(m,3))-log(P(m'|(m,5)) < E Vw,(m,s)(e)(payoff((m,s),m')P(m'|e, (m,s
e€£(m',(m,s))

x

log(payoff ((m, s), m')P(m'\e, (m, s))),

E P(e,Tn'\(m,s))
eg£ {m',(m,s))

x

log(payoff ((m, s), m')P(m'\e, (m, s))),

which proves (4.55). Let Pfc(m,5) = maxm« payoff((m,s),m'). In the second step of the
proof we show that for any pair (m,s) with P(m,s) > 0 we have

P(M|(m, 5)) > - log(Pr(™, s)) + H(M\E, (m, s)),
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or,
log(Pf (m,5)) > P(M|P,(m, 5 )) -P(M|(m, 5 )).

(4.56)

By definition of H(M\(m,s)) and use of inequality (4.55) we get
H(M\(m,s)) =

-

E P(™'\(m,s))\og(P(m'\(m,s))
m'£M\m

>

~

52
m'£M\m

=

-

^(e,m'|(m,6))log(payoff((m,5),m')P(m,|e,(m,5))

E

e££ (m',(m,s))

52

^(m'|(m,5))log(payoff((m,5),m')

m'£M\m

-

E

E

P(e\(m,s))P(m'\e,(m,s))\og(P(m'\e,(m,s))).

m'£M\m e££(m',(m,s))

Now using the definition of H(M\E, (m,s)) we have
P(M|(m, 5 ) >

-

^K|(m,5))log(payoff((m,5),m/))4-P(M|P,(m,5))

E
m'£M\m

>

-log(P1p(m,S))x

52

P(m'\(m,s)) + H(M\E,(m,s))

m'£M\m

= -log(Pnm,s)) + P(M|P,(m,s)).
In third step we prove the theorem.

Using (4.4) and Jensen's inequality for

f(x) = — log(a;) we have

log(iT) = log(E^Ks)Pf c (m, S ))> E^K^)log(Pr(m^))(m,s)

(4-57)

(m,s)

Multiplying both parts of (4.56) on P(m, s) and summing over all pairs (m, s) we get
E

P{m, s) log(Pr(m, s)) > E P{m, *) x (P(M|P, (m, a)) - H(M\(m, a))).
m

(m, s)

's

Then using (4.57) we have
log(PD

>

52P(Tn,s)((H(M\E,(m,s))-H(M\(m,s)))
(m,s)

=

P(M|P,(M,5))-P(M|M,.5).

This shows the first statement of the theorem. W e have,
log(PD > P ( M | P , (M, S)) - H(M\M, S),
and equality is obtained if and only if equality is attained in the inequalities (4.55) and
(4.57) used in the proof. Thus, equality holds if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied for every pair (m,s) with P(m,s) > 0,
1. Pfc = payoff ((rn, s), m') = const.
2. Conditional probability P(m'|e, (m,s)) is constant for all e £ £(m', (m,s)).
0
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4.6.2
Proof of Theorem 4-3.16
Necessity: Let
fc-1
E E *jPs{s)a{ms),ja{m,sl)J =
kM,M_1y

Vm £ M, ml £ M\m, s' £ S. (4.58)

Then using (4.20) we have
Pf = E max (————)
=
s',m'±mxkM(M -1)'

k(M-iy

and therefore the A-code provides perfect protection against a chosen-content
attack. Hence from Proposition 4.3.13 we have

k — 1
p&yo%(m,(m',s'))=

jfc(M_1),

which by using (4.58) gives us P(m) = 1/M
We note that E E a(ms),jPs(s) = 1, so
m£M s£S
•Kj= 52 52*3a(rns),jPs(s) (4.59)
m£M s£S

Therefore for all m £ M we have
E E
5252*3a{ms),j) =
s£S 3=1

=

5252
52 52*3a{ms),3a(m's'),jPs(s'),
s£S j=lm'£Ms'£S
E
E

E

E

*3a(ms),3a(m's'),jPs{S') + E

E

m'£M\m 3=1 s,s'£S

=

{M

~

= -M-

1)k X

kM(M - 1)

+ P{m) =

+

g S

E *3a(ms),ja(ms'),jPs(s))

3=1 s',s£S

1r a

' ^'Ps^

M'

which implies P0 = k/M.
k—1
Sufficiency: Let Pf - -T—L——

and P 0 = k/M. Then from Proposition 4.3.13 we have

E E *3Ps(s)Hms)^\m'S%3 = ^J-l) * ^ ^
Since P0 = k/M and using (4.59) we have
E

E
P

0
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=

5252*3a(ms),j = 5252
52 52*3a(ms),ja(m's'),jPs(s'):
s£S j=l
s£S j=lm'£Ms'£S

E

E
a

52

52 52 *3 {ms),ja{m.s,)jPS(s') + E

m'£M\m

3=1 s,s'£S

E

*3a(ms),ja{Tns%jPs(a),

j=i s',s£S

m'£A1\m

= irrrt1 - p(m)) + p(m)= kiMThat is P ( m ) = 1/M. Then, using (4.60) we have
£_

E

l

7r p

52 52 i 5(s)a(ms)iia(mv)j =
J=ls£S

kM(M-l)
a

4.6.3
Proof of Theorem 4-3.19
Necessity: Let
E

l

E *3a(ms),3a{m's%3 = M^M
for all (m, 5), (m', s') £ M

_ Xy

x S,m' ^ m and 5' ^ s.

Then

^
2^

^ A
(M-l)(k-l)
k-1
L, l^*3Hms),3Hm's'),3 =
M ( M - 1)

=_

M ~ ' (4.61)

E

52*3a(ms),j E

=

;'=1

E

a

(™'s'),j, (4-62)

m'£A1\m s'£S\s

E

=

52*3a(ms),j(k-l)3=1

Therefore J2f=i^ja(ms),j = 1/M for all pairs (m,s) and PQ = 1/M. Then using (4.26)
we have payoff((m, 5), (ml,s')) =

1
(M _1,, for

all (m,s) with P(m,s) > 0, which implies

Pxpa = 1/(M - 1).
Sufficiency:

Let P0C = 1/M and Pfs = 1/(M -1). Then from Proposition 4.3.11 we have
E

E *3a(ms),j = 1/M,
3=1

for all pairs (m,s) £ M

x S. Proposition 4.3.18 implies that,

payoff ((m, 5), (m',s')) = ,M_ly
Then using (4.26) we get the necessary result.
D
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4.6.4
Proof of Theorem 4.3.22

The proof of this theorem is very similar to the one given for the Theorem 4.3

section 4.6.1. We only note that in the first step we prove the following ineq
P((m',5')|(m,s)) x log(P((m/,5')|(m,s))) <

E P(e, (m, a')\(m, s)) log(payoff((m,s), (m', s'))P((m', s')\(m, s)), (4.63)
e££((m',s'),{m,s))

In the second step we show that for a pair (m,s) £ M x S with P(m,s) > 0,
log(Pf£(m, s)) > H((M, S)\E, (m, s)) - H((M, S)\(m,s)). (4.64)

To prove the theorem we use (4.29) and Jensen's inequality for f(x) = — log(a;
that
log(Pf£) = log(E P(m,s)Pf(m,s))> 5^ P(m,s)\og(Pf(m,s)). (4.65)
(m,s)

(m,s)

Multiplying both parts of (4.64) on P(m, s) and summing over all pairs (m, s)
E P(m, s) \og(Pf(m, s)) > E P(m, s) x (P(M|P, (m, s))
m

(m,s)

-

is

H(M,S\(m,s))).

Then using (4.65) we get
MPf) > 52P(m,s)(H(M\E,(m,s))-H(M\(m,s)))
{m,s)

=

P(M|P,(M,5))-P(M|M,5).

(4.66)

The last inequality (4.66) shows the first statement of the theorem. We have
log(Pf) > P(M|P, (M, S)) - H(M\M, S)

and equaltity is obtained if and only if equality is attained in the inequalit
(4.65) used in the proof.
Thus, equality holds in (4.66) if and only if the following conditions are satisfied for
any pair (m,s) £ M x S with P(m,s) > 0:
1. Pxc = payoff((m,s),m') = const
2. Conditional probability P(m'\e,(m,s)) is constant for all e £ £(m',(m,s)).
D
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4.6.5
Proof of Theorem 4.3.26
The proof of this theorem is similar to the one provided for Theorem 4.3.6.
Consider the encoding matrix D.

W e substitute a row, labeled by e; £ £, with a

block of k(k - 1) rows labeled by, (ej,..., e ^ - 1 ) ) such that e{(s) £ M(e{) and the array
obtained by restricting e\ to M(e{) is a OPi(2, k, k) on the set of k source states <S. This
results in a new A-code with k(k — 1)E encoding rules.
Let the communicants' strategy be defined by %' = (TT\, ..., ir^'1^,..., -Kk^k~^) and
•K\ = -Ki/(k(k — 1)). Let A and A 1 denote the incidence matrices of the original code and
the new code respectively. Then we can show that
payoff1((m,s),(m',3')) = payoff (m, m')/k.
Hence using the above equality and (4.29) we have
Pf(Ax) = EP(m?5)max(payoff(m,m,)) = Tm,s

m

'

k

D
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